





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

1248

TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

OF AMERICA

1884-5.

VOLUME I.

PUBLISHED BY THE ASSOCIATION.

324091
2. 36.
4.

BALTIMORE:

1886.

PB

6

M6

v.1

TRANSACTIONS
OF THE
Modern Language Association of America
1884-5.

I.—*Richter's Correspondence with a Lady. Some unpublished Letters.*

By FRANKLIN CARTER, PH. D., LL. D.

PRESIDENT OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE, WILLIAMSTOWN, MASS.

IN 1796, Richter was living at Hof, in the house with his mother. He sat at his writing-desk in the same room where she was busy with household occupations and composed his humorous, pathetic, and grotesque sentences to the music of the broom, the dish-pan, and the spinning-wheel. Those harmonies were quite unlike the music to which Goethe listened, according to the story in his letters to Frau von Stein as he developed the 'Iphigenie,' quite unlike the music under whose inspiration Schiller essayed to rewrite the Fiesko at Oggersheim, of which Streicher tells us in the naïve narrative of Schiller's flight. Richter was fully as sensitive to harmony as either Goethe or Schiller, and his improvisations on the piano became afterwards one source of his personal power over refined minds. But there was so great a capacity for higher music within him, that he was sometimes able to forget the discordant noises about him, and many of these higher notes which he struck are so pure and sweet that his critics are apt to overlook the disadvantages of his surroundings. That he himself in some moods keenly felt these limitations is plain enough from his writings. Even the household noises could not always be ignored, and were plainly now and then no inconsiderable disturbance to that serenity of mind necessary for the flight of his imagination. In 'Siebenkäs,' which is, as a whole, a pathetic account of his household relations, the fifth chapter containing the recital of Siebenkäs' efforts to adjust the domestic noises to his mental moods gives a clear insight into the difficulties under which Richter wrote the 'Quintus Fixlein' and the 'Siebenkäs.'

"If it is feasible for thee, Lenette, make to-day no special racket: such a noise almost stops me, as I sit here and work for the press.' 'I thought thou couldst scarcely hear me, I go so softly,' she replied."

"In general, since I am now working mornings for bread, it will be well, if thou, during my literary occupations, wilt do none but the most indispensable things.'

"Dearest! the hell-torment is indeed the same, as soon as I hear the noise. Yes, scatter the wretched sweepings with peacocks' tails and holy-water-sprinklings beneath the bedstead; blow them with a pair of bellows down behind the pot! I and my book in here suffer for it and are inevitably crippled.'

Such expressions are the echoes of words, if not the very words, used to his mother, as Richter sat by his desk and wrote for bread. But the noises were a small part of the causes that made his life trying. A very ideal nature, aristocratic by instinct, and longing for lofty companionship, and sensitive to the slightest impression, he lived in poverty, with prosaic souls, and suffered from misadjustments at every turn.

The 'Hesperus,' published in 1794, had in truth established a title to fame, but it had not much bettered his surroundings, though his literary success was to give him at last the entrée to cultured society, and greatly to enlarge his acquaintance with the various circles of human life.

It was on the fifteenth of February, 1796, that Frau von Kalb wrote to Richter for the first time. His books had so won the admiration of this gifted woman that she could address him in terms of enthusiastic friendliness. From that letter dated the long series of letters and interviews in which was played with Richter in more passionate words, if possible, much the same tragedy as she had previously played with Schiller, and then, on a less exalted key, with Hölderlin. A darker tragedy than these episodes was her life as a whole. She who had been the companion and favorite of princes and men of genius, a woman whose intellectual power and brilliancy had made a profound impression on Schiller and Richter, after having lost both son and husband by suicide, after having seen all her property vanish, undertook to support herself by the sale of lace, tea, and miscellaneous articles, and becoming blind in 1820, lived on the charity of a friend until her death in 1843. The correspondence between Richter and Frau von Kalb was published by Ernst

Förster, 1863, in the 'Memoirs of the Life of Jean Paul Friedrich Richter,' issued in honor of the hundredth anniversary of his birth.

Late in March of the same year, in which Frau von Kalb first wrote to Richter, there came to him a letter from another attractive woman, expressing admiration for his genius and asking for an exchange of friendship. These two first letters of homage from cultured women, coming so nearly together and opening to Richter the prospect of admission into the best circle of German society, must have been to him very precious. As we recall his imaginative temperament, the abnormal character of the depression excited in his mind by his previous exclusion from such an atmosphere as that to which these letters invited him, his glowing exaltations of love and friendship, and his previous disappointments in love, we may conjecture that these two letters, like two tropical vines, transformed the dismal cottage that was his dwelling into an orchid-house, and in his thoughts hid the dingy walls behind fantastic, but brilliantly-colored blossoms of hope.

From whom came the second letter? It came from Frau Kropf, the wife of a military man, a woman unknown to literature, as compared with Frau von Kalb, or several others in Richter's circle of lady friends. Frau Kropf was an acquaintance of Ahlefeldt, Richter's Berlin friend, and by him had been described to Richter, as answering in character to the Clotilde in 'Hesperus.' Her residence was temporarily at least in Baireuth. Richter's reply to the first letter of Frau Kropf is given in part in 'Truth from Jean Paul's Life,' vol. 5, p. 29, and is worth translating as showing the delight with which her letter was received. Its first sentence is much the same as the first in his reply to Frau von Kalb's earliest letter.

HOF, April 16th, 1796.

"It costs you only two pages to make a reader happy, while an author can scarcely accomplish that with four hundred. I will express to my friend my thanks for the opportunity, which I must ascribe to him in part, that I may offer to you these present thanks. Before enthusiasm invents great beauties, they must already have been present in order to awaken the enthusiasm.¹ The charm of a

¹This sentence refers to a passage in Frau Kropf's letters to Richter in which she says, evidently alluding to Ahlefeldt's praise of her: "I earnestly entreat you to count on nothing which you have perhaps heard through our friend of this Baireuth Clotilde. He has certainly given to my figure the coloring of love, which beautifies everything physically and morally."

beautiful, womanly soul is, when the setting gleams as much as the jewel, all potent. It throws its beams through a beautiful envelope which like vases of Volterra alabaster soften the lustre to render it more charming. May fate in the raw, northern weather of life give to the soft and tender blossoms of every fair soul a mild sun and a sheltering defence!"

Naturally, Richter received a reply to this note, and the correspondence was continued for a while with ardor on both sides. Richter visited Baireuth the same summer, was delighted with Frau Kropf and her reception of him, and her character gave certain features to the Natalie in 'Siebenkäs,' only part of which had already been written. That the final turn in the story, whereby Siebenkäs marries Natalie, took form from fancies that flitted through Richter's mind as to possible relations with Frau Kropf is probable. A little volume of hitherto unpublished letters, probably nearly all those which Richter wrote to Frau Kropf, came into my possession in manuscript in Berlin in 1864. When first obtained, I did not know to whom they were addressed. A sentence in the letter dated 'Hof, June 30th, 1797,' would lead one to suspect that the lady's name was Kropf. "By the way," the sentence runs, "what a fair trinity of three persons in one godhead of friendship I have that in each case begins with K: Kropf, Kalb, Krüdener!" Naturally the person to whom he writes would be the first one mentioned. The proof that these letters are addressed to Frau Kropf is conclusive. It is plain from the letters themselves that the lady to whom they are addressed, lived in Baireuth part of the time at least, and in 'Jean Paul's correspondence with Otto,' vol. 5, p. 319, is found a letter dated Baireuth, May 15th, 1796, in which Richter gives an account of a visit to a lady, said in a note at the bottom of the page to be Frau Generalin K**pf.¹ That the lady here alluded to is the person to whom these unpublished letters are addressed is made clear by the coincidence of a statement in this same letter to Otto from Baireuth, May 15th, 1796, with statements in number three of our series, also written at Baireuth, but the day before, May 14th. The former says: "Saturday early my first move after my arrival was for a pen in order to invite myself to her presence at five o'clock." The latter states:

¹Both in 'Jean Paul's correspondence with Otto' and 'Truth from Jean Paul's Life,' the names of many of Richter's correspondents and friends are intimated rather than given. Both books were published while some of the actors were still living, and apparently from deference to their possible sensitiveness the names were not fully stated.

"The first thing which I desired was a pen to announce to you, gracious lady." A little later in the letter: "at last, at last, at five this evening I may begin my ascension holidays and see you." That the lady visited in Baireuth, and to whom these letters are addressed, was Frau Kropf, and that the omitted letters in the name given in the note in 'Truth from Jean Paul's Life,' p. 319, are *ro* becomes now certain from the assertion of Richter in a letter to Oertel, dated Hof, December 1st, 1796, and published in Ernst Förster's 'Memoirs,' vol. I, part 2, p. 344. "Besides thee and Müller I have no one to write to except Matzdorf, Herder, Wernlein, Emanuel, Lübeck, Ellerdt, Frau Kalb, Frau Herder, Frau Schukman, *Frau Kropf*, Frau Krüdener." This list, comprising all of Richter's principal correspondents, furnishes only the name Kropf to complete the partial name in the above-mentioned note, and to make the probability suggested by the sentence about "The trinity in one godhead of friendship that in each case begins with K ; Kropf, Kalb, Krüdener," a certainty. The question whether a part of these letters may not be addressed to Frau Kropf, and the rest to some other person or persons, must be answered in the negative. They have a connecting thread running through all. That thread is the friendship of both Richter and Frau Kropf for Ahlefeldt.

The slight allusions to Frau Kropf in the biographies and the longer intervals that elapse between Richter's letters, as the first impressions made by the lady are forgotten, make it plain that she did not long occupy an important place in his thoughts. But she is worth remembering, as having for a time, at least, received the attentions of the great child-man, as having helped inspire him by her homage in hours of loneliness with fresh courage and the hope of wider relations with cultured society, and as having given form to one of his most elevated characters. His letters embalm her kindness and nature in the most beautiful way, and are themselves not merely a monument to her appreciation of him, but give fresh proof of his simplicity and goodness of heart, as well as of his delicacy and subtlety of expression.

The letters are written on the ordinary, heavy, unruled paper of that period, on pages of duodecimo size, the early ones with care, but the later more hurriedly. When I first began to study the little volume containing these manuscript letters, it seemed to me that the letter at the end of the volume, part of which is

lost, must belong nearer the opening of the correspondence. I thus expressed this opinion: 'There is in this little collection a part of one letter which, though bound with the others as the last, seems to me to belong by its contents, with those written previous to any personal meeting between Frau Kropf and Richter, and to relate mainly to Ahlefeldt and to his passionate admiration for Frau Kropf. The full, and a little stately signature, 'J. P. F. Richter,' seems to me also to indicate the earlier period, as in the later letters 'Richter' is sometimes the entire signature, while in some of them the 'Jean Paul' is fully written, and in two or three represents the whole of the name. More than this, the regular handwriting and request for indulgence on account of haste, appear to show that the letter belongs to a period of less familiar acquaintance, and suggest that when the descendant of the family of the receiver parted with these precious documents, not knowing where this undated part of a letter belonged, he or she naturally appended it to the rest.' Further study has proved the correctness of this conjecture, as this letter turns out to be the only one in the collection hitherto published. It is to be found in 'Truth from Jean Paul's Life,' vol. 5, p. 98, and is dated April 24th, 1796. In the six volumes of the 'Truth' which Otto and Förster edited, the letters are often abridged, and that part of this printed letter corresponding to what is in the manuscript is no exception to the rule. As, however, the printed letter contains three times as much as the part corresponding to the four pages of manuscript, it is plain that the letter was a long one, and as it relates mainly to Ahlefeldt's love for Frau Kropf, the surmise arises that Frau Kropf's first letter to Richter may have been in part inspired by the hope that he would have an influence in controlling Ahlefeldt's passion for her,—a wife and mother. The letter, although a large part of it has hitherto been published, may well be inserted here, as it is introductory to the others. Two-thirds of it are of course in Otto and Förster's revision; the last third is taken directly from the original copy.

HOF, April 24th, 1796.

"The blue heaven which now so unexpectedly begins the spring around us is in your letter. I was at once rendered proud and touched by the lofty frankness of your soul.¹ Our friendship is older

¹ In one of Richter's letters to Otto, he thus alludes to the epistle to which the above is apparently the reply: "At the letter of a wife I have been astonished. I have in the world the peculiar fate from Baireuth on to Leipzig and Berlin that, stand where I may, I always stand between two lovers as the *third man* with a beautiful, shining bald-head."

than our acquaintance, and as old as our similarity.—— Such a brightness as burns in you is not extinguished by the ink or breath of a third party, and such a mood will make no change in anything, (least of all in its object,) except in its intensity. Ah, if you tear out of * * *'s heart that lies between the double pressure of fancy and reality, the fair picture which still holds it together, it will certainly break. Thorny life will then have nothing more for him except wounds, and he would necessarily die of these. Such an affection is good, so long as the one party asks no return, and the other grants none. The later is in the condition of the sun which cannot help it, when it is worshiped, instead of being admired. His enthusiasm must be simply moderated to such a degree, that it will hereafter give pleasure and not pain.—— Instead of a sun you must be a moon: the former extracts the color from his flowers: his heart closes if a cloud passes over his sun. But the absence of the moon we bear, more calmly, and when it finally appears, it brings a quiet light without heat, fair fancies and remembrances at the same time. And this happy moderation of his affection he must receive from your hand, as it presents to him the gift of your letters in a different way. For instance, the previous waiting with longing from post-day to post-day has excited his fancy and doubled his torment and his affection. If you, however, would make the fixed condition, that you would certainly write to him after an interval of four or six weeks, the former (that is the torment) would fall away. You could gradually extend the intervals between the letters. Also this will assuage his ardor, if you do not combat him in your letters—if you always communicate to him pleasant events—if you do not speak in your letters of any distress. And may fate take from you the very material for suffering! Can you not ask of him some long literary work which would give scope to his head, but which would not touch too closely the sore places in his heart? Truly, if he should come again to Baireuth, there would be scarcely any remedy except two trifling ones, which, however, our sex can use more easily than yours: first, not to be serious for a moment; and second, always to be without witnesses. One loves a person more strongly when the restraint of visiting friends binds the tongue; therefore, young husbands love their brides during the honey-moon more ardently, when they are with them in foreign places and in the presence of witnesses. In short, your letters are his prescriptions. One from me to him must first get its healing power from your hand. When I shall have had the bliss-month's joy of having spoken to you, then I shall have more ability than now, since he does not even presuppose my acquaintance with his situation, to represent to him that he makes unhappy, while he is so, and that he robs the innocent heart which he adores of everything which he takes from his own. Forgive in my letter the traces of its haste: I did not wish to keep his longer. My candor you will not forgive, but approve: it was the only way to be worthy of your own. I beg you earnestly to rob me of a great deal of time, since you give me something which

one often loses by having time, viz.: joy and the sweet contemplation of a beautiful soul. May it often appear to

Its revering friend,

J. P. F. RICHTER."

The first complete and hitherto unpublished letter bears the date of April 29th, 1796. He speaks in this of finishing "a letter to our friend," and as it is plainly Ahlefeldt, whose passionate admiration for Frau Kropf is discussed in the letter just given, it must have been Ahlefeldt to whom Richter has reference as 'our friend.' Accordingly the letter to A * * * * given in vol. 5, 'Truth from Jean Paul's Life,' and dated 29th, must be the one which Richter had just finished. In this letter he advises Ahlefeldt quite in the strain of the last part of the letter to Frau Kropf, dated April 24th.

"All thy tears must become hers; all thy dark hours must pass as clouds over her soul. —— I wish rather to perish than see others perish: thou dost cause the goddess herself to bleed on the sacrificial altar. Love without desiring! that is just the misfortune, that she makes such a difference between love and friendship, as though one could love something different, or higher, or more beautiful than the soul. —— Love her as virtue that assumes no-body. The first kiss ends love. The most beautiful, ethereal flame burns out on the earthly altar. Think of her, but see her not: then thou wilt love. If thou shouldest then find her beneath fairer suns than our only one, then thou mightest extend thine arms and say: 'Come to my heart! I have deserved thee: for I have imitated thee: I have loved thee as purely in the first world, as if thou wast in the second.' I am, attached to thee by double chains of flowers,

Thy friend,

RICHTER."

The following letter begun 'with the same drop' of ink, says Richter, as the close of the preceding, is the first in the hitherto unpublished series.

LETTER No. 1.

HOF IN VOIGTLAND, April 29, 1796.

"I am writing to my dearest lady-friend with the same drop with which I finish the letter to our friend. I enclose it that you may point out to me the mistakes (and that I may remove them) into which the double fire of a double friendship has perhaps misled me. His letter is not yet in the ashes: it would have pained me too much [to destroy it]: I await now either the repetition of your command or its abrogation. As long as I live, all letters are as safe with me,

as if they were still lying in your soul, and if I die, they are still safer in the hand of my friend than in my own. His leaves, which like the yellow falling leaves of autumn have left my breast as full as they have left my eye, I gather up simply for the fair soul, which perhaps after many years will again desire them. I wish I could send him my three leaves with the fair escort with which they return* to me. My entire soul is open to yours, and far more, than I have previously ventured to lay it open before that of any woman whom I have seen. Your heart be your reward, if it speaks to me oftener than I can answer aloud. You can never give me too many letters—simply I—

I journey the tenth or seventeenth of May to Weimar and Leipzig! therefore, I beg you, when I announce to you my return, to write me the date of your departure, in order that I may let my blissful flight to Baireuth fall in the time of your presence. I have no wings as long as yours are in motion.

I am, with daily increasing reverence,
Your warmest friend,
RICHTER."

P. S.—Pardon the haste of the writing in my letter.

P. P. S.—To win his heart, I would have to imitate it and draw him over to the side of *cool* reason by the means of a warm discourse.

LETTER No. 2.

Hof, May 9th, Evening, 7 o'clock, '96.

"In great haste.—May earthly tempests ever pass as swiftly and lightly over the life-way of my newest and dearest lady-friend, as the present storm has passed over the 9th of May! Your friendship, gracious lady, would indeed compel a less lively enthusiasm than I possess for every fair and responsive soul to forget all in order to remember one single thing, viz.: your kind intentions. Just now the clouds move more calmly, and the barometer is rising, and I have the hope that Heaven as well as yourself will give me permission Thursday—probably in the 'Golden Eagle' for which I shall exchange my ordinary stopping-place the 'Sun'—to arrive in Baireuth, and in the afternoon at five o'clock to draw near the fair heart that has compelled my reverence for it to increase with each new letter and which, if I appear, will have the following to pardon—my personality which has been rendered misshapen and decrepit by my circumstances and my exertions behind the writing-table, and my pronunciation. But may my heart full of love for all men and full of friendship for the best bring me into harmony with the lady friend who belongs among the latter! If all my weather-prophecies fail, even then I hope in this or Ascension-week to repeat to you with a harsh voice, but with an enduring feeling, how truly I am and remain of an indulgent lady-friend, the revering friend,

RICHTER."

On the top of the last page of this letter is written, but so that it can be read only by inverting the sheet, the following postscript:

"If everything is turned upside down, as this letter is, and all my wishes are disappointed, then I shall not come to Baireuth sooner than two days after your departure."

Richter visited Baireuth according to the purpose expressed in the above letter, arriving there May 14th, Saturday, instead of Thursday, as he had planned, which fact explains the allusion to being 'a liar' in the first sentence of the following letter. On the appointed day, Thursday, Frau Kropf had driven to the village of Berneck to meet him, but as the weather had delayed his departure from Hof, she was obliged to return without him. Furthermore, from habit probably he stopped, as he had previously, at the 'Sun,' not, as he had planned, at the 'Golden Eagle.'

LETTER No. 3.

BAIREUTH, AT THE 'SUN,' May 14, '96.

"The first thing which I desired in Baireuth was a pen in order to announce to you, gracious lady, that the weather has made me a liar only one single time, and that on Thursday. May so many flowers and blossoms and hopes have flitted about the dreams of your morning sleep to-day, as surrounded my waking reveries on the way, where I constantly had the fair perspective of your neighborhood and of this little note.¹ If you do not answer the latter, I shall make the selfish explanation that I at last, at last, at five o'clock this evening may begin my Ascension holidays and see you. Since to-day is Saturday, when absolution and forgiveness is proclaimed in all the churches, you have opportunity enough to make your room a temple, and your chair a confessional, and to pardon with the indulgence of friendship poor Jean Paul for the many sins which you will not hear, but see. I have the happiness to be in the midst of spring, and only a quarter of an hour from you, full of hope, full of joy, full of expectation.

Your most fervently revering friend,

J. P. F. RICHTER."

In this letter, as in the previous, one sees the apprehension which the sensitive idealist has in regard to his appearance, (now that it is imminent,) in more cultured society than he had familiarly known. He fears that the effect of his person and conversation may be so different from that of his writings as to obscure the impression produced by the former. His fears seem

¹ The announcement of his arrival.

to have been quite groundless, though we have no such direct testimony to the pleasure which Richter's society gave Frau Kropf, as we have in regard to the impression she made upon him. In 'Jean Paul's Correspondence with Otto,' vol. I, p. 319, Richter gives an account of the first interview in a letter written the following day :

"With reference to the fair Clotilde: everything is delightful and thus : She drove Thursday to Berneck to meet me and, since nothing came of it, sent me a letter that still lies in * * * unopened. Saturday early my first move after my arrival was for a pen in order to invite myself to an interview with her at five o'clock : she sent immediately by the messenger a note in which she turned back my hour hand by the space of two hours : 'we will both drive at three o'clock through the Hermitage ;' I trotted then into the lower story of the Reitzenstein house and advanced through two beautiful rooms into a third, where she sat by the side of two nightingales, and near the half-draped window which was also overhung with flowers. I say to thee, could I once describe her, thou wouldest have an entirely new woman-character in thy head or even in thy heart: she has a majestic height—nearly equal to mine—is twenty-seven years old—has neither a curved, nor a straight, but an irregular nose—a half vanished reflexion of the dawn upon her face, and nothing but beauties there, (though the outline deviates a little from the perfect, womanly oval)—the finest, noble, Berlin pronunciation."

Frau Kropf talked with Richter in this interview, as was natural, largely of his books. He dined with her after the drive, as he did also the following day, and Monday wrote again to Otto, giving further impressions of his new friends.

"I bring back every evening a double respect for her," he says, "she lives in the greatest style and often gives dinners of from twenty to sixty guests. Her husband is a good-natured Pommeranian. She says her married life is not one of love, but that she is happy in her esteem for her husband. —— To-day she is in Culmbach, and thus my golden chain is filed apart, but to-morrow I shall hasten to her again with a part of it dragging behind me. At her house all the furniture is newer and more beautiful than I have ever seen : even her two nightingales mingle notes with hers, when she sings, which are enough to make the heart leap from the breast. —— If I come here again, thou must come with me to see her, because she wishes it. Here thou canst bathe thyself in all the warm fountain of spring, and everything blooms with the exception of myself."

¹ As Ahlefeldt had thus named Frau Kropf to Richter after a leading character in the 'Hesperus,' doubtless Richter had already mentioned to Otto this double compliment to himself and Frau Kropf.

Richter returned to Hof, and the following is the letter in which he at once sends back his greetings to the Kropfs.

LETTER No. 4.

HOF, May 18th, '96.

"I have scarcely become warm here, I should rather say cold, and will speak with no one except the dear lady friend whom I have left. I was landed or rather stranded¹ here about three o'clock this afternoon. The fair Eden-heaven over me was intended perhaps to compensate me for the fairer one from which I had fallen: but it simply reminded me of it. I have often been in Baireuth and am always happy there, but I was most happy the last time. My separation from you would have been as bitter for me as my buck-bean,² without, however, being so sanative, but the drop³ of lime-blossom honey, which was added to it, made the last moment the most beautiful. Thus the dessert of confectionery ends the series of dishes and thus the year gives us, when it has handed us all sweetness and berries, at the very end the intoxicating wine. I made the heavenly way homeward still more beautiful and touching by reproducing in colors the affecting scenes I had witnessed, as I once more placed among my mind's pictures the face of your Henry disfigured by the sorrow of repentance, and once more noted the unspeakably tender and yet equally firm and commanding mother resting with kisses on the head of her bowed favorite. Ah, how beautiful is a mother and such a son! I know you draw him now, if you can reach him, to your gentle heart, and I too would like to clasp him to my own.

I fear I imitated Frau Schukman and did not contradict her with sufficient mildness and kept too closely veiled the respect which she deserves for her intelligence in spite of her vain misuse of the same. Should she attempt from a pretty just feeling of revenge to act in society the part of an adversary and endeavor to form an opposition-party, I should flee to you as to my patron-saint, my protectress, and should ask you for nothing except three words, which would be kind, albeit not deserved by me, and from which hostile arrows would rebound.

Before I go to Weimar, I shall write once more: moreover, I would also answer your letters from Weimar, as they are to be forwarded to me. Now every line is dearer to me, since I see the fair hand before me and the beautiful eye which were occupied in writing, and I

¹ It is almost impossible to render into English the half-pun in the words ankommen und anlaufen.

² Apparently a medicine which Richter had taken, in which the main ingredient was the Menyanthes trifoliata—a variety of gentian.

³ Does Richter refer to a parting kiss, and if so, is the moon-light scene in 'Siebenkä's,' chap. xiv, where Firmian parts from Natalie, a reminiscence of this parting? A translation of 'Siebenkä's' was published in Boston, one volume in 1863, and the second in 1865. The full title is 'Flower, Fruit, and Thornpieces; or the Married Life, Death, and Wedding of the Advocate of the Poor, Firmian Stanislaus Siebenkä's.'

would not lose either half of the picture. Our three soul-evenings will yet many a time fill my breast with longing. I shall always henceforth see hovering before me your gentle, imposing, lovely form. I shall think with a sigh how much you deserve, how much you patiently endure and how little life brings you.¹ May you pardon me my mistakes which were almost the only response for your beautiful gifts! May every raincloud of your life be transformed into a rainbow! May my most honored lady-friend ever be as happy as are those who surround her! And among these belongs, although it was but for three days,

Her most cordial friend,

RICHTER."

At the side of the eighth or last page of this letter is the following postscript:

"All greetings with which thankfulness and high esteem can be expressed, my heart here offers to your dear husband."

At the bottom of the second page of the letter running over also upon the foot of the third and fourth is the following second postscript:

"May 19th. Second postscript. (The first is farther on.) I have just read again, that is to say, enjoyed again, your first letter and your two Baireuth notes, and have now, besides my delight over them, only the apprehension that the approach to the sun which I, as an author, have attained, I, as a man, may forfeit. Oh, dearest lady-friend, now you will continue to maintain this name, or it were better that you had never assumed it. It will, however, be as hard to do without you, as it was to find you."

LETTER No. 5.

HOF, May 23d, '96.

"In greatest haste.—Here, best lady-friend, you have the first-shoots of my poor fancy: I desired by the quantity to compensate for the quality. I am more unskillful at nothing in the world (dancing excepted) than at such fine games. I fear my conceits are even more stupid than I myself. You have, however, stretched out over me so potent and beautiful a sceptre that I could perform for you not merely the most praiseworthy, but also the oddest movements. I wrote to you the last time before I had seen my Otto; he is able therefore for the first time to-day to respond to the sweetness of your melodious heart with the echo of his own, and to thank you for your interest even in unseen friends. I shall start for Weimar the 30th in the afternoon. You will put on the letter simply my name and the words, "to be delivered at Frau von Kalb's, by birth a von Marschalk." I

¹ An evident allusion to her 'married life without love.'

hope to write to you once more [before I go.] The A.¹ letter was to me an open heaven-door into the Eden of a virtuous soul. To yours may fate give in the short night of life beautiful, bright stars and the nocturnal, sweet-scented rockets!

Your most fervent friend,
RICHTER."

LETTER No. 6.

HOF, HOF, HOF, June 2d, 1796.

"Yes, dearest lady-friend, I am still nesting here, because I, as a weather-Daniel, would not journey directly into the face of the gusts of rain. Day after to-morrow, however, I shall finally lift up my duck-wings.

Day before yesterday you sent a twinge of joy through my heart, in that a carriage with a veiled lady drove by which was fine enough for me to regard as yours. I know not whether the veiled lady would by her beauty also have justified my mistake. Ah, why was it not you? Never does the friendship which one has given to a dear person in a strange place take larger dimensions, than when one finds this person in one's own region. Is there then no other Silesian lady-friend,² for whom you will protract the fair hours even to Hof, in order to let mine begin here. In general one likes to see lady-friends in expressions of affection with lady-friends, with children, with brothers and sisters. Love is so becoming to your sex! Ah, I would have been glad unseen to see you and your Eliza in the intoxicated hours of warmest love.

Since I shall have scarcely more than time for two things in Weimar, namely, for arriving and departing, you will probably receive my next letter from this inkstand. But may your epistle or epistles breathe upon me there, as zephyrs from your flowers! Advise me rather to forget than to remember. I shall perhaps be again with you sooner than A. will.

Every new letter rounds out more beautifully his noble apostle's head in my fancy. If the last one was not open, command me to send it to you.

Before you read the 'Mummies,' read the 'Biographical Diversions,' then the 'Flowerpieces,' and finally the 'Mummies.' Live happy, dearest one! May the heaven above you and the one in your heart never have more clouds than you need just for a beautiful, cool shade!

Your RICHTER."

P. S.—The 19th of June, I shall probably be again at my writing-desk, and will answer your letters.

¹ Evidently Ahlefeldt again.

² An apparent allusion to some previous incident in Frau Kropf's life.

LETTER No. 7.

HOF, July 22d, '96.

“Finally, unforgotten and not-to-be-forgotten lady-friend, I am again by your sewing-table. Three long weeks fate dipped (if I may speak so oddly) my head now in the dawn, now in the evening twilight, now in the cups of flowers, now in rainbows and quite sated me—that is, I have been three weeks in Weimar. But I should have to write just that length of time, if I wished to complete for you a history of the journey and of the stay. Orally I shall need less time and shall enjoy a greater reward, since I can then not merely talk to you, but also look at you. My Weimar history is that of a butterfly: a life on flower-leaves, not on leaves of paper. I was, and drank, and ate, and stayed, and enjoyed with all the great people in Weimar and with all the beautiful: from the duchess-mother and from Herder and Goethe on through all the women and men of double nobility, viz.: that of culture being included. Since all had read my books and expected me, the loving reception surpassed not only my merits, but also my hopes. In brief, all days were such, and I wonder that I did not fall in love, as I did when near you, from eight o'clock until eleven.

Out of this Tempe-vale I returned here to a mountain of affairs! I had because of the new acquaintances, not merely new letters, but also new literary work to do. I have therefore as yet written to none of my old acquaintances except you: excuse my silence to Ahlefeldt, unless you are imitating it. I would rather I had in my left hand his and could thus go to Baireuth and take yours in my right.

My journey has taken from me many prejudices and errors, and in their place given me the hope of leaving Hof, especially for occasional periods. For your description of your journey, for which I, alas, requite you with nothing, my heart thanks you. In this description your heart, artless, sympathetic, firm, and beautiful, throws its own warmth into every foreign element. May fate bring you, dear one, restored and happy back! Your arrival will hasten my visit to Baireuth. For yours in Hof I no longer hope, though my wish were that you needed something from the nearest market, and would buy it yourself, though it were nothing but wishes from me for you. Let not your soul and your writing-pen forget, Your friend,

RICHTER.”

The climax in the correspondence appears now to be passed. Perhaps the passionate words of Frau von Kalb and the intoxicating delights of that first visit to Weimar, made in response to her urgent invitations, have obscured a little the impressions of Richter's visit to Baireuth. The letters hereafter are friendly, but less fervent. In the following letter both Frau Kropf and

Ahlefeldt are addressed. Without doubt Ahlefeldt is visiting in Baireuth, and it is natural to address them conjointly, but the device of a double letter may have had some significance. At all events from this time there are longer intervals of silence.

LETTER No. 8.

HOF, September 13th, 1796.

"Beloved lady-friend and beloved friend—Leave a place in the melodious double-chorus of your friendship for my weak voice too! I write to you both at once to ask you both not so much to forgive my silence, as to interpret it. Just because I am complained of by so many correspondents at the same time, in the number of the complaints lies the answer to each one. A new, lengthy work has swallowed me and my powers up, scarcely can I now look out with my head from the crater of my volcano. I will however fly out and in a few weeks hasten to Baireuth to two so dearly loved souls.

Thou, my Ahlefeldt, hast some excuse for thy silent passing through Hof in thy goal,¹ and in the midnight. It is indeed easier to visit me when going to Berlin than on the way to Baireuth.

You, honored Minona, must not longer withhold from me the glad sight of your words. Oh! I love and esteem them so much. Otto was never private-tutor at court; he lives here as a private gentleman, without office, simply for his family, the muses, and the sciences; his eldest brother is a practising lawyer; his youngest, a merchant.

May you both live happy in an elevated spiritual harmony, in whose strains I, as a third voice would like soon to join. Live happy!

JEAN PAUL FR. RICHTER."

There is now apparently a longer break than the last one in the last correspondence. The next document is a postscript dated February 3d, 1797. We are left to infer that whoever collected these letters did not find the one which this postscript was intended to accompany. Possibly a letter or two between September, 1796, and February, 1797, are also lost, but the probability is against this supposition, as there is an allusion in the last line of the postscript to silence on the part of Frau Kropf.

Postscript to a probable lost LETTER No. 9.

February 3d, 1797.

"While after finishing your letter, I was closing one to Ahlefeldt, whose pardon too I have to ask for a long silence, accident sent me a chance for a postscript. I have now to make of you besides the previous request for forgiveness a second for assistance. It concerns

¹ That is because going to Baireuth to visit Frau Kropf.

the poor bearer¹ of these sheets. I have applied as an intercessor for this deserted one to the Lieutenant-Colonel,² and I beg you, which will be still better, to become for her a lady-intercessor. The deceived Julia Ann (her name is more romantic and finer than her fate) was led astray by a soldier. He took from her innocence and hope, and left her nothing except poverty and—his child. As he now intends to marry another, she asks of the judicial authorities simply his assistance for the maintenance of her child. The remaining and longer part of this story you can learn from my letter to your husband. So our sex never sheds any tears, except by proxy, and deserves to be called the harder, rather than the stronger, and the other sex should be called the tenderer, instead of the fairer. I say nothing more about this; the justice of your husband and your gentle, loving heart will need, in place of entreaty, nothing but the knowledge of the circumstances which deserve the help of you both. Farewell, farewell! and put an end to my punishment which is your silence!"

LETTER No. 10.

HOF, February 25th, 1797.

"Since I am always painting for people only Clotildes and Adelines, who live in my books, but not in houses, they are so much the more curious, when I paint for them something beautiful to whose original I can lead them. In this condition is the merchant Jerold, who will deliver this sheet to you, dearest lady-friend, in order to have the pleasure of seeing her whose portrait I have often painted for him. His knowledge and his behaviour will easily prove to you that he gets nothing from his calling, except the profits: indeed, his wish to convey something to you is not mercantile, although it is as selfish as my wishes are, when I am with you. To-morrow the receipts required of Julia Ann will arrive, and I thank the Lieutenant-Colonel very much for this fine beginning of assistance. May heaven grant that your silence owes its origin to a more trifling cause than illness would be, and that not the physician, but diversion, forbids your writing. Farewell, dearest lady-friend!"

JEAN PAUL."

LETTER No. 11.

HOF, March 24th, '97.

"The bearer, dearest lady-friend, is my protégée whom I protect by recommending her to your charity and to the love of justice in your husband. Her need detracts nothing from her neatness, and while others neglect dress, she secures it at the price of hunger. I shall make to your friendly soul no farther entreaty or intercession for her.

¹"In order that I might save the poor woman the money and fatigue, and keep her child from having a catarrh, I did not after all have her go to Baireuth," is written as a note at the foot of the first page of the letter.

² Probably General Kropf, husband of the lady to whom these letters are addressed.

Mr. Jerold thanked me most warmly for my note of recommendation to you. The commission which you gave him, he will execute again, as the first time it did not turn out as he thinks it ought, to meet your taste and his respect for the same.

I hope in three weeks to be in Baireuth. Then I shall by visits refresh and compensate myself for the loss of all those letters which, alas! by a greater epistolary genius I might have secured from you. Farewell, my not-to-be-forgotten lady-friend and cause by three lines, which you may send me, me too to fare well!

JEAN PAUL FR. RICHTER."

LETTER No. 12.

Hof, June 7th, '97.

" You would be hard on one who is often nothing but mute, unless you had inferred from my silence that I have in truth executed your little commission in regard to the flax-spinning, but without result. The girl lacks not a willingness, but a spinning-wheel for the work: and her poverty forbids her purchasing and learning. I cannot tell you how I now after so long a deprivation long for a little reflection of your hand or rather of your hand-writing—for the paper would not be white enough for the former. This letter is the third—counting in the two before my Baireuth journey—to which you now owe not three lines, but at least three syllables of response.

My most hearty wish is that you—may not be well, in order that a good fate and a bad condition may persuade and bring you to Carlsbad: and in truth simply for this reason I wish it, because I myself am going there this time, although I go in better health than that of most who journey thither: for I have nothing to seek there except, instead of remedies, pleasures, and therefore my soul would have you there. I wish for you—besides health—everything which can comfort, quiet, and delight you. Farewell and write to me soon, angry and beloved lady-friend! JEAN PAUL FR. RICHTER."

P. S.—You will certainly grant me this little space that I may here put down my most friendly greeting and remembrances to Mr. von Wambold. Give him in your letter also such a little space for the play of friendship."

LETTER No. 13.

Hof, June 30th, '97.

“ ‘Gracious lady,’ that is ungracious—in brief it is the opposite of the ‘dear lady-friend.’ You are however certainly mine still, and know how for the silence of a man, whose mode of thinking you have learned both from his pen and his presence, to assign causes which will not deprive me of your fair, benevolent heart. My failing is best excused by its frequency. I wrote once to Frau von Krüdener, when she was in Baireuth: I have not written a second time, though she wrote to me once from Constance, and once from Lausanne. I have

not written to our good friend, Ahlefeldt, since his departure from Baireuth—to dear Frau von Kalb in Weimar I have not written for three months. By the way, what a beautiful trinity of three persons in one godhead of friendship I have, which in each case begins with K—Kropf, Kalb, Krüdener. Properly you owe me a letter, for I wrote the last to you and I have as yet received no answer to it, except the glad minutes and half-day at your house, and the beauties which I saw in your mirror, when I stood by the former behind you and compared the seeing countenance with the one seen.

I wish I could see and hear you scold about me: at least my eyes would gain something, and at last my ears. I cannot say forgive, for you do not belong with the persons against whom one would dare to sin: but I say, conjecture reasons, and be as indulgent toward the unchangeable friend of your heart and mind, as he is full of love for both. Farewell, and be ever as happy as one is when observing the flowers on your embroidery frame, and those of your charms!

JEAN PAUL."

This is the last of the letters. Apparently the episode is nearly over, and as in the case of other of Richter's correspondences the fire probably burnt out, and the friendship became a remembrance. But some of these letters are models of epistolary grace in the original, and there is scarcely one of them that has not at least one charming expression or elegant turn. The already published letters to Frau von Kalb, Frau von Krüdener, Emilie von Berlepsch, Josephine von Sydow, Caroline von Feuchtersleben, and other women may show more fervent and exalted states of mind in Richter, but perhaps none of these correspondences leaves a finer impression of his literary grace and his native goodness than this. All these correspondences and Richter's relations to these various women, suggest that he, like Schiller, was so enthusiastic in theory over every form of friendship and affection as to be often embarrassed in actual life. He was probably oftener embarrassed than Schiller, for his mind and style of writing and his presence had peculiar fascinations for women. It would be agreeable to believe that the gracious advances of Frau von Kalb and Frau Kropf, were in the end only good for him, but the ease with which in interviews he received their personal homage, and the extent of that devotion in one of these cases, and in others, can hardly have failed to suggest to him that he had by nature a certain sort of sovereignty over the female mind. He himself says in one place that he climbs "into the nests of the higher classes only for the sake of

the women, who, as is the case with the birds of prey, are greater than the males"—a not altogether attractive statement. Schleiermacher says of Richter's visit to Berlin in 1800, that "he wishes to see only women, and thinks that even a common woman is, if not exactly a world, at least a continent."

Richter quotes approvingly more than once Franklin's advice that "one should change his beds every night," and in a letter to Frau von Oertel, he adds: "Truly man ought to change everything (except people); especially, besides his shirt, his canes, walks, and above all his cities—I think one ought to live in two cities and move hither and thither between them." He did not confine his changes to things inanimate, and certainly had lady-friends enough to make a frequent change among them possible.

It is something of a satire on his expansive, but exclusive theories of love and friendship to find to how many distinguished women he professed a warm attachment, and wrote letters of the most complimentary and effusive tenderness. Nor were these letters written at different periods of his career only. In the summer of 1796, he made the acquaintance of the three women of culture, whose names begin 'with K,' and wrote many letters to each of these that, to parody his style a little, at least gleam with the moonlight, or sparkle with the starlight of unquenchable affection. Two of these new acquaintances were indeed extraordinary women, and one certainly hoped that the friendship would issue in marriage. Frau von Kalb during that first visit at Weimar in the summer of 1796, constantly exchanged notes with Richter, and after a week expressed herself in a way that throws much light on the tendencies of the age. "For God's sake, show to no other than me thy heart! All who comprehend thee will be willing to die for thee. No, for God's sake not! All the world will have him, by God all the world! No, no, no! they shall not have him, or I will perish: I will first be annihilated, then they can have him."

Nor was she the only one among Jean Paul's adorers that laid a claim, in some sense just, to his affection, and hoped to be united to him for life. In those days it was perhaps no advantage for a woman, either with respect to mental or moral happiness to be the favorite of a great author. If such relations seem to us extravagant and indiscreet, not to say immoral; if the acceptance of the unrestrained homage of many women seems

to darken the picture which Richter's panegyrists have painted of his goodness and nobleness, we should not forget that the 'storm and stress' frenzy lasted longer with most writers than with Goethe and Schiller; that these two for a time stood isolated from their contemporaries by their return to reason; and that their 'Xenien' had a *raison d'être* in the actual movements of the time. If sentimentalism is more native with women than with men; if the literary sentimentalism of that age was intenser and more disintegrating than that of any other age, because it proceeded from profound agitations of the very centers of life; if Richter, whatever else he may have been, was the high-priest of that sentimentalism, then naturally the gifted women of that period melted and wept over his pages; then for some of them he was the 'unique,' the only genius, and their reverent worship, when they came into relations with him, knew no bounds.

On the other hand, Richter's own narrow lot from childhood, his privations and loneliness, his dreams of the fine world of elegance and culture, and his fear that this world would not open its doors to him, were the very worst preparation for this worship. When he found not merely these doors opened, but women of grace and beauty and power offering incense to him, no wonder that he found it grateful—no wonder that he not merely accepted it, but accepted it in some cases in such a way that the worshiper reasonably regarded herself as the peculiarly favored one—no wonder that he became intoxicated and treated these hearts throbbing with love, as though they gave him his due and often used the admirer as a model for some new character. In some instances at least he introduced scenes into his writings from real life in such a way as to awaken the suspicion that the friendship was cherished for literary purposes.

This, however, we may doubt. In Goethe's friendships the sympathetic and critical faculty seemed to be coëxistent and coördinate. If Richter had something of the same combination, he had not the sense of proportion that Goethe had, nor was what he had properly developed. He was a man of extremes. There were indeed two Richters, or rather three. There was the Richter who soared and sang, and the Richter who waddled and cackled. There was also the Richter who stayed at home like a snail within his shell and reflected, and would not exchange the close-fitting, cosy dwelling for all the glories of a sunlit world. It was the Richter that soared and sang who had these

enthusiastic friendships with women, and this Richter was in their society oblivious of all else. As he says in one of our letters of his first visit to Weimar: "fate dipped my head now in the dawn, now in the twilight, now in the cups of flowers, now in rainbows." "My Weimar history is that of a butterfly: a life on flower-leaves." That expresses the conditions with exactness. Let out into the elysian fields of the society of charming women he flitted from flower to flower, gay, happy, careless. One must admit that it was not so well for the flowers, for they were human after all, and regarded themselves as such, and this 'butterfly history,' instead of seeming to them fated or instinctive, appeared like the devotion of the entire man.

If one is disposed to pardon the enthusiasm of the friendly expression in interviews, but to condemn that of the letters as more deliberate, we are yet to remember that in that letter-writing age the 'litera scripta' seemed less formal and dangerous than now. Correspondence was the main conduit of sentimentalism. And this correspondence with Frau Kropf both in its origin and in some of its expressions suggests at least how easily the friendship might have transcended the proper limits imposed by the relations of the parties. That it did not thus transgress may have been owing on the one hand to the conscience or the jealousy of Frau Kropf, or on the other to the captivating charms and exactions of Frau von Kalb. To the result the somewhat later acquaintance with Frau von Krüdener may also have contributed. Whatever the cause, one cannot regret that the temperature in these letters remains something below the boiling point attained in some of Richter's other correspondence with cultured women.

II.—*The Aims and Methods of Collegiate Instruction in Modern Languages.*

BY W. T. HEWETT, A. M., PH. D.,

PROFESSOR OF THE GERMAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, N. Y.

IT is evident that the study of the modern languages is to occupy a larger place in education in this country than ever before. The intercourse of people with people, political, social and literary is becoming constantly more intimate and we may anticipate in the future a more cosmopolitan spirit in the relation of nations. The arbitration of differences, and friendly consultation in questions of disputed rights bring into a union of sympathy and genial interest states which have hitherto stood apart. Science has brought nations into immediate and personal connection, making the intellectual progress of one the possession of the other, while commerce and the facility of an interchange of citizenship unite them by mutual interests. These tendencies are separate from any questions touching the usefulness of the study of modern languages as a method of discipline and the culture which is to be obtained from contemporary literatures. They indicate indisputably certain new demands on education which must be met: they are facts patent to the observer as well as the scholar. Instruction in our colleges must take, if not a new, at least a changed direction from the enlarged intercourse of nations. We are brought to ask the question, not what has the past to give us, but what contribution has the living thought of each nation to make to its neighbor, what results of study, what intellectual discoveries, what special gifts from national tendencies and traits has each to impart. The very nearness and sympathy of nations politically causes each to present problems which every student of contemporary thought must investigate. These facts carry their own weight apart from any literary considerations. The question of a cosmopolitan spirit in literature, or of a world-literature is not involved in these views of the growing importance of the study of modern languages. We might urge with great imperativeness the necessity to every scholar, to every educated

man, of a knowledge of the literature of Europe of the present day, no literature now stands alone but affects every other literature, and the subtle thought of one nation colors the intellectual life of every other. Without then touching upon the relative value or the proportionate time which should be devoted to the classics and modern languages, we are met by these facts which emphasize the position which modern languages must assume in every carefully adjusted college curriculum. Conceding then the importance of linguistic study, the question arises, what considerations are of force in determining the order and methods of linguistic study in our schools and colleges.

The elementary study of the modern languages should be remanded to the public schools: the province of instruction in our colleges should be to build upon foundations already laid, and to carry forward the student as in the case of Latin and Greek, to an intelligent study of the literature and philology of these languages.

The standard of requirements for admission to our colleges and universities should not be practically prescribed by the average work done in the public school, which is often defective in scope and arrangement. Our colleges would be perpetually hampered by the imperfect organization of these schools. Any examination of the studies of the high schools and academies of the different states with a view of basing the requirements for admission to our colleges upon them must lead *a priori* to but one conclusion. There is no uniformity in the choice or in the order of studies. If our higher institutions of learning never advance until a consensus of all the secondary schools warrants the step, they will be held forever in tutelage to the lower schools. Let the universities themselves determine their own province and we shall find that within a short time their requirements will be met by all first class preparatory schools, which will in turn raise the level of instruction in all the elementary schools of the country.

President Eliot in one of his masterly papers upon education has shown that every advance that has been made in the requirements for admission to Harvard University has been followed by a corresponding advance in the instruction of all the high schools of Massachusetts.

One who is familiar with the average attainments of students who apply for admission to college cannot fail to ask seri-

ously to what subjects have the years of school-life been devoted. Pupils enter our public schools at from six to eight years of age, and those who complete a definite course of study are under instruction from eight to ten years. With what are they occupied during this period? What solid acquirements have they made before entering college? Years have been devoted to the study of elaborate arithmetics and yet the actual attainments in mathematics are meagre and inadequate, and the substantial study of geometry and algebra usually begins in college. Only a limited number possess a satisfactory acquaintance with the master pieces of English literature. Other essential branches as, American history, physical geography and the historical knowledge of English are wanting. How have these invaluable years been spent when the memory is quick and active and the imagination vigorous, when curiosity is constantly inciting to new subjects of interest, and there is a hunger and thirst for knowledge? It would seem as if any pupil of proper age could master all the essential principles of written arithmetic in two years, that algebra need not require more than an additional year, and geometry a like period: for English grammar, physiology, elementary botany, the higher reading of English and American history, and geography, a half year each would seem sufficient. Allowing the largest amount of time necessary for essential elementary branches, there remains ample space for modern languages. Time is wasted in unskilful instruction, in a multiplicity of subjects. A lack of a scientific arrangement of these subordinate branches as well as the use of poorly chosen text-books of which the market is full, are evils which affect our whole public school system.

What are the reasons that demand that elementary French and German should be remanded to the public schools? The acquisition of language is easier at an earlier stage of instruction than later. The memory is quick to grasp words and forms and they become stamped on the mind with unconscious effort, which is not possible later. What is a laborious task to a mature student whose mind is occupied with the thousand things which distract the attention and weaken the powers of our American youth, presents less difficulty to one who is younger. The organs of speech are flexible in early life and better adapted to acquire a correct pronunciation. The study of language at this period corresponds to the normal development of the

mind. The laws of imitation and repetition come powerfully to our aid in instruction.

If it be conceded that there is abundant space in the courses of study in our public schools for one or more of the modern languages, and that the study is at that time desirable, we are met by a further objection to the possibility of transferring the elementary study of French and German to the secondary schools, viz., the lack of capable teachers, which, in the view of some, makes it desirable that these subjects should be begun in college. It is said that the instruction would be inadequate, and that time would be wasted in attempting to teach modern languages in our high schools, that it requires later more time to correct errors in pronunciation and to supplement deficiencies in preliminary training, than it would if the study of these languages was begun after entering college. It is fair to admit that in entering upon such a system, until the standard of requirements in our colleges fixed by experience and universally recognized, there will be deficiencies in the preparation of students, as there are now in the familiar English branches. There is no reason, however, if college instruction in modern languages is skilful and thorough, why the same graduates should not give as satisfactory instruction in modern languages as in classics, although the niceties of pronunciation of a living language might not in all cases be preserved. The uniform requirement of the modern languages for admission will cause, as in the case of Harvard and Cornell, these demands to be met by the enlargement of the present courses of study in all our secondary schools. The German language occupies a favored position in this respect from the large German population in the middle and western states. In the largest cities there are numerous private German schools, and German is taught in most of the high schools. There are in this country two million native-born Germans. The opportunity of obtaining instruction in German from native Germans is possible in every large village.

The experience of Harvard college is of value in considering whether the preparatory schools can furnish adequate instruction in the modern languages. French or German was first required for admission in 1875. The percentage of failures the first year was 41 in French and 21 in German: in 1876 it was 36 per cent in French and 14 in German: the records of the first two years show that the failures were twice

as numerous, in proportion to numbers, in French as in German: the number however, which offered French was far greater: being in 1875, 41 per cent, while in German it was but 7½ per cent.

Since 1878, the percentage of failures in French and German taken together is as follows: in 1878, 36; 1879, 21; 1880, 13; 1881, 18; 1882, 15; 1883, 25; 1884, 12. This shows a steady advance until the number conditioned in modern languages does not exceed the average number conditioned in mathematics in which instruction is supposed to be so much better. The failures in algebra in the same series of years was far greater, being in 1878, 31; 1879, 28; 1880, 29; 1881, 25; 1882, 27; 1883, 32; 1884, 19 per cent. In plane geometry in 1878 43; 1879, 37; 1880, 36; 1881, 27; 1882, 20; 1883, 16; 1884, 17 per cent.

The average number of failures in French and German in six years from 1878-84 was 20 per cent; in algebra, 27 per cent; in plane geometry, 28 per cent. The failures in arithmetic in the same time were 12. 5 per cent.

This shows that while the requirements in modern languages for admission are still low, yet that requirement is met better than in mathematics, the average percentage of failures in which is 24, while in French and German it is 21.

The admirable system of public instruction in New England is so constituted that an upward impulse in study in any one branch is responded to throughout all the public schools. But in the middle and western states, the spirit of German nationality is more compact and influential in educational questions, and thorough instruction in French and German should be possible in all graded schools and academies.

The experience in Cornell University is less conclusive from the fact that in the requirements for admission in several courses a choice has been allowed between advanced mathematics and French or German, but the number offering one of the modern languages is constantly increasing, and the preliminary training of those who apply for admission is of a higher order. I would here observe that an effort on the part of the Board of Regents to improve the instruction in modern languages in the schools of New York would probably exert a beneficial influence, but united action on the part of all the colleges in requiring French or German for admission would undoubtedly be effectual in promoting the study of modern languages in all preparatory schools.

The methods to be pursued in the study of language are naturally determined by the object sought, which is primarily to obtain an acquaintance with the literature. This is the aim of the greater number of students. A less number seek to acquire the ability to speak the modern languages for purposes of travel, business or general culture. A higher object sought by advanced students is the study of the philology of those tongues; German is studied in its relation to a group of languages in which it is sought to trace the history of the beliefs, customs and civilization of the primitive Germanic people as well as of the forms and meanings of our own English speech; French is studied in its relation to cultivated, spoken and mediæval Latin and to the other Romance languages, and in its contribution to English. It is evident that unless it can be shown that an acquaintance with the literature of any modern tongue can be obtained more easily by the effort to acquire a facility in speaking that language, we have two methods of study before us according to the object to be attained, viz. a knowledge of the literature or the ability to speak. It is held that the ability to speak a language becomes at once the key to a facile and thorough acquaintance with its literature. This may be conceded, but it is important to consider that the language of literature and of common life is only in part the same. There are higher ranges of analysis and thought in the former than in the latter. The vocabulary of ordinary speech, while sufficing to express familiar wants and feelings, forms but a small part of the word treasures of a language. Words in common use describing physical objects and the qualities of objects, as well as universal feelings, underlie and form the basis of the higher language. These words having certain clearly defined primary meanings expand in their higher application. They may assume significations which can only be traced with difficulty to the original root. Every branch of knowledge, every art and science, every great writer has a special vocabulary which must be learned by reading, and is largely beyond the possibility of imparting by conversational study. The attempt to use the language of Cicero or Cæsar conversationally as is often done is thoroughly mechanical. If continued a sufficient time, a certain familiarity with forms and expressions will be acquired and a knowledge of the peculiar style of the author. If a similar attempt were made to familiarize a pupil with English by teaching him to employ phrases taken

from Burke or even from Tennyson, or with German by sentences from the Herder's prose, the result would be to impart a knowledge of form rather than of spirit, which would be of but little general use. The spoken language has its own domain, and literary study and methods their distinct province. There is therefore a limitation in the results which are attained by the exclusive or even prevailing use of the conversational method.

I agree with that view which holds the limited use of a conversational grammar, and conversational exercises are important as familiarizing the learner with common forms and phrases, and in training the ear to understand the spoken language. The question as I regard it is in brief this, not whether the power to speak French or German intelligently can be attained in a country where these languages are not generally spoken, but whether with the limited amount of time, and the limited practical use which most college students can make of French or German, in speaking, it is the best to insist upon, or make of primary importance in a course of general instruction, an ability to speak German or French. My own observation of the attainment of the children of foreign parents residing in this country, and of the majority of American students abroad in speaking a foreign language, as well as of the results of that method of study in America, leads me to believe that the effort to teach German conversation to all students would be to sacrifice time without a corresponding substantial return. I do not question the possibility of bright students, under favorable circumstances acquiring a certain ability to converse with correctness and fluency upon a limited range of subjects. Familiar intercourse with a competent and skilful teacher, and a systematic graded course of instruction extending over a considerable period may accomplish valuable results for those who expect to use familiarly a modern language. But the question recurs whether the results with the average student, whose use of the language will be limited to a few occasions and to a limited number of phrases, will compensate for the labor and time required. Will not valuable time which should be spent in the study of the literature necessarily be consumed in the process, and the result be that the student is left the proud master of a few sentences, but without any literary knowledge? We are met by the statement, however, that this presentation of the case is narrow and incomplete; that no one expects that the ability to speak should be made the end of study, but that in-

struction in speaking should be a means and an accompaniment of all study of the modern languages. Explanations in the language taught and familiar illustrations or lectures should accompany so far as practicable the study of German from the beginning. With this modified view we agree.

Even in teaching conversational German there is room for a wide choice of methods: we are past the endless iterations without progress in so many text books of the Ollendorf system, but we are exposed to a new danger in the vast multiplicity of exercises which aim to teach all possible expressions, and introduce unusual words, simply for the sake of idiomatic completeness. In all languages the words actually employed in ordinary conversation are far fewer than is generally supposed. Two thousand words undoubtedly exceed the actual number in common use in conversation in English, while a mastery of a thousand chosen words would enable a scholar to converse intelligently in German upon a wide range of topics. It follows from this that the number of words introduced into a conversational grammar should be rigidly limited, to such as are of constant use, words introduced in exceptional meanings should be avoided. As the most familiar expressions are sufficient to illustrate the ordinary forms of words and uses of moods and tenses, all stilted formal terms should be abolished. We are familiar in some text books with such sentences as the following, none of which a student would be called upon to employ again:

“The generations of beasts arise and pass away without a thought of the significance of their life and of its particular period ever arising within them.”

“The hero of the historian or the poet always acts independently, executes all he undertakes, sets aside every obstacle and attains infallibly to his great purpose.”

I venture to say that there is nothing in these sentences however profound their truth, which would impress itself on the memory of the average pupil; and being forgotten, it is simply a specimen of mispent ingenuity which a sarcastic scholar has called “brain slaughter.” Sentences taken from the higher and more formal literary style are not adapted to teach the familiar principles of the language and such expressions may be left to be learned from the literature. They are the relic of a time when grammar was a complete philosophy of human expression, and presented an analysis of the most varied shades of thought.

I have considered the study of modern languages with reference to an acquaintance with the literature of those languages, but a claim is made which has entered largely into the discussion of the relative advantages of the study of the classics and of modern languages. It is affirmed that an equal discipline may be obtained from the thorough and systematic study of German and French, as from Latin and Greek. By discipline is meant what is understood by that term in the study of the classics derived from grammatical study, viz. the power to define at once and accurately any part of speech, the use of any mood or case, the etymology and history of any word, and its differentiation in meaning from its synonyms. It embraces the philosophy and in part the philology of language. There is, it is true, a valuable, possibly invaluable mental discipline to be obtained from instruction of this kind. It is an excellent preparation for the study of logic and of mental philosophy. This would be an inadequate statement of the results of classical study. The mind acquires a keen logical and defining power, a mastery of words, a clear discrimination which is essential to the profoundest and the most accurate thinking. All this can be attained by a limited acquaintance with standard authors. If however we mean by discipline something more than this narrow view of mental training, viz. such a mastery of a language as to enable a student to translate rapidly any author, to enter at once into the spirit of a poem or a play, in short the discipline or growth which comes from contact with the thoughts of an author instead of the mere forms which he has employed, then we must admit that classical training with the great mass of students has failed to accomplish this. We have learned Latin in the past from the grammar, not from the great writers of Rome. How few college graduates have ever read Homer entire or Horace, so that they return with constant sympathy and delight to refresh their souls at these fountains of knowledge and taste. The acquaintance of most graduates with the Greek drama confined to one or two plays of Sophocles or Euripides or Aeschylus, but very few possess a thorough knowledge of the works of any one of these authors. I value the proverb that nothing is so prolific as a little known well, and esteem highly that training that comes from a mastery of one great play or oration, but such a discipline is only the preparation for the intelligent study of the entire works of the author. What I desire to emphasize

is that the culture of the taste and the refining influences of literary knowledge must be sought equally with the discipline of a rigid grammatical drill. The study of language must be subordinate the study of the thoughts of an author, and the intellectual enlargement and expansion which comes from it. It is time that an earnest protest should be made against the study of literature as it is frequently pursued in this country and abroad. The study of an author does not mean the study of his thoughts but so much philology, so much extraneous matter regarding the history of manuscripts, the circumstances of the time, etc. Many scholars seem to think that the only value attaching to Walther von der Vogelweide is because his poems afford so many words and forms, metres and rhymes for critical study. The sight of a fearless political singer in a period of ecclesiastical tyranny, of a poet of a fresh and vigorous imagination and of pure and lofty ideals of the dignity of the human soul is of less importance to them than the words he used. The Nibelungenlied may be read without reflecting on its interest as a revelation of the national life and passions of the time. Tennyson may be studied so that he becomes a teacher and prophet of truth without investigating the sources of his poems or invoking the aid of a commentary. There is a growing tendency based upon the advance of philology and upon certain methods almost universal in Germany to study literature as the *Paradise Lost* and Pope's *Essay on Man* were studied a generation ago. There are text-books which furnish a thousand questions upon a few lines of some English or Latin classic. Pushed to an extreme, such study induces a cold, critical treatment of the most glowing passages in literature, stifles enthusiasm and stands in the way of true literary culture. Philological comments and illustrations should be subordinate to the interpretation of the thoughts of the author and the truths he presents. Grammar should aim to present the accepted facts of language. Those necessary for a student are few in number and the intricacies and refinements of expression should be learned from the literature not from the grammar.

Even when a recognized place has been conceded to modern languages, the subject suffers from a defect that characterizes the arrangement of studies in most of our colleges. The courses are crowded with a variety of studies, each of which is pursued for a limited time and then abandoned. The time is so

limited that the student fails to attain a mastery of any one subject. Just at the moment when he is conscious of power and fitted to advance intelligently and profitably to a knowledge of the literature, his work is interrupted and his attention diverted to other subjects. The constitution of the college curriculum in the past has been the cause of this: the low standard of admission, has involved a large amount of instruction of an elementary character, and no time has been left for a student to pursue a subject for which he has an especial gift. The aim to so arrange the studies, that discipline of all the powers should be obtained, and that the graduate should be familiar with the elements of the world's knowledge in a great variety of subjects, have prevented students of marked tastes from following out any given line of study. A reform in this direction has in some universities removed these grounds of complaint, but in others still, no adequate provision is made for a systematic course of study in modern literature. Even where ample time is conceded to the study of a modern language, the reading may be so arranged as to afford no connected method, but only a promiscuous variety of reading which gives no complete view of the works of an author or a period, or even of a given class of literary products.

For advanced students, in addition to a historical and philosophical course, there should be a course of reading with a definite purpose as the study of the classical drama of Goethe and Schiller in German, the literature of the Romantic school, the *Sturm* and *Drang* period, Lessing's dramatic criticisms, the lyric poetry, or the works of a single author, as Heine, Herder or Freytag, which would contribute to form the taste and give a definite literary knowledge such as a random course of reading cannot afford. Such study would lift the work of the instructor above its ordinary routine character and give it a dignity of aim which would be of value alike to the teacher and the student.

Seminary work for students of an advanced grade is unsurpassed, but the difficulty of securing students of the requisite preliminary knowledge and special gifts has thus far made my own experience of this work unsatisfactory. Its general introduction with all students would be desirable. A method, however, which seems to me to be a substitute for seminary work is for the teacher to have a system akin to that in use in the laboratory where the students work with the instructor either

in a seminary room or in his own study, wherever books of reference are available.

For two or three hours upon certain days in each week, the students can have his advice, and he can direct their work, mark their deficiencies, direct to authorities and thus stimulate to special investigation which would have all the advantages and certain special merits over the ordinary seminary system. For students of ordinary attainments, this method seems to me to promise more than any other. Such a method was employed by Professor Zacher, of Halle a few years since. All his advanced pupils worked with him in his library. Only by some such system can the personal influence of the teacher be exercised most effectively in quickening and directing his students in advanced and most delightful study.

III.—*The Factitive in German.*

BY SYLVESTER PRIMER, PH. D.,

PROFESSOR OF MODERN LANGUAGES IN THE COLLEGE OF CHAR-
LESTON, CHARLESTON, S. C.

THE design of the present article is a discussion of some points of special interest in the factitive construction in German and its comparison with that of the same case in the cognate languages; this will best be attained by an historical tracing of this construction as far back as possible and expedient, and by showing its later and special development on German soil. Clearness will necessitate a discussion of the nature and functions of this case and its relations to the accusative (to which it is now more nearly allied) and to the other cases. Inasmuch as the factitive case forms part of the predicate it will involve the consideration of the predicative idea, or the relation of subject, verb and object to one another, since these three ideas, according to Becker, the idea of action expressed by the verb, the idea of being, either as agent of the action, as in case of the subject, or as objective and terminal point of the force of the verb, as in case of the passive object, form when united that antithesis of action and being out of which the sentence is developed. The intimate relation of the active subject and passive object appears in that "what is predicated of the subject as an action, may be predicated of the object as suffering," whenever it becomes subject, but always so that it forms a direct antithesis to the real agent. Both are again intimately connected with the verb as its support or immediate complement and modifier. The subject, however, always represents something general and indeterminate while the verb, either in itself or with its complement or modifier, i. e. the predicate, is specific. It would appear, then, that the verb contains not only the idea of motion or the active force in the sentence, but it also unites in itself the additional idea of substance, not necessarily appearing as substantive, but rather in the motion which of itself forms the synthetic bond between the subject and this substantive element of the verb. These two

elements of the verb, the substantial or predicative and the verbal or copulative, form the predicative idea of every sentence. Whenever the verb contains more of the substantial element it becomes firmer and self-supporting and we call it intransitive, but when the verbal element predominates and the substantial element is to a greater or less degree eliminated, then the verb seeks support and durability in a new substance, the object becomes the necessary complement, and we call the verb transitive; hence the frequent transition from one State to the other (cf. Rumpel in Hübschmann *Zur Casuslehre*, p. 59.). The very nature of the transitive verb requires an immediate complement for the completion of its sense, which the self-reliant intransitive verb can dispense with, though capable of modification by an added substantive. Still a third class of verbs, which do not form a complete thought even when qualified by an object, require besides the regular object an additional complement or modifier for the completion of the predicative idea. This may properly be called the verbal objective to the object; it is also called *essive* or *predicative* case, better known as the *factive*. The nature of this additional complement, its relation to the regular object and the verb must claim our attention for a moment before we proceed to special cases.

"The accusative," according to Madvig, "is the original word, unlimited and unrelated." "The accusative, therefore," continues the same author, ("as an absolute form of the noun introduced), is in the most simple way to define and complete the predicate expressed in the verb." If the theory of the suffixal case-endings in the Aryan family, which now obtains, is true, there must have been a time when the original word, i. e. the noun-word, performed more or less indifferently the various functions of the present case-endings. The pronominal suffix *s* of the Aryan nominative gave precision to the subjective idea and made the subject the case of emphasis and animation by introducing the active personal, i. e. independent, element. The accusative, however, is the case of dependence and the noun-form sufficed for a long time to express this relation, as seen in the neuter in which the nominative and accusative are still the same and are generally the root or radical part of the word. After the pronominal suffix *m* was employed for the masculine and feminine it added no new force to the noun-idea, the accusative still represented the inanimate, neutral, the unlimited, un-

related, predicative noun-relation in a general and oblique manner; it still remains the general oblique case while the other oblique cases express special and peculiar relations of dependence. The accusative only defines and completes the idea, in other words completes the defective sense of the transitive verb, or fills up the gap left in the thought by the transitive verb. When joined to the intransitive verb the noun-idea assumes an adverbial meaning and the relation is felt to be a looser one. This loose construction gives to the accusative relation in Greek its comprehensive and manifold use and Hübschmann (l. c. 117⁽³⁾) notes the same feature in other languages. In DeSacy this forms the basis for a division into two principal usages of the accusative, viz., the immediate complement of transitive verbs, and adverbial expression. These latter include all complements of the circumstance or of the immediate modifier which might have been expressed more appropriately and fully by a preposition and its object or by a sentence. Hübschmann calls it the general oblique putting of the noun, l. c. 119, such at least is the theory of Hübschmann, Madvig and others.

With the immediate complement of transitive verbs we are not at present concerned, it is the *cas adverbial* of DeSacy to which we must now turn our attention. While the form of the noun remains the same, its relation to the verb and subject, its functions are quite different; the relation is no longer objective, it is predicative. The function of this case will be best understood by considering the different attributive, objective and predicative relations which the sentence is capable of expressing, and here we shall find Becker's *Ausführliche deutsche Grammatik* invaluable. He justly says that the complete thought expressed by every sentence consists in the union of the idea of action to that of being. But since no new combination of ideas can be formed without this union of action and being, then "every sentence, to whatever extent the relations which it comprehends may have been multiplied, is—the predicative, the attributive, and the objective." The predicative relation differs from the attributive in that it represents a thought, a judgment of the speaker while the attributive relation only represents an idea of being, the already predicated judgment, not the predicated judgment. The objective relation unites the idea of being to that of action, but differs from the predicative relation in that it expresses not a thought but an idea, and from the

attributive relation in that it expresses not an idea of being, but one of action, it has also the additional function wanting in the other two relations of representing the being not as subject of the action, but as object of the same, that is the immediate complement of the transitive verb. A close study of the so-called factitive case will discover that it partakes of a double nature: it has in so far the predicative nature that it predicates some quality of the substantive which it modifies, and its substantive nature is seen in that it expresses qualities of the noun and conforms to the noun-government in the sentence. Hence we see it modifying the verb and at the same time the subject or object of the sentence. Its grammatical relation in the sentence has generally been considered an accusative relation, but we shall see that it differs slightly from that.

We have already spoken of the substantial and verbal element of every verb, whether active, passive or middle, and the synthetic bond formed by the active force of the verb between the subject and this substantive element of the predicate. A synthetic bond also exists between the active force of the verb and the person or thing affected by the action, but here in an opposite direction; it is not that which sets the force in motion, but that which suffers the force. The third class of verb, of which we have already spoken, and whose substantial element is not yet sufficiently developed to dispense with the substantive and complete its meaning in itself, shows us more clearly the nature of this bond. We find this substance implied in the expression of the feeling or state, in the act or thing done, or in the effect or thing produced; but where the substantial element is so general and vague that without further modification it conveys no accurate idea of itself, as in *ἐργάζομαι σε*, *διδάσκω σε*, then we need another modifier than the person or thing affected by the action of the verb to show us how the person or thing is affected. Hence in addition to the direct object of the action, the real accusative legitimately so-called, we may have with verbs implying a state or feeling, an act, effect or motion, an accessory modifier indicating the operation of any of these verbs on the sufferer. Generally the construction of this double accusative, as it is called, is effected when the two complements of the verb are the person and the thing. Kühner says on this head: "The accusative of the thing blends as it were with the verb to a compound verb and the ordinary objective accusative is united to

this verb. The blending of the verbal idea with the substantive to one verbal idea can be regarded as an idiom of the Greek language." In commenting upon this Delbrück (Syntaktische Forschungen 34) aptly remarks: "The first part of this assertion hit the mark for the majority of cases, but not for some, inasmuch as both accusatives can also be coördinate complements of the verb, as Loph. Ai. 1108, *κολαζ̄ ἐκείρονς τὰ σεμν̄ ἐπη̄*. Hübschmann says that the necessary accusative (i. e. the objective accusative) and the voluntary accusative (i. e. the verbal adjective to the object), joined in one idea, "denote a completion or more exact modification of the verbal idea." By a comparison of these two definitions we find that together they express what we have already enunciated, viz., that the so-called second accusative modifies not only the verbal idea, but at the same time the real object of the verb, and in this light we can better define its functions and determine its case.

From the foregoing it will appear that the factitive, like the genitive, dative and accusative, is an especial form of the complementary relation, though having now no special case-form by which to distinguish it from the general oblique case and naturally enough assumed later the case-form of the objective relation, while still later, when the expression of the relation denoted by it required more exactness, the factitive relation demanded prepositions for the clearer enunciation of its relation to the verb and object. Let us follow out this gradual development, as it will throw some light on the function of the factitive.

The factitive, then, as a special form of the complementary relation which includes in itself both a verbal and a substantive element naturally expresses the relations of those effects the realization of which is expressed with the idea of the verb itself (cf. Becker ii, 163); such are verbs signifying to *become*, to *make*, to *change*, to *turn out*, etc., which, besides the passive object, require an object marking the effect of the action of the verb upon the passive object. This shows the essential distinction of the factitive from the other complementary modifiers, more particularly from the accusative which denotes the purpose or aim of the action without combining the realization of the effect with the idea of the verb. This distinctive function of the factitive, however, shows its close relation to, while at the same time separating it from, the accusative, which is the mere passive object of the action. Thus in the sentence *I will make the house large*,

the idea is not *the large house*, nor yet *the large-made house*, but *the house being made large*, under the process of construction and of being constructed large at the same time. Grammar, ignoring, or not fully understanding the real relation, looked only upon the substantial relation to the object as a real relation of agreement in the form of an attribute of the object, forgetting the equally important predicative relation to the verb; hence the accusative form was used to indicate this relation in those languages admitting of flexional changes, as *Socratem Apollo sapientissimum judicavit*. The falsity of this conception can easily be seen by analysis. For the signification of the idea expressed is neither *Socrates sapientissimus* nor *sapientissimus judicare*, but the two ideas blend into one, as *sapientissimo-judicare Socratem*, to *wisest-judge Socrates*. Thus the Greek and Latin present the real factitive relation with verbs signifying to *make*, to *become* by forms of agreement, as *fecit Cajum heredem*, *Philip-pum elegunt ducem*, and in the passive, *Cajus fit heres*, *Philippus elegitur dux*. The transition from this way of representing the factitive to joining it with the infinitive of the verb *to be* was easy, as *σοφιστὴν δή τοι ὄντα μένοντι γε τὸν ἄρδητον εἶναι*, *Socratem sapientissimum esse judicavit*, *he thinks him to be the wisest*. But the infinitive itself is a real factitive, as we shall see later. The conception of the factitive as forming part of the predicative modifier and therefore as necessarily standing in the relation of agreement with it was all the more natural inasmuch as the idea of the factitive is fully as, if not more, active than passive, and therefore readily confounded with the predicative idea; as, *er macht das Feld öde*, *er nannte ihn träge*.

It is clear from the foregoing that the factitive is neither an attribute of the passive object, nor does it stand in the ordinary objective relation to the predicate, but in a peculiar relation to both verb and passive object. The relation, as above shown, is always one of effect; the factitive expresses the kindred effect and contains the principal idea of the thought expressed, and has the principal accent. It is all the more necessary to observe carefully this relation, as in German it is nicely distinguished by special forms of objective relations, though having no special case. At present the German denotes this relation mostly by prepositions, though often the relation is one of agreement with the passive object or subject, as *Man nannte Attila die Geissel Gottes*. *Attila würde die Geissel Gottes genannt*. This relation

may be expressed in three different ways: when connected with the verbs *werden* and *machen*; as, Eis wird zu wasser, Er macht sein Haus zu einem wirtshause, the action is real and the relation of the factitive is a real one. In connection with verbs denoting a moral and desirable effect; as, Ich rathe zu Frieden, or with expressions like geneigt zur Sünde, willig zur Arbeit, the relation becomes moral. In predicative expressions of cognition or judgment denoting that for which something is recognized or considered; as, du hälts ihn für einen Dieb Ich erkenne diesen Mann für einen Ehrenmann, the relation is no longer real nor moral, but only logical. The logical factitive is also employed in connection with the verbs *nennen schelten, heissen* in the sense of *ein Urtheil aussern*; as, Er nennt ihn einen Betrüger, Er hat ihn einen Schurken, Unverschämten gescholten, Man hiess ihn den Guten. But as the basis of the logical factitive is always a predicating judgment, it assumes preferably the form of an adjective which may be considered the attribute of a noun understood, and which expresses here, as ever when the attribute of a noun understood, the idea of being. The pure logical factitive (i. e. expressed without a preposition) is now only found in German with *heissen, nennen schelten*, the only verbs in which the logical factitive agrees with the passive object. The real factive in German only agrees with the subject when joined to *werden* and *bleiben*; as, Er wird ein Bettler, Ich bleibe dein Freund. In all other cases it follows the preposition *zu*; as, Er wird zum Lügner, du machst ihn zum Bettler. The factitive adjective is invariable. But the farther we go back the greater correspondence we shall find in German with that of the ancient languages in the agreement of the factitive with the passive object, though at the same time we shall see even in the Gothic the beginning of the tendency to the use of the preposition *to*. Here the verbs signifying *to be, to become, to remain, to appear* require agreement with the nominative: *ik im hairdeis gôds*. 2 John x, 11; *jabai ni galaub-jam, jains triggvs visip*, 2 Tim. ii, 13; *ei vairpaip sunjus attins isvaris*, Matt. v, 45, etc. Yet *visan* and *vairpan* are often followed by *du*: *jah vairpa izvis du attin jah jus vairpiip mis du sunum*. 2 Cor. vi, 18. *Ei sijaima veis du hazeinai vulpaus is*, Eph. i, 12. After verbs signifying *to name, to call*, we have the pure logical factitive agreeing with the passive object: *panzsei jah apaustauluns namnida*, Luke vi, 13; *silba Daveid qipip ina fraujan*. Mk. xii, 37; *haihaitun ina Zakarian*. With *vôp-*

jan, however, the factitive stands in the nominative case which is the beginning of this same construction in Modern German: *jas vōpeid mik laisareis jah frauja*. Jno. xiii, 13. With verbs signifying to *consider, reckon, make, to call, to declare, to represent, to show, to take, to give*, we have the factitive agreeing with the passive object: *garaihtana domidēdun gup*, Luke vii, 29; *unte triggvana mik rahnida*, 1 Tim. i, 12; *jah ni svasvē fijand ina rahnjaip*, 2 Thess. iii, 13; *sahwazuh izei piudan sik silban taujip*, Jno. xix, 12; *qam sunus mans, giban saivala seina faur managans lun*. Mk. x, 45; *aftra qipa, ibai hvas mik muni unfrōdana, aipphau vaila þau svē unfrōdana nimaip mik*. 2 Cor. xi, 16; *missataujandan mik silban ustaiknja*. But here the same as with *visan* and *vairpan* above the preposition *du* with the dative is sometimes used, as *taujis puk silban du gupa*, Jno. x, 33. The same construction of the factitive follows *laisjan*, as *jah laisida ins in gajukōm manag*, Mk. iv, 2; and *bidjan*, as *patei puk bidjōs*, Mk. x, 35. But *bidjan* generally requires the genitive of the thing, as *bap pis leikis Iēsuis*, Mt. xxvii, 58.

Even in Gothic we see the beginning of the use of the preposition to express the factitive relation and this has become the more usual mode in Modern German. The progress of this tendency is marked in O. H. G., where we seldom find the nominative with *werden* or the accusative with *machen*, both of which are generally followed by the preposition *ze*. The adjective used as factitive is, however, varied, the nominative being used after *werden* and verbs of its class, and the accusative after *machen* and verbs of that class. Thus, *then blinton deta sehenten, nu wird thu stummer sar*. Yet the uninflected form is found. In like manner *lassen* and *haben* often require a complementary object denoting the effect of the active force of the verb, thus becoming the real factitive, as *iz italaz lazent* (leave it empty), *lazen wir in lebenten, mih Meistar habetut zi thiū* (hatted mich zum Meister).

In Latin the preterit participle (passive) forms a real factitive in the nominative after verbs signifying to *become* and fills the same relation in the accusative after active verbs which require the factitive to complete their meaning, as *quum milites a manē diei jejuni sub armis stetissent defatigati; Collegis novem singuli accensi apparebant; aliquid perfectum reddere; aliquid effectum reddere; me segregatum habuisse; inclusum in curia senatum habuerunt; (Romulus) habuit plebem in clientelas principium*

descriptam; habere cognitum Scaevolam; de Caesare satis dictum habebo. The Greek ἐλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας (he has taken the honor-present) and ὡνούμενοι ἔχονσιν (they have bought) are examples in which the participles express the factitive relation and such examples might be multiplied. The examples with *habere* show the beginning, in Latin even, of what became later the compound tenses of the modern languages derived from it, as *habeo epistolam scriptam* for *scripti epistolam*. But here *habeo* (and *ἔχω*) has not yet lost the full force of its primitive signification of *to have, to hold, to possess* and become a mere temporal auxiliary as it now is. We find this same process of the formation of the compound tenses independently at work in the Teutonic family, where in O. H. G. the consciousness of the full meaning of *haben* and *eigan* had not been lost. After *werden* we find the nominative, often *haben* and *eigan* the accusative, as *Er habet gespannenen sinen Bogen, Sie eigan mir ginomanan lioban Druhtin minan; Tho ward thaz wort sinaz zi Lichmen gidanaz.* The infinitive now so commonly used with *lassen* and *bleiben* was originally a participle used factitively (cf. Becker, § 99). With *haben*, we often find the preposition *ze*; as, *der Got ze Fatere habet, ze Scalke wolt er un havin, habetun nan zi Huahē* (zum Hohn). *Sein* which is used as the passive of *haben* also has the same construction, as *Si druhtin iu zi Bilide* (zum Muster), *Thaz si in zi Zeichane, er alten Liuten zu Huhe ist.* The construction with *zu* has become the rule with verbs having the signification of modern *gereichen, hinreichen, dienen, nutzen, beitragen, taugen*, and the adjective *tauglich, geschickt, reif, nötig, and genug*, all of which require the factitive idea to complete their meaning. Thus with *irgangen* = mod. *gereichen* we find, *theiz thir irge ze Guate* (dass es dir zum guten gereiche), *thaz irgieng in ze Arge* das gereichte ihnen zum Bösen. With *irgangen* = mod. *gereichen*, and *dienen*, we find the dative of the person in connection with the factitive. In Latin which has no corresponding verb (to *irgangen=gereichen*) *esse* expresses the personal and factitive relation by the dative, the dative of the person corresponding to the genitive of other languages; as, *magno malo est hominibus avaritia, id tibi est dedcori.* The same factitive dative occurs in *rem lucro habere, laudi, crimini dare, auxilio venire*, which stand for genitives, as such expressions as *magni facere, flocci facere* clearly show and which represent the predi-

cation as predicate genitive, a shade of relation which lies within that of the factitive. This factitive dative, denoting aim or purpose, is now commonly expressed in German by the prepositions *für* and *zu*; as, *zu Seinem Vortheile sprechen*, *für einen Unterhalt sorgen*.

As above stated the logical factitive agrees with the passive object in Modern German only with the verbs *heissen*, *nennen* and *schelten*; with *heissen* and *nennen* the logical factitive is put in the nominative or accusative according as the verb expresses active or passive meaning. In O. H. G. we have the same construction with *heissen* and *nennen*; with all other verbs the factitive relation is expressed by the preposition *fure*, as *fure Wunder ze chtonne*. The adjective, however, which is the favorite form for expressing the logical factitive, is uninflected in Modern German and stands alone or after the preposition *für* or the particle *als*; as, *Ich preise ihn glücklich*, *ich halte ihn für unglücklich*, *Ich sehe ihn als gerettet an*. But in O. H. G. it stands alone and is mostly inflected; as, *theih so hohan mih gizelle*, *Chraftelosen weist du mih*, but also uninflected, as *wanda er salig geheizzen wirt*.

We have already mentioned, while discussing the transition of *Socratem sapientissimum judicavit* to *Socratem sapientissimum esse judicavit*, that the infinitive is manifestly a form of the factitive and its use with the modal auxiliaries certainly expresses a factitive relation, since they express the causal relations of possibility and necessity, i. e. are causitive verbs; the relation is here that of the real factitive. The infinitives after the verbs *begehrren*, *verabscheuen*, *gebieten* and *zulassen*, as well as after those of the same signification in Greek and Latin, would then express the relation of the moral factitive. Not only the modal auxiliaries in the strict sense of the word, but also the temporal auxiliaries, including every verb which denotes some temporal or modal relation of the predicate, take a complementary infinitive standing in the relation of factitive to the verb and subject. Such are in German *beginnen*, *anfangen*, *fortfahren*, *pflegen*, *sich gewöhnen*, etc. Besides these verbs, all verbs signifying *to appoint*, *to know*, *to mean*, *to say* (verba declarandi [et sentiendi, since the logical factitive soon became confounded with the moral]) which, like other verbs governing the factitive, "require besides the object in the relation of the logical factitive a passive object in the accusative," have the

logical factitive after them. This passive object and infinitive expressing the relation of the logical factitive form the so-called *accusativus cum infinitivo*. In all these cases the infinitive is imperative and is only exceptionally violated. In Modern German the supine has encroached upon this function of the infinitive so that its use has been very much limited, whereas in Goth., O. H. G. and M. H. G. the infinitive is still used, if not in all, at least in most cases, after verbs denoting a temporal or modal (in their widest sense) relation of the predicate, as *dugann Iesus qipan paim manageim bi Iohannen*, Matt. xi, 7; *And dulp pan hvarjoh biuhts vas sa kindins fraletan ainana pizai managein bandjan, panei villedun*, ib. xxvii, 15. *Thaz sie thes biginnen iz uzana gisingen joh sie iz ouh irfullen mit mikilemo uuullen*, Otf. i, 1, 109-111; *Thiu kind gistiountun stechen*, ib. i, 20, 5; *so ther sterro giuon uuas queman zi iu*, ib. i, 17, 43; *si begunde trüren*, Nib. 61, 2, *Atsaihvip armaion izvara ni taujan in andvairþja manne du saihvan im*, Matt. vi, 1; *ni skuld ist lagjan þans in kaurbanaun*, ib. xxvii, 6. *Tho bat er nan zi note thia steina duan zi brote*, Otf. ii, 4, 44; *Ich trouwe an im erdwingen bediu liute unde lant*, Nib. 56, 4; *Daz vorhte si verliesen von Guntercs man*, ib. 61, 3.

In the above examples the finite verb expresses only a temporal or modal relation, and the infinitive expresses the real predicative idea; it cannot, like the *accusativus cum infinitivo*, be changed to a substantive clause, and the subject of the predicative idea must be the same as the subject of the finite verb. In the case of the objective infinitive the two subjects are different and the infinitive expresses, not—as in the former case, the real predicate, but the predicate of the object of the finite verb, and is thus equivalent to a finite clause. This construction is common after *βιάζομαι*, *κελεύω*, *κωλύω*, *πέιθω*, *ἀναπταίω*, etc.; *jubeo*, *spero*, *cogo*, *sino*, etc. The Modern German retains it after *heissen* (=befehlen, genannt werden), *nennen*, *lehren*, *lernen*, *helfen*, *machen*, and *lassen*, but it has introduced *zu* after *bitten*, *befehlen*, *erlauben*, *rathen*, *zwingen*, etc. In Gothic and O. H. G., however, the pure infinitive is still used after *erlauben*, *rathen*, *verbieten*, *bitten*, etc., *uslanbei mis frumist galeipan jah gafilan attan meinana*, Matt. viii, 21; *thoh bat er nanzi note thia steina duan zi brote*. Otf. ii, 4, 44; *Der wirt der bat ez läzen*, Nib. 37, 1.

This objective infinitive has encroached upon the functions of

the present participle after the verbs *sehen*, *hören*, *fühlen*, *finden* and the like, though the infinitive construction is here very old, and also found in the Anglo-Saxon. *Thar gisah er stantan gotes boton sconan.* Otf. i, 4, 21. *IC seah turf tredan, tyne vaeron ealra Rā 14'.* But the more common and undoubtedly original construction after these verbs is the present participle, for the active idea in this factitive relation usually requires the adjective for its expression, which function the participle properly fills, and not the infinitive. In Greek we find the participle almost universally employed here, seldom the infinitive; in Latin the participle is the most common, but the infinitive is also quite frequent. The Gothic follows the Greek and Latin, expressing this relation mostly by the participle: *jah gasahv svaihron is ligandcin in heitom*, Matt. viii, 14. *Gasahv mannan sitandan*, ibid. ix, 9. *tigat unhlþón usgaggana*, Mk. vii, 30. *Gahausjands þan (sa blinda) managein faurgaggandein frah hva vesi pata*, Luke xviii, 36. We also find the infinitive: *jabai nu gasaihvip sunu mans usteigan*, Jno. vi, 26. The O. H. G. shows the same fluctuation though giving the preference to the participle which is generally inflected; here the participle is even found after other verbs, as *Pediw wandon sie dih mir irbolgenen*, *daz tuot mih ouh singenten*. In English the participle is imperative in this construction. This same change from participle to infinitive has apparently taken place in *Ich bleibe sitzen, er reitet, fährt, geht spazieren*, where the English still uses the participle, and the participial construction is still found in upper German dialects and in Danish. The Anglo-Saxon has mostly the present participle, as *He geseah godes gäst niperstigende*, Mt. iii, 16; *Hig geseoð maunes sunu cumende*, ib. 24, 30. But the infinitive, in almost the same signification, often supersedes the participle.

The transition from the participle to the infinitive is greatly strengthened by the fact that we find it not only after verbs like *sehen*, *hören*, etc., but also after other verbs, as *daz wir in fernemen betonten, die in ne geloubent irstanden, so wissi er sih ferlornen*, etc. Moreover the Greek, as already mentioned, inclines to the use of the participle in preference to the infinitive, differing from the Latin in this respect. $\delta\tau\epsilon\alpha\tau\omega\sigma\eta\gamma\epsilon\theta\eta\varsigma\gamma\epsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma\varsigma$. But cf. also $\delta\tau\epsilon\alpha\tau\omega\sigma\eta\gamma\epsilon\theta\eta\varsigma\gamma\epsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma\varsigma$ $\delta\alpha\eta\kappa\epsilon\tau\eta\varsigma\gamma\epsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma\varsigma$. The Lithuanian uses only the participial construction and the participle agrees with the passive object.

The possibility of such a change lies in the allied nature of the participle and infinitive, both of which partake of the nature of the verb and substantive, and can have active or passive meaning. This is especially the case with the preterite participle: as, *der gefallene Schnee*, *das getrunkene Wasser*, while the same participle from transitive verbs has active signification (cf. Schmeller, *Die Mundarten Bayerns* 994). The same feature is peculiar to the Latin preterite participle which is passive, except that of the deponent verbs. Yet *juratus*, *pransus caenatus*, *cantus*, *tacitus*, *solitus*, *confisus* have also active signification, while *adeptus*, *comitatus*, *complexus*, *populatus*, *meditatus*, *opinatus* and *pactus* have likewise a passive meaning. The German present participle also appears dialectically in the passive sense, as *mein tragendes amt*, *meine unterhabende Mannschaft* (vide Schmeller, l. c. 998). This same vacillation is found with many Greek verbal adjectives in—*τος*, as *μενετός*, *ύποπιός*, *μεμτός*, etc. The Latin Gerund shows this same feature, as *Athenas erudiendi gratia missus est*, *Antonio nulla spes erat restituendi* (of being reinstated). In Greek the active infinitive often has a passive sense, as *παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν* (to be asked), *ἵππους ἔδωκεν ἐταίροις πρὶς γῆται ἀγειν*, *πόλις χαλεπὴ λαβεῖν*, *ηδὺ ἀκούειν*, etc. We might quote in English Shakespeare's *fear of swallowing*, (i. e. of being swallowed). We find a change similar to the one between infinitive and participle in the adjective and substantive nature of the Latin participle in—*dus* (*amandus*), etc., when used as participle and as gerundive. An analogous change takes place in the German infinitive and supine when they assume, as they often do, the sense and form of the adjective (cf. Becker i, 196, § 101). Out of these peculiarities arises the frequent change between infinitive, participle and supine, and they also explain why one language uses one form while another prefers the other form. Thus the Greek prefers the participle instead of the infinitive after *πανομαι*, *τογχάνω*, *λανθάνω*, the Latin the future participle instead of the supine in—*um*, as *eo visurus*, and the infinitive instead of the Gerund and supine, as *peritus cantare*; *tempus est abire*, *eamus visere*, *materia facilis dicere*, the Gothic and Old High German the infinitive instead of the supine after *come*, *go*, *send*; as, *Ni hugjaþ ei gemjau gatairan vitop aippau praufetuns*, Mt. v, 17; *jah gagg faurpis gasibjon bropr peinamma*, ib. v, 24. *pans sandja briggan anst izvara in Iairusalem*. 1 Cor. xvi, 3. *Tho sleih ther farari*

irfindan uuer er uuari. Otf. ii, 4, 5; the English requires the participle instead of the infinitive in *I could not help laughing, I continued working, he forbore speaking*, etc. The substantive element of the infinitive and participle hinder them from designating exact time. Moreover the participle expresses the qualities of the adjective, and only becomes a noun through its adjective nature, while the infinitive is from the very outset a verbal noun. The insertion of the infinitive of the verbum substantivum (*sein, esse* *irrati*) with the logical factive, as *Socratem sapientem esse judicavit*, was the first step in the transition to *Socratem sapere judicavit*. *Sie wandon dih mir irbolgenen* (*irbolgenen wesen, irbelgan*). The fine shade of meaning between the two expressions is here lost sight of. The fact that in English the real participial termination —*ende* has been supplanted by the suffix —*ing*, originally employed in the formation of abstract substantives and verbal nouns, or more exactly, gerunds, has greatly enlarged the functions of the present participle so-called, or more correctly speaking, one form now performs the functions of the participle, the gerund and the abstract noun, so that it is almost impossible to separate for syntactical purposes these three different relations. Inasmuch as the gerund approaches very near the infinitive, the transition in Modern English from participle to infinitive, or vice versa, becomes comparatively easy. In the older language, however, there was more opposition to this transition, though even there we find the participle where we should expect the infinitive, and we have just seen that the infinitive often usurps the place of the participle. Verbs signifying *to begin, to end, to cease*, and verbs of emotion employ the participial construction. And this participial construction obtained in the earliest Germanic languages, as the following examples prove: Anglo-Saxon! *pā se Hælend pys geendude hys twelf leorning-cnyhtum bebeonde*, Mt. xi, 1. Goth. *Usfullida Iesus anabiudans paim tvalif sponjam seinaim*, ib. *Bipeh pan gananpida rodjans, qap du Seimonau*, Luke v, 4. Greek, *ἐτέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς διοτάσσων*. But the Anglo-Saxon differs from the Gothic and Greek in Mk. ix, 32. *Hi ondrēdon hine ḫsigende*; Gothic, *jah ohtedun ina fraihnan*; Greek, *ἐθοβοῦτο αὐτὸν ἐπερωτῆσαι*. The accusative dependent upon it, may have been the cause for the use of the infinitive in Greek and Gothic.

This near approach of the participle and infinitive in express-

ing the relation of the factive points to shades of difference in its original function which in the development of language have been differentiated into shades of meaning naturally represented by the nearly related participle and infinitive. This differentiation, however, did not become so pronounced as to preclude an exchange of functions between the two. An investigation of the origin of the infinitive (and participle) may throw some light on the nature of the original functions of the factitive.

The development of the infinitive system in the cognate European languages, before all in Greek, where it has been most complete, forms one of the most interesting chapters in the history of the growth of language. Starting in the very infancy of the language we find this relation gradually developing itself from somewhat narrow boundaries to a complete and magnificent system capable of expressing very varied relations, and carefully distinguishing fine shades of meaning. Nor did it start from any part of the verb, but from the noun, though even in its earliest stages we find it invested with some of the qualities of the verb, and capable of performing at least one of the verbal functions; viz., that of governing a dependent noun. The real infinitive in Sanskrit is the accusative case of the abstract noun formed by the suffix *tu- m* from which we also find the instrumental case *tvā* (according to Bopp iii, 249) and the dative *tarvē* or *tarvāi* and the Gen—abl. *tos*. Inasmuch as the infinitive in *tum* does not everywhere express the accusative relation, but others lying far from it, its real accusative form was not recognized, and its true nature and relation long misunderstood, though clearly shown in its dependence upon verbs or verbal substantives or adjectives signifying *will, wish, know, can, begin, strive, order, conclude* and the like, or on expressions of motion where the accusative indicates the objective point of the motion and is the usual construction in skr. Of this a passage in the *Sakuntalā* furnishes us the best example, where, of two actions governed by the verb signifying *to begin*, one is expressed by the accusative of an abstract noun in *a*, and the other by the infinitive in *tum*: *bā hūtsēpan rōditun-ca pravrttā*, 'arm-out-stretching and to weep she began.' Here we can also observe the first faint beginnings of that construction which now plays so important a part in the European family, I mean the accusative with the infinitive after *verba declarandi et sentiendi*. Thus in the *Sāvitri* stands, *yadī māngivitum iccasi,=si me vivere*

cupis. After verbs of motion we see this infinitive usurping the place of the causal dative, while the special dative relation is generally expressed by the genitive which in Prâkrit and Pâli has entirely suppressed the dative. This probably led to the use of the infinitive in *tum* to express the causal relation where the infinitive simply gives the reason of the motion, and then even after verbs expressing no motion whatever, as *alan tê pândupa trânâm baktiyâ klê's'am upâsítum*, away with thy love to the Pându—sons, *in order to bear pain*. After expressions of time, also we find the dative relation expressed by the infinitive in *tum* where the genitive or the Latin Gerund in *di* might properly stand, as *nâ' yankâlô vilambitum*—this is not the time for hesitation or to hesitate. *Pândavân hantum mantrati*—the plan to kill the Pândavas (dat. would be for killing, and is the same change that is made in English). The ordinary accusative occasionally expresses the relation of cause or purpose, as in *Sampadam dâivum abigâto 'si*—thou wert born to a divine lot. On the other hand the dative of the common abstract noun often encroaches upon the functions of the genuine accusative infinitive, in particular after *upa-kram* to begin, as *gamanâyô 'pacakramê*, he began to go (to going or for going instead of the going); we even find the limiting passive object; as, *astrâni darsanâyô 'pacakramê*, he began to show the weapons (to or for showing instead of the showing). This construction also occurs after verbs of wishing, etc., after *ut-sah*—can, where we find the dative governing the passive object like the common accusative infinitive, as *tvâm . . . nô' tsahé paribôgâyâ*—I cannot enjoy thee (to or for enjoying instead of the enjoying). Even the objective point of the verb of motion stands in the dative: *vanâya pravavraguh*.—They walked forth to the wood.

From the above examples we see that the accusative infinitives in *tum* and the dative (infinitives) of the abstract nouns in *ana* and *a* were interchangeable, a fact of all the more importance as the latter suffixes (in connection with others) have superseded the suffix *-tu-m* in the formation of infinitives in the European family; of these *ana* is here more important as forming the infinitive in German. In Sanskrit we find it not only in the dative case expressing the special dative relations, but also in the locative, which, as already observed, often assumes dative functions; as a rule, however, such infinitive—locatives govern the genitive, though they occasionally take the accusative in-

stead: *tām . . . na tu kascana niranē 'bhavac caktō dwyamānam* = but none of his friends were able (lit.) in the holding him the player back. The abstract in *a* is less frequently used for the infinitive, appearing also in the ablative and genitive cases (which are alike in form), though here the functions approach nearer those of an abstract noun. Another peculiarity of the Sanskrit infinitive in *tum* is the manner in which it acquires the force of the failing passive infinitive after auxiliaries signifying *can*, *to be able*, etc., by employing the passive form of such auxiliary, as *nā hartun sakyatē punah* = it (the cloth) cannot be got again, lit., it is not able to get again (cf. Bopp iii, 301 § 870 and 302.*)

The Gothic infinitive, formed, as above stated, by the suffix *ana*, has functions closely corresponding to those of the Sanskrit infinitive in *tum* and its equivalents the dative-infinitives, though showing a more advanced stage of development. One of its most remarkable similarities to the sk. infinitives is the manner in which it expresses the passive voice of the infinitive by the passive form of the auxiliary, signifying *can* (*mag* = can, am able) which forms its passive by the proper tenses of *visan* and the preterit passive participle (with present signification) *mahts*, *mahta*, *maht*. And though the Gothic can form the passive by means of *vairpan* and the past passive participle, yet it prefers this method wherever in the Greek text the passive infinitive is dependent upon a verb signifying *can*, as *maht vēsi* — — *frabukjan* = *ηδύνατο πραθῆναι*. Mk. xiv, 5; *qinō* — *ni mahta vas fram ainðmēhun galikinðn* = *γυνὴ οὐκ ἴσχυσεν ὑπὸ δενδρὸς θεραπευθῆναι*, Luke viii, 43. In the same manner the preterit passive participle (with present signification) *skulds*, *skulda*, *skuld* is employed to give passive signification to the active infinitive, as *unte sunns mans skulds ist atgiban in handuns mannē* = *μέλλει παραδιδοσθαι*, Luke ix, 44, (must be delivered, lit. is obliged to deliver). But the use of the active infinitive for the passive is not confined to these two constructions. Often only the context or an added dative of the personal pronoun, either alone or after the preposition *fram*, as in Sanskrit the instrumental, can determine whether the idea expressed by the infinitive is active or passive. cf. Mt. vi, 1, *du saiħvan im=πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι αὐτοῖς*. Here even the Greek employed the article to give a more concrete idea; without the personal *im* the Gothic would be active.

But more commonly the passive signification of the Gothic

active infinitive is to be inferred from the context, especially in those cases in which the infinitive expresses the causal relation, the peculiar function of the dative-infinitive in *tu* in the Vēda-dialect, or of one of its equivalents. The Gothic either employs the infinitive with the preposition *du*, or the bare infinitive after verbs of motion, in which case, aside from the possible passive signification, it corresponds to the Latin supine: *gerunnun hiumanns managai hausjan jah leikinōn fram imma*, many came to hear and be healed by him, Luke v, 15. Sometimes the strictly active infinitive expressing a causal relation is employed without *du* even after verbs not expressing motion: *ei mis gibaideau vaurd . . . kanjan runa aivangēljōns* = that the word may be given me . . . to announce the secrets of the evangels. This causal function of the preposition *du* before the infinitive is its earliest and would appear to be the first beginning of that desire to give more concreteness to the relations which the case-endings more loosely indicated, a tendency which spread rapidly in German. Besides its other functions in German this preposition has as it were become almost the sign of the factitive relation, in this respect performing the function of the mere dative ending of the infinitive in *tu* in the Vēda-dialect, or of one of the abstract nouns used instead; in classic Sanskrit the locative of the abstract in *ana* often performed this function. Other examples are found in expressions like, he went out to sow, *du saian*, who has ears to hear *du hausjan*, etc. The use of *du* even spread to the nominative case where we cannot follow it. Nor shall we even touch upon those cases where the Gothic has been influenced by the Greek construction.

Another rare construction in Sanskrit already mentioned is the one, which, if not the germ of that later important construction of the *accusativus cum infinitivo*, is at least strongly analogous to it. The following example will serve to show this: *na givitum tvān viscahē = non vivere te sustines*; *kam api rāqān-an snatum tatra dadarsa* = I saw a king bathe there. In such cases the infinitive is properly the appositive of the passive object, or approaches as near that relation as possible, and this may well have been the primitive relation of the so-called second accusative. It would, however, be a very difficult undertaking to trace back to their origin the different shades of relation which make up the double accusative, or the *accusativus cum infinitivo* as we now know them. The historical origin of this

accusative construction lies in the fact already asserted by Hübschmann that the accusative is the case to represent most appropriately the noun-meaning. The influence of the other cases will soon call our attention; first we will notice some of the different shades of meaning furnished by this construction in Gothic, sometimes agreeing with, and again differing from the Greek: *jabai nu gasaihvip sunu mans uscigan* = εὰν οὐρ θεωρᾶτε τὸν ὑιὸν τοῦ αὐθεώπου ἀναβαῖνοντα, Jno. vi, 62; *haihait galeipan siþonjans hindar marein*, he bad the disciples go over the sea; *gatauja iqvis vairpan nutans mannē*, ποιήσω ὑμᾶς γενέσθαι ἀλεῖς αὐθεώπων; *vaurkeip þans mains anakumbjan* = ποιήσατε τοὺς αὐθεώπους ἀναπεσεῖν; *ni vileim þana þiudinðn ufar unsis*, οὐ θελομεν τὸν τιν βασιλευσατε ἐφ ἡμᾶς (we will not have this fellow rule over us). The O. H. G. shows a greater variety and the Modern German still more, in other words there has been a gradual enlargement of the relations expressed by the infinitive from the earlier periods to the present time. Delbrück (synt. Försch., p. 121) in his concluding remarks on the development of the infinitive system, sums up the whole matter thus: "Certain forms which we call infinitives are originally datives of abstract nouns, which are distinguished from the datives of other nouns, only by being able to take verbal constructions, and in that they seldom form other cases from the same stem. Thus the infinitive in the hitherto described sense is nothing but a syntactical category." On p. 124 he continues: "Capelle justly says that the oldest use of this form is shown in the final and consecutive infinitive in Homer (p. 95). This use evidently extends back to the dative original meaning of the infinitive (which had imbibed the locative element)." It must be remembered that the infinitive in *tum* is lost to the European family.

A careful consideration of a few of the salient points just brought out in the foregoing discussion of the origin and later development of the infinitive will aid us to determine the origin, nature and original function of our factitive, which the infinitive often expresses. It would thus appear that the real primitive force of the factitive was to express a causal relation existing between the verbal idea and the factitive. It denoted the purpose, aim, effect produced by the joint action of the verb and factitive; the compound action thus created governed the passive object. With verbs of motion it indicated the direction

and objection point toward which the passive object, if any, or agent, moved in order to execute such action. The first relation was naturally expressed by the dative, while the latter belongs to the functions of the accusative, though also expressed by the dative. But from the outset boundaries were not strictly drawn: the uncertain limits between the dative and locative relations soon added a portion of the locative function to the factitive, and this opened the way for the genitive and the nearly related ablative which itself is closely connected to the instrumental. But this latter case was rarely called into requisition in forming the composite nature of the later factitive as we know it in the European family. Its composite nature may in many instances account for the manifold shades of relation expressed by the factitive, extending from real apposition to those vague and almost indefinite relations expressed by adverbs, and which make the factitive case so difficult to define and understand. The fact that its case-form finally disappeared is in part an accident of the growth of language, but it is in a greater degree due to the interchangeable nature of the accusative and dative relations. Cf. the Latin infinitives which have become accusative from old dative forms and the English dative *him*, now used as accusative. Yet the Latin has retained the factitive dative (for which) after the verb *esse*, in expressions like: *rem lucro habere, laudi, crimini dare, auxilio venire*, but the genitive in *magni facere, flocti facere*, etc. The accusative finally prevailed in most cases, and the factitive was assigned to the province of the accusative. As the case-endings do not express the relation between the verb and its object so exactly as the prepositions we find the latter often introduced to give that precision and exactness to the relation. For this reason the Gothic employed the preposition *du* (German *zu*) to express the causal relation, the primary function of *du*. Hence the almost universal use of *zu* in Modern German to denote the factitive relation.

IV.—*How far should our Teaching and Text-books have a Scientific Basis?*

By H. C. G. BRANDT, A. M.,

PROFESSOR OF FRENCH AND GERMAN IN HAMILTON COLLEGE,
CLINTON, N. Y.

AT a meeting of Natural Science Men, held a couple of years ago at Berlin, the question which I have proposed to ourselves was discussed. Much to the surprise of the adherents of Darwinism, Prof. Virchow maintained, that the doctrine of Darwin should not be taught in any institution lower than the University, that it should not enter the text-book of natural history used in a school of any grade from the *volks schule* up to the Gymnasium and *Realschule*. I am not able to judge whether Virchow's view is too conservative in the field of natural science. But it is possible in any branch of learning to set before students theories and generalizations when they ought to be fed upon the old, hard and dry facts and laws. This method is the more vicious; the newer these theories and the vaguer these generalizations. But when the latest results consist of new facts and new laws of language well established, conservatism in the adoption and in the teaching of them becomes a great fault and a great injustice. I admit, that there is danger in going too fast and too far in adopting and teaching the new results, but in the department of Modern Languages as in many other departments the danger lies in the other direction, not merely in ultra-conservatism in appropriating and digesting the new results, not merely in ignoring them, but in unpremeditated, unconscious, down right ignorance of them.

I am ready to lay down and defend the following proposition: All teaching should start from a strictly scientific basis, and all aids in teaching, the text-books, reference books, etc., should be constructed upon a strictly scientific basis.

It may seem to some of you that I am re-asserting what nobody denies, and want to defend what nobody attacks. But let us not be deceived :

1. There are plenty of Classical Philologists—claiming to be the philologists par excellence, sneering at the same time at Comparative Philology and its results—who deny that there is a scientific basis to Modern Philology. They assert, that the study of Modern Languages is hardly worthy of the serious pursuit of students and investigators.

2. There are many, who may not deny the claim of a science to the study of Modern Language, but they do not care whether it is or not. They want to learn how to read or to speak a little French or German or Italian, because the ability to do so is of great value to them. They are the utilitarians taking the “bread and butter view” of our study. Even if they are the devotees of another science, they do not hesitate to put themselves on a level with the merchant and the traveller, who want a little French and German, “just enough to get along, you know.” They do not object to learning even “a little Latin and less Greek,” because the vocabulary of their branch of learning is largely made up of words derived from Latin and Greek.

3. There are even teachers of modern languages, who do not realize, that their department is a science. They teach at random, some with a text-book, some without any. At best they satisfy the utilitarian’s demands, and even this they could do better, if they took a strictly scientific starting-point.

I believe, therefore, that I am not asserting the obvious, when I declare that our department *is* a science, and that its teaching must be carried on accordingly.

Were this proposition accepted, it would not be very difficult to fix the extent, to which the latest results reached in our science should be taught in the class-room or—what amounts to the same thing—how far these results should be embodied in the text-books. In fact, were our Association not as limited as it is—for very good reasons, to be sure—and were our papers intended to be brought before the general public, I am not sure but it would be worth our while to state the reasons, why our department is a science. But among us this will hardly be necessary. I need only recall such names as ten Brink, Sweet, Skeat, Scherer, the father of the “Jung grammatischer,” tho Saturn-like he would now devour his own children, Sievers, Paul, Verner, Braune, Kluge, Gröber, Tobler, Förster, Neumann. We recognize these men as the foremost among those who have developed within the last fifteen years the old humdrum,

empirical treatment of living languages into the scientific study of them of to-day. They have done even more than that. Investigating the phenomena of *living* languages they have reached results which are valuable contributions to the science of language and comparative philology. They have started a new branch of philology, viz., Phonetics, invented new methods of investigation, and gained deep insight into the nature of language—I refer to Paul's *Principien der Sprachzenhie*. These men are modern-language-men. They are Professors of either English, German or French (excepting Sweet) in England and Germany. And yet we are told, that these men and we, their pupils and humble followers, have no science as the basis and the goal of our endeavors!

Let us be bold enough to take for granted that we have a science and inquire now, why and how we should resort to this science in our teaching.

Let me give first a few reasons why:

1. By basing our instruction and text-books upon a scientific ground-work, our department and our profession gain dignity and weight. It has been often remarked, with how much justice I do not care to discuss that the still prevailing method of teaching Latin and Greek is old-fashioned, stale and stereotyped. The trouble with our teaching of modern languages is, that it is loose, random, unsystematic. This trouble is partly due to the fact, that our students come to us with such various objects in view. One wants to *speak* French only, the other to *read* it only, and only Prose at that, so that he can read French scientific books and journals. The third wants to study it thoroughly, the fourth wants its literature and its philology. We naturally vary our methods in teaching these groups of students. But we can go too far in this. The student who wants only to speak French, that is, to acquire a couple hundred phrases and a vocabulary to talk about the weather and all kinds of "small talk," has little claim upon the instructor in a high-school, college or university. Even the *natural method* can hardly save him at his age. He should have begun in the nursery, when the mother as the "bonne" was all in all to him, primer, grammar, dictionary and literature. We cannot bring back to him in our class-rooms the conditions in which the *natural method* is the only proper one. The *natural* method can have no claim upon us. I distinguish between the natural and the *oral* method, which combined with

grammar and exercises, is the best preparation for acquiring a speaking knowledge. It is even quite feasible to accustom a large class to the spoken word and train the *ear* as well as the *eye*. But the *natural* method we cannot use. For all other methods the ground-work should be scientific. I mean by that, that for instance the systems of inflection which the students learn should be such as can be traced to older systems, and be compared with those of related languages. Even if the student never study the language in its older periods, and only wants to acquire ability to read ordinary prose, the lowest purpose any one can have. As another instance, taken from German, the terminology should be scientific, though we never go so far as to study the nature and history of *Ablaut*, *Umlaut* and other phonetic laws, the scientific terms can be used in the most elementary section of the grammar.

A scientific basis dignifies our profession. I do not wish to hurt any body's feelings, or bite off my own nose—for I am a foreigner myself—but our calling suffers from a large number of foreign-born teachers, who have never gone through any course of preparation and training for their work. The foreigner too often knows English very imperfectly, is a violent advocate of the natural method and takes to teaching, because he thinks he is naturally fitted for teaching his mother-tongue. The American teacher too often neglects the phonetics of the foreign tongue, teaches German or French because he has happened to sojourn a while in Germany or France, or because in the department for which he has really prepared himself abroad, there happens to be no vacancy at home. In short, the feeling is, *any body* can teach French or German or what is just as dangerous, *any body* can teach English. By introducing scientific methods, we shall show before very long that every body cannot so teach, that the teacher must be as specially and as scientifically trained for his work in our department as well as in any other.

2. A scientific basis for our instruction and text-books is easiest, even for the beginner and for the student, who never goes farther into the language than is usually required in college or for admission to college. The so-called "practical" arrangements are often so fanciful, the rules so weighed down with exceptions, the groupings so arbitrary, that even with the large amount of exercises after the Ollendorfian system, the student might as well learn the inflection of each noun and each verb

by itself. When the student advances to the elective and maximum courses of the college, and to the historical and comparative work of the university, the advantage of the scientific ground-work of his elementary course is apparent to every instructor able to conduct higher studies.

3. A scientific basis affords a valuable discipline, otherwise, not attained from the study of a living language. There is a great deal of prejudice still on this score against our department, strongest, perhaps, against the study of English. But the prejudice that if any discipline is to be gained from the study of languages, Greek and Latin are *the* ones to be studied, has been shaken somewhat of late. But I want to say frankly that I cannot go the whole length that some of us and representatives of other departments have gone in the opposition to Greek and Latin. Our friends representing the Romance languages and English cannot do without Latin under any circumstances.

I am not in favor of throwing Greek overboard and taking on any amount of Modern Language to replace it. I always feel misgivings when we speak of a modern language as "replacing," as a "substitute for," or as an "equivalent of" Greek. But I do think, that French "im aller weitsten Sinn" scientifically studied, is worth as a disciplinary study, any amount of the old-fashioned syntactical gymnastics, which generally stands for Latin or Greek.

When "English" meant, and too often still means a certain amount of orthœpy, elocution, style and literature, when we teach French and German as if they were accomplishments like dancing, fencing, or final touches to be put on (to) young ladies in their seminaries at an extra charge, and on (to) young gentlemen, who have not brains enough to get into college, our department is justly charged with affording no mental discipline. Let "English" mean as it should and as it is bound to mean more and more, the historical scientific study of the language, Beowulf and Chaucer. Let "German" for students of the grade with which we have mainly to do mean an intelligent acquisition of its sounds, a drill in the various laws of its phonology, Ablaut, Umlaut, Grimm's Law, English and German correspondences and cognates, syntactical analysis of Lessing's and Schiller's Prose, and of the difficult parts of Faust and of Nathan der Weise, the reading of the masterpieces of German literature, speaking and writing the language, and we claim without pre-

sumption, that the discipline acquired by going through such courses, while *different* from the discipline afforded by the study of Greek is not *inferior* to it. More than that. Two sides of this discipline Greek cannot afford at all, viz.:

1. That gained from the exact analysis and reproduction of foreign sounds or in the case of English of the Old English pronunciation. The Greek and Latin sounds are difficult to reconstruct.

2. That gained from so entering into the spirit of a foreign language as to be able not merely to appreciate its best literature which is the utmost attained in studying Greek, but to speak the language, to think in it, live in it, dream in it. Is it logical to claim that it trains the mental powers to reproduce the ancient Latin and to deny this to the reproduction of Neo-Latin? I have taken for granted that our department is a science and tried to give some reasons, *why* our instruction should have a scientific basis.

I will now briefly return to the question how far the latest scientific results shall enter our instruction. It seems clear, that when the results are pretty safely established, we should make use of them. They may not have been generally accepted yet. We cannot always wait for that. We *must* keep abreast of the latest research and sift its results. Every department will have its own tests.

In English and German, I think that Grassmann's and Verner's investigations, which have explained the two large groups of exceptions to Grimm's Law, should be made use of. I should leave alone all speculations about the cause and starting-point of the General Teutonic shifting, but the facts of Grimm's Law, including those of Verner's Law, ought to be taught. It is to be regretted that Sweet in his Anglo-Saxon Primer and Reader does not state the laws in the Phonology. He says, "s becomes r in the preterite plurals and past participles of strong verbs; th—d under the same conditions." Of course, these transitions take place according to Verner's Law, and why not state it? A student does not get that clear-cut impression from such separate statements of facts as Sweet gives. In the very next paragraph, he says, "r is often transposed," which means the transposition of r is no law. But the student ought to be made to understand clearly the difference between such an unexplained sporadic change as this and the interchange of s—r, th—d,

which *must* take place, if there is such a thing as Verner's Law in the Teutonic Languages, which no one yet has ventured to gain say. In my opinion, there is nothing more stimulative of thinking and investigating than this conviction, that phonetic laws like physical laws, are not liable to unexplainable exceptions.

Of very few laws, it is true, *all* exceptions have been accounted for, but if the laws are firmly established and apparent exceptions are still unexplained, the greater is the benefit derived from studying and applying them. The fruitful work that has lately been done upon ablaut and accent can be made to tell in our treatment of strong verbs and word formation in a modern language, without shooting over the heads of students and entering too much into comparative philology. The strong-verb-classes should be based upon the now well established ablaut series. It is a mistake to expect students of college grade to learn the strong verbs individually and separately. They are learned more easily in the groups, into which they naturally fall according to their ablaut.

In conclusion, I will mention a very important subject, concerning which we ought, in my opinion, to teach the latest results, viz.: Phonetics. The analysis and synthesis of sounds is no mean branch of General Philology, though poohed at by many philologists. It certainly forms a large part of our work. We ought to employ above all the analysis of vowels by their articulation and not by the effect upon the ear, according to the Bell-Sweet system, now also adopted by Sievers. Persons from 14 to 20 years old ought not to be expected to learn foreign sounds by the almost unconscious imitation, proper enough in the nursery. Sounds can be acquired without knowing the movements of the organs of speech, just as I can raise my arm without knowing the movements of muscles. But by scientific instruction we can save time, and attain an accuracy otherwise never reached by adults. Think also of the large number of our students who have no aptitude for acquiring new sounds. By imitation alone they never acquire them. If we teach them the articulation according to a scientific system, it is possible to redeem some from their awkwardness and helplessness.

V.—*On the Genitive in Old French.*

BY HANS C. G. VON JAGEMANN, PH. D.,

PROFESSOR OF THE GERMANIC LANGUAGES AND PHILOLOGY IN
INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON, IND.

SOME years ago a German teacher published a pamphlet the object of which was to show that Latin and Modern French syntax could be taught by the same rules. The idea was not a bad one, for there are certainly a great many points in which Latin and French usage resemble each other very closely, but unfortunately the points of difference are so numerous that it would be utterly impracticable to teach a boy Latin and French at the same time without completely confusing him. On the other hand, if a student is already well grounded in the fundamental rules of Latin syntax, constant reference to the same must be regarded as a valuable help in teaching Modern French, particularly if the additional element of the Old French can be drawn upon for comparison.

The object of the present paper is to show how, as far as the use of the genitive case is concerned, Latin differs from Modern French and what intermediate position the Old French holds between the two. As the representative of the Old French I have selected the "*Histoire de la conquête de Constantinople*" by Villehardouin¹ since this writer is really the first original French prose writer of any account. Most of the French prose writings before Villehardouin were either translations of Latin works or slavish imitations of such without regard to the genius of the new language.

It is usually said that in the transformation of the Popular Latin into the Romance languages two agencies may be seen at work: first, phonetic decay, second the tendency toward analytical construction. Different writers have insisted more particularly on either one or the other of these two principles and in fact it would be possible,—theoretically—to explain most changes on the ground of either one of the linguistic tendencies named.

¹ The figures in the references denote sections and lines in the edition of Villehardouin by Paulin Paris, Paris, 1848.

For an analytical language can do away with declensional and conjugational inflections, hence a tendency toward analytical construction means also a tendency toward simplification of forms, hence phonetic decay. On the other hand, the tendency toward phonetic decay admitted, the decrease of distinctive inflections arising from the same, would produce a tendency toward analytical construction as a substitute for the lost inflections. Or, to give a particular instance: it is possible that the loss of the Latin case endings made it necessary to express case relations by prepositions, as was done in the Romance languages; but, theoretically, it is also possible, that the use of prepositions gave rise to the dropping of the case endings, since now, without sacrificing clearness, case relations could be expressed without the cumbrous inflections.

While we may thus theoretically ascribe the majority of the changes that took place in the transformation of the Popular Latin into the Romance tongue, to either the principle of phonetic decay or the tendency toward analytical construction, there is historical evidence enough to show that phonetic decay was the older and stronger of the two agencies. Not only is it universally found in language, but in the Popular Latin particularly it may be traced back to very remote times. On the other hand, the tendency toward analytical construction must be admitted as an independent linguistic agency, as we find traces of such constructions quite independent of phonetic decay. Cicero's "habeo dictum" is almost too well known to be quoted.

By this tendency toward analytical construction the Latin preposition *de*, originally denoting the going out, departure, removal or separating of a thing from any fixed point, came to be used to express relations which in Classical Latin had been expressed by the genitive case. From the idea of "going out of" grew out that of "belonging to" and this coincided with the principal idea which seems to have underlain the Latin genitive. Hence we find already in the Popular Latin such constructions as *quarrada de melle*, a load of honey, *monasterium de Santo Mauritio*, *homo de viginti annis*, etc. (Diez).

On the other hand, where in Latin the ablative case was used to denote relations similar to those of "going out of" or "originating in," as, for instance, in the case of the so-called ablative of cause or of instrument, the loss of the ablative case in French

and the general levelling tendency of the new language caused such relations likewise to be expressed by the genitive.

Thirdly, the preposition *de* is used in French in all cases where the same was used in Latin, e. g. *de te loquimur: nous parlons de toi*. Here *de* is a real preposition, not merely a case particle and we cannot properly call *de toi* a genitive.

Our subject divides itself hence into two parts:

1. The French genitive succeeding the Latin genitive.
2. The French genitive succeeding the Latin ablative.

The Genitive in French succeeding the Latin Genitive.

The genitive is used in Latin :

1. as *genitivus subjectivus* : to denote that which does something or to which a thing belongs, e. g. *facta Caesaris, horti Caesaris*. In French the preposition *de* takes the place of the Latin genitive, but in Old French the case particle is often omitted and the simple objective case used. Here we must distinguish between proper names, nouns denoting persons and such denoting things.

a. The oblique case without *de* of proper names, without a preceding noun denoting a title, etc., occurs rarely. We find it, however, in *la merci Dieu, el voyage Dieu* 49.15, 51.7, etc., *l'incarnation Jhesu Christ* 1.2, *la honte Jhesu-Christ* 12.6, etc.; also *el lieu Thiebaut de Champaigne* 27.6, *au tens Innocent l'apostle de Rome* 1.2, and *en la main Joffroi le mareschal* 124.34, 149.20; also in apposition, vid. below.

b. Before nouns denoting persons the case particle is often omitted, especially after words denoting family relations like *frères, fils, suer*, etc.: *li fils l'empereour de Constantinoble qui est frères sa femme* 51.4, *sa femme fu fille le roi de Navarre* 23.13; vid. 30.13, 51.4. 59.3, 60.3, 68.5, etc. Also often after words like *palais, ostel, conseil, mesnie*, vid. 3.4, 24.4, 37.7, 53.6, 62.39, 64.4, 75.19, etc.

Hence in Modern French such expressions as *Fête-Dieu, Hôtel-Dieu, église St. Pierre, rue Voltaire, Quarantaine-le-Roi*, etc.

When two nouns in the genitive case are governed by the same word, *de* is sometimes used before the one, but omitted before the other, e. g.: *les noces l'empereour Henri de Constantinoble et de la fille le marchis de Monferrat* 169.29. When one

genitive is governed by another, *de* is sometimes, but rarely omitted before both: *de la mesnie le frère Baudoin de Flandres* 75.19.

c. Omission of *de* before common nouns does not occur. Beside the omission of the case-particle, the frequent substitution of the dative for the Latin subjective genitive is worthy of notice. This construction is most common in cases similar to those where *de* is omitted. We find *la fille au roi Tancré*, *la fille dou roi Tancré*, and *la fille le roi Tancré*, vid. 6.3, 20.13, 25.4, 26.10, 32.24, etc. This construction is common in the popular phraseologie of the present day. When the governing noun is used as predicate with the auxiliary verb *estre*, the dative seems to have been preferred to either of the two other constructions: *la contesse Marie qui suer estoit au conte Thiebaut de Champagne* 6.3. Exception: *une cité qui avoit esté l'empereour de Constantinoble* 150.18. The dative of a personal pronoun is found once: *qui cousins germains li estoit* 122.9. Once we find in the same sentence two constructions combined: *cil dist à l'empereour Baudoin moult vivement le message son seigneur et as autres barons*, 123.8. The dative *as autres barons* belongs to *message*, not to *dist*, as might be supposed. Vid. chap. 121. Singular is the use of the dative in the following connection: *mcult fu grans desconfors aus pelerins de la mort au conte Thiebaut de Champagne* 25.6.

With the above exceptions the Latin genitivus subjectivus is regularly expressed by the preposition *de*. Here it may be remarked that words like *endroit*, *parmi*, *environ*, etc., which are originally composed of a preposition and a noun, and would therefore require the genitive, are already used as simple prepositions, governing the oblique case. Besides those already mentioned we have in Villehardouin: *contremont*, *contreval*, *emmi*, *encoste*, *entour*.

A peculiar kind of the subjective genitive is the genitive of apposition, which is already used in Latin, but to a much smaller extent than in Modern French. In Latin it is always used after words like *vox*, *nomen*, *verbum*, etc.; sometimes after *oppidum*, *terra*, *provincia*, etc.; regularly, when the genus is defined by the species: *virtus continentiae*. In Modern French this genitive is used wherever there is a subordination of a special term to a generic term: Villehardouin employs it very regularly; but whenever the special term is a personal proper name, the

case particle is dropped according to the usage spoken of above. We find therefore: *la cité de Jerusalem* 130.20, 132.6, etc.; *le païs de Bourgoigne* 28.9; *la terre de Babilone* 52.19, 59.21, 87.9, etc.; *el palais de Calcidoine* 64.8, 65.17, 74.6, etc.; *le chastel de Buiemont* 74.23, 105.14, 154.28, etc.; *le flum de Charte* 163.5; *le mois d'avril* 172.1, 177.52; *la montagne de Blaquier* 176.16, 177.59. No exceptions.

But the case-particle is omitted in the following cases; *l'église Sainte Sophie* 163.17, but *une église de Sainte Jehan de l'ospital de Jerusalem* 89.43; *qui ot non Foulque de Nulli* 1.5, 10.9, 23.13, 42.2, 47.14 and many other examples, no exceptions; *el moustier Saint-Marc* 15.2, 23.11, 62.2, etc.; but *el moustier des Apôtres* 111.2; *l'abaie Nostre Dame de Soisson* 27.4; *l'autel Saint Marc* 40.10; *la feste Saint Martin* 44.18, 59.17, 62.27, 87.57, and many other examples. The omission of *de* after *feste* was the first step toward the modern elliptical construction: *la Saint-Michel*, etc., comp. 18.9, 89.23; exceptions: *la feste de Nostre-Dame Chandeleur* 156.3, but without *de* 168.26; *la feste de Saint Marc* 39.2. Other examples: *le bras Saint-George* 60.38, 61.7, etc.; *la tour Galatas* 71.11; *le gonfanon Saint Marc* 78.4, 79.1; *l'ille Saint-Nicholas* 33.8, but *l'ile de Grece* 109.32. The last example will be a proof of the correctness of the observation, that as a rule the case-particle is omitted only before personal proper names. Exceptions are not found in Villehardouin, rarely in other places, e. g.: *Gehsesmani vil' es n'anez*, and *andez, fillies Jherusalem*. (Passion du Christ).

As to the syntactical position of the subjective genitive it must be remarked, that while in Modern French the genitive must immediately follow its governing noun, in Villehardouin's language the same may be separated by other members of the sentence; also inversion may take place, which in Modern French is only allowed in poetry: *quar une meslée commença des Véniciens et des Français* 49.28, *moult fu grant décroissement à l'ost de ceux qui . . .* 33.3. The oblique case as well as the dative used in place of the genitive, generally follow the governing noun; exceptions are rare and occur only with *Dieu*: *par la Dieu grace, la Dieu merci, la Dieu main* 50.13, 49.15, 51.7, 96.23.

2. The genitive is used in Latin, as *genitivus objectivus*, to denote that which is affected by the action or feeling spoken of. It is expressed by Villehardouin as well as in Modern French by

the preposition *de*: *il metra tout l'empire de Constantinoble à l'obedience de Rome* 51.4; *qui tel murdre et tele traison avoit fait de son seigneur* 127.9; *et i firent grant gaaing de proies et de prisons* 99.13, etc.

Diez says (Gr. d. r. Spr. 5. ed. p. 868): "in der formel *amor dei* fällt im Prov. und Altfr. die casuspartikel aus." There are, however, several other cases, where Villehardouin omits the case-particle before the objective genitive: *le service Dieu* 1.16, 25.7, 57.25; *la vengeance nostre Seigneur* 17.13; *le secours l'empereour* 137.54; *la féaulté l'empereour* 114.5.

The syntactical position of the objective genitive is the same as that of the subjective genitive.

3. The genitive is used in Latin, as *genitivus qualitatis*, to denote the external condition or the internal nature of a person or a thing, either joined directly to the governing noun, or by an elliptical construction, as predicate in connexion with the verbs *esse, fieri, haberi*. In either case the genitive must be accompanied by an adjective. Under the same conditions the *ablativus qualitatis* may be used, the latter, however, expressing generally only transitory qualities or conditions. In French the genitive is used to express these relations, and it is also used to denote the material of which a thing is composed, where in Latin an adjective would be employed: *une maison de bois*. Villehardouin's use of the genitive of quality agrees on the whole with that of the Modern French; a remnant of the Latin construction, however, is found in the regular accompaniment of nouns expressing internal qualities by adjectives: *qui ert prisiés et de grand renom* 148.4; *mais il estoit de moult grant cuer* 46.6. Transitory qualities, which in Latin are usually expressed by the ablative, are sometimes put in the dative: *qui mout estoient à grant paor* 138.9, a confusion of cases, which, during the time of the formation of a language, cannot surprise us. The genitive of quality is often used after *estre*: *moult fu li os bel et de bonnes gens* 33.9. To express the material of which a thing is made, the genitive is used as in Modern French: *un pont de pierre* 74.9, etc. The position of the genitive of quality is always after the governing noun.

4. The genitive is used in Latin, as *genitivus partitivus*, to express the whole of which anything is a part, or to which it belongs as a part. A comparison of the Old French use of the partitive genitive with that of the Latin and the Modern French

will show better than anything else what intermediate position the Old French language holds between the synthetical Latin and the analytical Modern French. Villehardouin enjoyed the linquistic resources of both periods of the language and used them freely. He uses the partitive genitive regularly:

a) after nouns denoting a certain measure of things of the same kind: *trente quatre mil mars d'argent* 37.8, 38.12, 51.18, 87.5, etc.

b) with all words which denote a part of a whole. Such are:

aa. nouns, e. g.: *moitié* 14.14, 49.21, 90.13, 141.27, etc.; *plenté* 10.7, 31.3, etc.; *partie* 21.3, 23.1, 31.20, etc.; *compagnie* 43.15, 100.16; *foison* 26.12, 81.16; *part* 90.3; *multitude* 118.18; *li remenans* 145.48, 154.40, 155.13. The only exception of this class which I have been able to find is also the only case of a partitive genitive (except the pronoun *en*) preceding the governing substantive: *serjens à cheval grant parti* 155.16.

bb. all superlatives: *li plusieur des barons de la terre et de nos pèlerins* 39.3, 15.8, 16.9, 17.11, 39.8, etc. As a superlative may be considered *soveraine*: *qui de toutes autres estoit soveraine* 61.20. In conformity with modern usage, the genitive generally follows the governing superlative. The only apparent exception is: *li baron de France li plus haut et li plus puissant* 16.9, where *li baron de France* is a formula. Sometimes the genitive is separated from the superlative by a verb, which is not permitted in Modern French: *qui plus grans estoient del conseil au marchis* 119.22.

cc. numerals: *uns des plus doutés homes* 26.2; *quarante homes des plus sages de toute la terre* 15.8, 23.5, 32.21, 38.8, 41.8, etc. The genitive regularly follows the numeral.

dd. pronouns: *il enmena de gent ce que il en pot mener* 83.9, 91.25, 113.10, etc.; *quangues avoir en pot* 164.5, 157.44, etc. The genitive may precede the pronoun when the construction of the sentence demands it.

ee. adjectives and adverbs. Here contrary to modern usage the greatest liberty prevails as to the use of the partitive genitive, and it is necessary to examine the different adjectives and adverbs separately.

Satis is in Latin always followed by the genitive: *satis eloquentiae, sapientiae parum in Catilina fuit.* The same is true of *assez* in Modern French, and generally, but not always in Old French: *et assés en i ol de mors et de pris* 72.15, 34.9, 49.4, 72.15;

but: *il n'avoient mie encore deniers assés* 8.4; also two examples where *assés* stands after the noun: *autres gens assés* 29.4, and *pèlerins assez* 42.12; but it precedes the noun in *si ot assés paroles dites* 13.8 (*assés i ot de paroles* 65.21, 123.29); *si gaaignièrent assés bues et vaches et bugles* 165.2; similarly 59.28, 133.35. Villehardouin seems to be at liberty to omit *de* whenever the use of it would injure the symmetry of the sentence, as in: *il gaagnièrent assés et proies et autres avoirs* 153.34. The same remark applies to

plus, which is generally construed with the genitive, as in 22.14, 53.10, 62.6, 87.52, 119.12, but without *de* in: *plus i ot arses maisons à ces trois feus que . . .* 106.29, which instance also shows how great a liberty existed at that time in regard to the syntactical position of such adverbs of quantity, a liberty which the modern language has entirely lost.

Tant, as adverb, is generally used with the genitive: *tant de gent* 159.21, 33.15, 35.5, 54.46, 56.25, etc. In a few cases *de* is omitted: *pourchaça gent tant come il pot avoir* 132.2, 96.13, 141.18. Once it is used as a declinable adjective: *tante gent* 150.20. *Autant* and *combien* are both followed by the genitive: 87.49, 141.12, 160.62.

Petit, used as an adverb of quantity, is generally followed by *de*: *petit a l'en véu de si perilleuses rescousses* 161.58, 61.5, 117.5, 169.8, etc. One exception: *petit mangièrent et burent, car petit avoient viande* 83.5. Like *petit* is treated:

moult: *moult de peine* 50.11, *moult des autres* 144.13, 7.7, 22.13, 22.16, 30.11, 32.2 and many other examples. Whenever the use of *de* would make the construction awkward, Villehardouin can dispense with it, as in the following instances: *mout i gaaignierent chevaus et armes et autre richesses* 157.26, *moult i ot gens navrés et mortes* 49.33, 65.9. This is particularly the case, when *moult* is separated from the noun to which it belongs.

Poi is always followed by the genitive: *poi de gent* 74.45, 49.31, 74.41, 134.2, 84.12, etc. Once it is used with the verb *estrc* like an adjective: *li Franc furent poi* 174.29.

Nus des autres 93.29.

Chascuns d'aus 70.17, 170.34.

Maint is generally used as an adjective, as many examples will show where it is inflected: *mainte larme* 19.9, *maintes autres bonnes gens* 3.16, 1.10, 5.7, 4.8, 8.8, 25.13, 28.13, etc. In a few instances it is used like a noun followed by a genitive: *mains*

des autres 100.26, *maint s'en croisièrent* 1.20, 31.22, 87.47, 137.42. *Mains* (Modern French *moins*): *il n'i en avoit mie mains* 107.22.

Bien des autres 145.38.

The greatest liberty Villehardouin enjoys in regard to the use of the partitive genitive after the adverbs of negation, where the modern language is very regular. *Pas* is rarely or never used in cases where the negation can be syntactically connected with the object; *mie, point* or the simple *ne* are used instead.

Mie is almost always used without *de*: *quar nous ne troverions mie chevance en autre leu* 49.18; *ce n'estoit mie merville* 103.41, 62.16, 154.17, 162.6, etc. One exception: *ce n'estoit mie de merveille* 150.23. After the simple *ne*, *de* is generally omitted: *là ot tant de navrés que n'estoit fins né mesure* 105.17, 82.21, 101.10, 107.17, etc. Exception: *il dicta ceste oeuvre né onques n'en menti à son escient de mot* 60.4. The genitive is always used after *ne point*: *il n'i avoit mès point de pais* 97.6, 62.24, 74.41, 133.36, 174.9.

A few instances may be found in Villehardouin of a construction, which was used very rarely in Latin, but which is very common in Modern French; namely, the partitive genitive by means of an ellipsis: *il nous a donné de ses nouvelles*. Villehardouin: *sachiés certainement que nous vos ferons du pis que nous pourrons* 68.18; *il vous donra volontiers de son avoir* 66.13; *pour Dieu, si i mete chascuns de son avoir* 35.8, *si avoit dedens de ses chevaliers et de ses serjans* 136.10.

This construction, I believe, gave rise to what I may be allowed to term, the "partitive genitive absolute" of the Modern French: *nous avons de bons livres*. This use of the genitive in which the modern language is so persistent, is found only sporadically in Villehardouin, and it seems to me that neither the clearness nor the elegance of his style suffer in the least from the greater liberty which he enjoys in this respect compared with the Modern French. He says in 14.5: *ces gens porteront viande à neuf mois*, and in 64.15: *et se porchaça de viande cil qui mestier en ot*, and I cannot see why the one construction should be better, i. e. clearer or more elegant than the other. The first is certainly simpler. In Modern French, however, the use of a concrete noun in a general sense without the preposition *de* is impossible, except in a number of pretrified expressions, where noun and verb express a single idea. We can no

more say, as Villehardouin was permitted to do: *il n'avoient mie pooir de pourchacier viandes* 74.39, and a pity it is that this liberty has been lost, for there is nothing more monotonous in the French language than the occurrence on one page of a dozen or more of partitive genitives without any real *raison d'être*. The French themselves are conscious of it and omit *de* whenever the use of it, although demanded by the general rule, would defy the first principles of rhetoric, as for instance in: *enfans, parents, amis, étrangers, tous le pleurèrent*. Beside the above cited example there will be found in Villehardouin only a very small number of cases of this "partitive genitive absolute" (124.23, 144.2), but a great many others in which contrary to Modern French usage, *de* is omitted: *nous ferons vaissains pour passer quatre mille et cinq cens chevaux et nés pour passer quatre mille et cinq cens chevaliers* 14.1; similarly in 32.2, 54.6, 46.4, 49.3, 62.13, 62.18, 74.39, 75.4, 77.7, 87.6, 105.15, 121.20, 134.14, 141.33, etc. At any rate Villehardouin makes very arbitrary use of this construction, as the following example may show: *tiex i ot qui le guerpirent et de tiex qui bien le firent à la parfin* 144.2.

5. The genitive is used in Latin after the verbs of reminding, remembering and forgetting: *admoneo, commoneo, commonefacio, memini, reminiscor, recordor, obliviscor*. Most of these verbs have been lost in Modern French; *recordor* has assumed a different meaning and a different construction, and *oublier* is treated as a transitive verb. The ideas of remembering and reminding are now expressed by other verbs, or, what is very common in French, by a periphrastic construction. *Se souvenir* governs the genitive. The only verb of this class which is found in Villehardouin, is one which was very rarely used in Latin, and then in a different sense, viz.: *summonere*, Old French *semondre*. In Modern French it has been lost. Villehardouin: *meintes fois vous en ont semons et encore vous en semonons-nous* 94.8.

6. The genitive is used in Latin after certain adjectives denoting a relation to a thing (*adjectiva relativa*). As these cases are very nearly related to those in which the *ablativus causae*, or *instrumenti* is used, I shall speak of them in that connection.

The Genitive in French succeeding the Latin Ablative.

Since the ablative in Latin assumed the functions of several cases of the Indo-European case-system, it had to express several distinct ideas, which apparently have no connection with one another. For our purpose it is unnecessary to go farther back than the Latin, and following one of our best school grammars we will assign to the Latin ablative three elements, viz.: 1) *where?* 2) *whence?* 3) *wherewith?* The second function of the ablative, viz., to express a point of departure, coincides with the general idea underlying the use of the preposition *de*, and it will be safe to say, that here originated the use of *de* instead of the simple ablative. When the case-distinctions were lost in French, *de* came to be used to express also *wherewith?* and to a certain extent even *where?*, the latter at least in the figurative sense of *when?*

1. The ablative expressing *whence?*

The ablative is used in Latin either absolutely or with the prepositions *ab*, *de*, *ex*, to denote the point from where something starts or where it originates. The prepositions are generally employed when the sense is literal; when it is figurative, they are usually omitted. In French *de* takes the place of the simple ablative as well as of the ablative with *ab*, *de*, *ex*. Thus we find in Villehardouin *de* expressing the point of departure.

a. in space.

aa. after nouns: *le passage de Venise* 31.14, *mainte larme i et plourée au départir de lor pays et de lor gens et de lor amis* 30.5.

bb. after verbs of motion: *onques mais à nul jor ne parti de nul port plus biaux estors* 44.14, 32.18, 44.16, 56.21, etc.; *si fist son ost issir de Constantinoble* 64.11, 45.8, 70.29, 72.17; *dui blanc abbé, qu'il avoit amenés avec lui de son païs* 27.14, 56.15, 116.11; similarly: *traîr de* 42.4, 45.8; *recevoir de* 47.5; *movoir de* 49.17 and many other verbs of motion; *semondre*, in the figurative sense of *to alienate*: *dont vindrent avant cil qui se descordoient et semondrent les autres de leur seremens* 89.10.

Estre loing or esloigniés de: li emperèces Morchufles n'ert mie à celui jour esloingiés de Constantinoble plus de quatre jornées 113.2, *et bien estoit neuf jornées loing de Constantinoble* 154.33; also by an ellipsis: *une abaie qui estoit à trois lieues de Constantinoble* 61.13. The participle

Nés, used in Latin with the simple ablative to denote the parent, is used in Villehardouin with *de* to denote the place of one's birth: *cil messages estoit nés de Lombardie* 56.16; *et ce fut une chose dont il reçurent mout grant blasme ou païs dont il se départirent et en celui meisme dont il furent nés* 148.10.

Similarly to the Latin construction *prope ab*, we find in French the genitive used with *près* and related words. Villehardouin: *près d'ici* 62.18, *près des murs* 62.35, 42.15, 75.11, etc., *ensi leur dura cis périls et cis assaus près de dis jors* 76.13, *et bien furent tous près d'estre perdus* 135.25: *hors de la porte* 95.6, *fors de la teste* 115.19, *et commencierent à mettre hors les chevaus des huissiers* 105.8, 56.31, *de fors la ville* 164.19, *fors du cuer* 136.28. Similarly

De toutes pars often means not "from all sides," but "on all sides" and even "towards all sides:" *si s'espandront de toutes pars parmi la terre pour querre viandes* 62.12, 49.30, 72.14, 80.22, 96.3; *d'autre part: le palais l'empereour Alexis, qui ert apeles Calcidoines et fu encontre Constantinoble de l'autre part du bras, devers la Turkie* 62.40, 90.5, 64.12, 70.25, 81.7, etc.

The verb *approcher*, in Modern French always construed with the genitive, is found in Villehardouin with the genitive, dative, and accusative: *lors véissiés les eschielles aprochier de la vile* 77.9; *ensi fu Johannis tot le mois d'avril devant Andrenoble et l'aprocha si de prendre que . . .* 172.1; *en mains lius refurent les eschièles des nés aprochiés as murs* 103.14; *et dura-il bien cis frons trois arbalestrées, et commença aprochier la rive qui desoz les murs et desoz les tours estoit* 77.5; *et fu jà de l'iver grant partie passée et entour la Chandelor estoit et prochoit li Caresmes* 100.2; *dui nés aprochièrent si la tor l'une par devant et l'autre part* 104.18.

b. in time: *de la Saint Jehan en un an* 18.9, 88.27, 89.31, 89.22; *d'hui en huit jors* 13.4, *de jor en jour* 54.12, *d'eures en autres* 92.18, 102.3; *et de lorc tens estoit prophétisé que . . .* 127.24.

On the idea of the element *whence?* contained in the ablative is based the use of this case after the verbs of removing, preventing, delivering and others which denote separation. This ablative is in French invariably replaced by the genitive. Thus we find in Villehardouin: *ensi fu Andrenoble delivrée del siège* 121.1; *mais nepourquant il en gari et en fu portés en litière*

153.27; *mais por nos péchies furent li pelerin resorti de l'assaut* 103.18; *cil estoient soustrait de l'obedience de Roine* 98.20; *tuit cil seroient quites de tous les péchies* 1.7; *que nous puissions estre acquit  s de nostre passage paier* 35.6.

In Modern French, *arracher*, *  chapper*, *emprunter*, *acheter*, and similar verbs, may be construed either with the genitive, if nothing but the simple separation is to be expressed, or with the dative (of interest) if an intimate relation exists between the direct and the indirect object. Villehardouin distinguishes similarly: *si avoit un fr  re que il avoit rachat   de la prison des Turcs* 42.3; *car de molt gran p  ril furent esch  p  * 95.8; *que onques nus n'en eschapa* 100.23, 100.29; *et les commencent    rescoure moult vigoureusement dou feu* 96.5. But: *dont prisrent li message cong  e    l'empereour Kyrsac* 87.26, (now generally *prendre cong  e de q*); *et leur fist tolir leur avoirs* 153.6; *li rois de Hongrie nos tolt Jadres en Esclavonie* 38.7; 43.8, 68.16, 72.22, 83.13, etc. .

Upon the idea of separation is also founded the use in Latin of the ablative with adjectives or adverbs in the comparative degree instead of *quam* with the nominative, or, in the construction of the accusative with the infinitive, instead of *quam* with the accusative of the subject. The ablative instead of *quam* with the accusative of the object is rarely found in the best writers, unless the object be a relative pronoun, in which case the ablative is preferred. In French this "ablative of comparison" has been replaced by the genitive, but the use of the same has been very much restricted; in fact it has been confined to the comparatively rare case where the adverbs *plus* or *moins* are followed by a numeral or such words as *midi*, *minuit*, *demi*, *quart*, *moiti  *. We can say in Modern French *cette ville a plus de quarante mille habitants*, but the construction *son fr  re est plus jeune de lui* is no more allowable. Villehardouin stands clearly in the middle between the Latin and the Modern French. On the one hand, he has more liberty than the Latin writers of the classical period, as he can use the genitive instead of *que* with either nominative or accusative: *et cis quens Thiebaus estoit jeunes hons et n'avoit pas plus de vint-dui ans, et li quens Looys n'en avoit mie plus de vint-sept* 2.6; *il port  rent es n  s perri  res et mangonians plus de troi cens* 44.13; 53.10, 74.44, 103.18, 108.4, 108.6, 113.3, 131.8, 134.10, 139.21, 177.60. On

the other hand, his use of the genitive case is not so much restricted, by far, as that of the Modern French. The following examples will show this: *dont mout avoit à cel tans de bons; nus homs à celle heure n'en avoit plus de lui* 22.13; *et n'i avoit celle qui ne fust graindre de une des nostres* 81.23; *bien tesmoignent cil qui la furent que onques chevaliers ne se desfendi miels de lui* 143.29.

Again, from the idea of "going out of" grew out that of "originating in;" consequently the genitive came to be used in French to denote the origin of a thing or of an action: *maint autres homes du païs de Bourgoigne* 28.9; *la dame si ot de son seigneur une fille* 23.14; *li quens del Perche mourut, dont fu moult grans damages* 30.2, 31.18, 33.4, 43.15, 50.5, etc.; *tant i travellièrent que païs en fu* 50.13; *les gens de leur païs* 56.14, 69.14, 70.4, 72.5, etc.; *si qu'il en ot moult grant pris* 72.13, 75.16, 89.40, 87.42, etc.; *et mout estoient durement lassés de la bataille et de l'ocision* 105.20, 146.43; *car la discorde estoit une chose dont grant maus péust avenir* 125.3; *et li prist une maladie dont il mourut* 98.3, 98.7; *li quens Joffrois s'accoucha de maladie* 29.8, 122.16, 130.5.

This is particularly the case after all words denoting affections of the mind and external expressions of such affections. Thus we find the genitive:

a. after nouns: *la cremeur qu'il avoient de l'empereour Alexis* 68.20; *si ot grant peour de lui* 98.2, 147.3; *dont il et tuit li baron orent mout grant duel* 130.16; *que il eust pitié de la terre d'outre mer* 32.9, 41.4, 16.11, 55.22, 58.32, 59.11, 91.10; *mout firent grant joie de sa venue* *li Grieu* 92.4, 21.5, 84.9, 107.35, 112.17, 121.5, 125.2; *dont il recurent grant honte* 31.16; *si en recurent moult grant blasme* 145.35, 54.15; *l'empereour Baudoin l'en sot mout bon gré* 127.33, 52.2; *li baron li crioient merci de la prise de Jadres* 55.15, 147.23, 42.17, 147.32; *et li quens de Saint-Gile en ot si grant envie* 109.19, 109.15; *moult fu grans desconfors aus pélerins de la mort au conte Thiebaut de Champaigne* 25.6.

b. after adjectives: *nepourquant fut-il molt liés de sa venue* 22.4, 37.10, 76.34, 80.4, 109.29, 127.7, 129.20, 171.11; *si en furent moult dolent et moult irié* 91.10; *car à si grant chose come à l'empire de Constantinoble poés croire que mout en i avoit abaans et envieus* 109.7.

c. after verbs: *plorer* 17.2, 19.9; *se merveiller* 13.4, 43.3, 52.15; *se resjouir* 60.9; *se plaindre* 119.4, 123.12; *se vengier* 123.26; *se souffrir* 29.12; *blasmer* 22.17, 31.9, 46.9, etc.; once *blasmer* is used with a dative and with an accusative: *et li blasmoit le tort qu'il avoit envers els* 92.21; *louer* 73.2; *mercier* 84.10; *reconforter* 74.1; *desconforter* 73.2; *peser* has two different constructions: *dont avint une aventure dont mout pesa à ceus de l'ost* 56.4 and: *et fist grant semblant que il l'en pesast* 98.9; *irier* 91.10, 91.36; *courecier* 43.13, 48.7, 77.2, 124.24; *esbaïr* 58.27, 32.3; *s'esmaïer* 44.22, 32.3, 61.22, 172.36; *resbaudir* 103.23; *effréer* 151.35; *espoenter* 172.35.

In Latin *propter* or other prepositions are often used to express the cause after verbs of the above class. Villehardouin rarely uses another construction than the genitive case. Once two different constructions are found in the same sentence: *molt fu nostre Sires piteusement loés et merciés par les pélérins, pour ce que il les avoit en tele manière secorus en poi de tans, et de ce que il estoient mis au desor de ce dont il soloient estre au desous* 84.10.

Again the ablative, by means of its element *whence?*, is used in Latin with verbs in the passive voice to denote the logical subject or that by which anything is effected and which in the active construction is put in the nominative. With personal nouns the preposition *ab* must be used. This ablative, whether with or without preposition, is in Modern French regularly rendered by the genitive. At the same time, however, the use of the Latin preposition *per* has been very much extended and the same is now generally employed to denote the author of a physical action, while *de* has been confined to express the logical subject of passive verbs denoting a mental process, or where the effect upon an object is direct and immediate, as with the verbs of perceiving, knowing, recognizing, receiving, abandoning, etc.

Here is another point where Villehardouin's language stands exactly in the middle between the Latin and the Modern French. While on the one hand he distinguishes no more, as was done in Latin, between nouns denoting persons and common nouns, he does on the other hand not yet distinguish between physical and mental processes. The genitive is used throughout to denote the logical subject of verbs in the passive voice. Thus we find: *il furent moult regardé de maintes gens* 16.4; *car onques ne fu homs qui tant fust amés de ses homes et d'autre gent com il estoit*

23.10; *li plais fu moult contredit de ceus qui* 38.16; *car onques si grans afaires ne fu empris de nulle gent* 61.23; *il a illes près de ici qui ne sont mie habitées sé de laboureurs de blés non* 62.9; *car onques de si poi de gent tant de pueple ne fu assegé en une vile* 74.45; *cela fu arse dou feu* 96.25, 91.2; *clercement fu seu des Grieus et des François comment il avoit esté estranglé* 98.10; *et furent escoménié dou clergié cil qui ne la tenroient* 102.8, *mout furent volentiers veus li message de tous ceus de l'ost et ceus de la cité* 120.7; *mout fu plains de ses homes et de ses amis* 136.5; *si fu la convenance retraite de l'empereur et del marchis* 124.31 and many other examples.

2. The ablative expressing *wherewith*?

The ablative is used in Latin to express the means or the instrument by which a thing is done. In Old French as well as in Modern French, the genitive takes the place of this ablative. Thus we find in Villehardouin: *il fu férus d'un glaive parmi le cors* 72.10, 153.26, 177.68, 152.11; *là ot Guillaumes de Champs* plié le bras brisé d'un pierre 75.15; *si virent la cité fermée de haus murs et de grans tours* 44.19, 75.2; *lors se clostrent li nostre de lices par defors* 153.18, 74.23, 158.17, 167.14; *et ne fu armés que d'un gambeson et d'un chapel de fer* 75.21; *il sembloit que toute la champaigne fust coverte de batailles* 81.18; *quar trop en avons petit à ce que nos en avons à faire* 62.7; *une colombe qui estoit une des plus hautes et des mius ouvrées de marbre* 127.10; *l'endemain se recrurent d'une route de serjans à cheval* 141.14; *et se combatoient main à main de haches et d'espées* 76.30.

Rarely other prepositions are used instead of *de*: *qui tout vit cela à l'ucil* 79.9; *le mur del Dimot que Johannis avoit abatu à ses perières et à ses mangoniaus* 164.7; *mainte menue gent s'en emblèrent par les nés de marchéans* 54.5; *ardoir à feu* 91.12.

In Modern French *avec* is used to express the instrument necessary to perform a certain act, while *de* is used to express the instrument which may be used to perform the act: *elle nous faisait signe de la main*, but: *elle écrivait avec une plume*. (While this rule holds good in general, there are, of course, exceptions to it). Villehardouin does not make this distinction.

The ablative is used in Latin with verbs denoting plenty or want, and with the corresponding transitives of filling, endowing, depriving. The corresponding adjectives govern the genitive. In French the genitive succeeds both Latin constructions.

Thus Villehardouin: *lor nés chargiés de dras et de viandes et autre belles choses* 30.19; *onques en nul termine ne furent aussi chargiés de guerre come il furent à celui point* 169.22, 44.7, 147.8, 165.28; *ceste vile est de tous biens garnie* 49.20, 128.6, 130.22, etc.; *car il pristrent dix-sept grans nés et les emplirent de grans merriens et d'estoupes et de pois et de tonnaus vuis* 95.17; *la dame estoit grosse d'un fil* 23.14; *et nous ironis riches d'avoir et de viandes* 89.21; *une nef de Pisans qui pieine estoit de marchandise* 96.25; *et nostre gent sont besoigneux de viandes* 62.12; and many other examples.

In conformity with the Latin construction *potior aliqua re* we find *se saisir* used with the genitive in French: *quand je serais saisir de ma terre et de ma cité* 116.21; 118.30, 124.34, etc.

The ablative is used in Latin with, or without, the preposition *cum* to express the manner in which a thing is done. Villehardouin decidedly avoids substituting the simple genitive for this *ablativus modi*, as has been done in the Modern French. There are really only two instances of a genitive of manner in Villehardouin: *qui de bon cuer avoit volu le bien de l'ost* 91.38; and vid. below; while in a great many cases contrary to modern usage different prepositions are used. Very often, to be sure, the modern language may use either *de* or some other preposition, but with the above and one more exception Villehardouin never uses the genitive. Thus we find: *en tel manière* 12.4, 16.8, 29.9, 51.5, 58.30, 61.10, and many other instances; *en toutes les manières* 12.11, 87.21, 94.13, etc.; *en ceste manière* 38.15, 151.33, 153.1; *en maintes manières* 87.44, 112.14, etc.; *à nule manière* 121.13, 123.19; and even *par tele manière* 124.33, while the modern construction with the genitive occurs only once: *en cele colombe dont Morchafls chaî avoit ymages de maintes manières ovrees el marbre* 127.21, and here it may be considered doubtful whether *de maintes manières* belongs as *ablativus modi* to *ovrees*, or as *ablativus qualitatis* to *ymages*. Similarly *à bonne foi* 19.5 and *en bonne foi* 55.10, 59.19, 110.5; never the Modern French *de bonne foi*; *par force* 45.5, 64.14, 72.22, 101.17, 103.36, 105.3, 152.9; *par vive force* 76.28, 96.10; *à force* 70.9. The common modern construction *de force* does not occur. *Il tendra cinc cens chevaliers en la terre d'outre-mer à sa despense* 51.25; 87.9, 87.11; once *de sa despense* is used: 51.22, but this must not necessarily be taken as a genitive of manner; *par autres chemins* 32.2; *ensi le receurent à moult*

grant joie 57.1; 33.7, 87.31, 111.14, 92.7, 110.33, 177.37; *et il fn receus à moult grant honneur* 56.25, 124.3; *il furent tuit à un accord* 110.18 (now *d'un accord* or *d'accord*); *il me recevroient volentiers et à gré* 116.19; *et li autre remestrent mout à malaise dedens Constantinoble et à mout grand mésaize* 150.35.

These examples will show that Villehardouin avoids using the genitive to express such relations as were expressed in Latin by the ablative of manner, and prefers some other preposition to *de*.

3. The ablative expressing *where?*

The ablative was used in Latin with the preposition *in*, and in some particular cases, without any preposition, to denote the place *where?* This ablative cannot be rendered by the genitive in French; a preposition must be used instead. The Latin *terra marique* is usually *par terre et par mer* or *sur terre et sur mer*. Only once Villehardouin uses *de la terre* in the sense of *by land*: 158.15. By a tropical use of the element *where?* the ablative came to be employed to express *when?* This ablative of time is rendered by the genitive in French; but the use of the same has been very much restricted. It is only used in certain adverbial phrases e. g.: *de jour et de nuit*, *de mon temps*, *de bonne heure*, etc. In Villehardouin we find only two instances of the genitive of time: *car n'iert eure, né de jor né de nuict que* 74.33, and *l'endemain de haute heure* 99.11. In all other cases different prepositions are used, e. g.: *dont moult avoit à ce tans de bons* 22.13; *au matin fu li parlemens en unvergier* 27.3; *par nuit* 99.22; *à la vesprée* 103.27; 1.2, 13.6, 22.14, 42.1, 88.3, 45.5, etc.

De before infinitives.

Of *de* before infinitives I might have spoken under several of the preceding headings, but it seems convenient to speak of it separately. The use of *de* before infinitives has its origin without doubt in the Latin construction of the genitive of the gerundium, but it has crept in, in several cases, where in Latin *ad* with the accusative of the gerundium was used, which latter construction has in French generally been replaced by *à* with the infinitive. Villehardouin's usage will be illustrated by the following examples: *li message furent aparellié de ce otroier qu'il requeroyent* 13.12; 116.23, 170.65 (the modern synonym *apprêter* is usually followed by *à*); *il estoient prest de asseurer ceste con-*

venance 15.4; *il estoient prest de mouvoir* 34.7 (Villehardouin does not distinguish as the Modern French does, between *prêt à faire qc.* = ready, prepared to do a thing, and *prêt de faire qc.* = disposed, willing to do a thing. [Littré]); *et si serai-je bien atornés d'aler avec vos ou d'envoyer si come je vous ai en convenant* 88.34 (if the verb existed with the same meaning in Modern French, it would probably be construed with *à*); *que cil qui tel murdre avoit fait, n'avoit droit à terre tenir* 98.17 (Modern French *avoir droit de faire qc.*); *nous nous sommes tuit accordé de faire empereour* 110.27 (the modern construction would be with *à*); *cil del rivage leur pooient aidier de traire et de lancier* 170.72 (Modern French *aider q. à faire qc.*).

If the infinitive is governed by a noun, Villehardouin generally uses *de*, as in the following phrases, *prendre jour de faire qc.* 35.6; *avoir mestier de faire qc.* 39.10, 62.16; *avoir ochoison* 40.3; *avoir pooir* 51.26, 55.26, 74.39, 177.26; *avoir volonté* 51.28; *faire proière* 147.29; *prendre conseil* 157.37, 160.26, 163.10, etc., all followed by *de* with the infinitive.

De in French succeeding the Latin preposition *de*.

De in French succeeds the Latin preposition *de* in the sense of *concerning, about* or *on*. This is particularly the case after verbs of speaking and thinking. Villehardouin's usage agrees here with that of the Modern French, except in a few cases: *vous dirons des pelerins* 31.20; 101.2, 151.15, 154.2; *croire q. de qc.* 65.22 instead of the modern construction *croire qc. à q.* Similarly: *puis leur menti de quanques il lor avoit en convenant* 153.5: "in regard to what had been arranged between them." Also: *s'entraider de la guerre* 175.26.

CONCLUSION.

The results of the present investigation may be briefly stated as follows:

1. The substitution of a periphrastic construction by means of the preposition *de* for the Latin genitive and ablative cases began with the *genitivus subjectivus* and the *genitivus partitivus* and the ablative expressing *whence?*; in Villehardouin's time it had already been extended to all the other functions of the genitive and the ablative, except, the ablative of manner and the

ablative expressing *where?* The construction of the oblique case without *de* and the use of the dative instead of the Latin possessive genitive are very limited in extent.

2. There is, however, in Villehardouin's language a much greater freedom in regard to the use of the genitive, compared with the modern language, especially in the use of the genitive of comparison and the partitive genitive. The use of the latter by means of an ellipsis, which is very common in Modern French, is almost unknown to him. Villehardouin possesses much more liberty than the modern language in regard to the syntactical position of the genitive.

It seems doubtful whether the Modern French has gained anything in exchange for the lost freedom of the language of Villehardouin's time.

VI.—*The College Course in English Literature, how it may be Improved.*

By JAMES MORGAN HART, J. U. D.,

PROFESSOR OF MODERN LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, CINCINNATI, OHIO.

THE possibility of bettering the present curriculum in English literature will depend in great measure upon the proportion of time allowed to it. So long as the classics and mathematics retain for themselves the lion's share of time and interest, the hopes of our professors of literature will never become unduly exalted. If I may express myself with thorough frankness, the customary quota of English literature, say less than two hours per week for less than two years, is so insufficient that I cannot look upon it as capable of improvement. The study will remain perforce hurried and superficial. Now the course that I have in mind is one of two full hours (better three) throughout three entire years. It is the course which has been required since 1880 for the B. L. degree in the University of Cincinnati, viz., three years, three hours a week. The classical students are now (beginning with 1884) compelled to take two of the three years, and the Scientifics one year. Perhaps this last requirement will be hereafter raised to two years.

How is this amount of time to be best utilized? I confess that at more than one point I am in doubt; at least, my past experience is still to some extent only experimental.

i. What does *not* rightfully pertain to English Literature? Settling this preliminary question will help us greatly. The main question resolves itself into three: What are we to do with Logic, with Rhetoric, with English Philology (Anglo-Saxon and Early English)? Fortunately the Logic question is fast settling itself. The growth of this study has been so rapid of late, its drift towards mathematics and the experimental sciences so unmistakable, that no disciplined mind of the present day can look upon logic and literature as having anything in common. As to Rhetoric, the course is not so clear. There are still only too many persons of influence and culture

who persist in looking upon the instructor of English literature as necessarily the instructor of rhetoric. I am unable to share this opinion. To me rhetoric is a purely formal drill, having no more connection with the literature of England than it has with the literature of Greece, Rome, France, Germany, or Arabia. The canons of the art were laid down two thousand years ago by Aristotle, and quite one thousand years before there was an English literature in any sense.

To my way of thinking, the study of English literature means the study of the great movement of English life and feeling, as it is reflected in the *purest* poetry and the *purest* prose of representative men, those men who have led their people's sympathies. Rhetoric always savors to me of the school-bench. It is, if we look into it scrutinizingly, little more than verbal jugglery. And however clever we may be at it ourselves, however quick we may be at perceiving it in others, we shall be none the wiser in *understanding* an author, the influences that moulded him, his peculiar mission, his hold upon us. The proper object of literary study, in one word, is to train us to *read*, to grasp an author's personality in all its bearings. And the less rhetoric here, the better—in my judgment. Rhetorical exercises are, of course, useful. So are the parallel bars and dumb-bells of a gymnasium. Need I push the comparison farther?¹

In the next place, how is it with Anglo-Saxon and Early English? I think that here most of us have confounded two radically distinct matters, viz., literature and language. Literature is thought. Were, now, the connection of thought between our King Alfred of pious memory and our Queen Victoria an unkroken continuity, I could spare my time. I should say at once, unhesitatingly, that it would be our *duty* to master Beowulf and Elene just as the Athenians and Alexandrians mastered the

¹ I do not wish to be understood as arguing in general against the utility of training in Rhetoric and Composition. In fact, such training seems to me an indispensable part of the school-curriculum. The above strictures are aimed solely at Rhetoric and Composition, as they are often taught in College. In my experience, college-students have a positive dislike of such drill, while they are almost invariably attracted to literature proper. It seems to me that Rhetoric, if taught at all in College, should be taught by the professor of Philosophy. It should come *after* the instruction in literature, should be treated in a very liberal spirit, in fact, as a national mode of *envisager* the subject, and especially should the instruction be of a kind to contrast ancient methods and tastes with modern, English with continental. It will be perceived that all this is very different from recitation upon Tropes, Introduction, and Arguments and from the writing of Themes.

Iliad and the Odyssey. But alas, the case is quite otherwise. However unpleasantly the confession may go against my own personal interest and sympathy, as a devoted specialist in Anglo-Saxon philology, I must confess that everything anterior to the Conquest is as foreign to our way of thinking as if it had been expressed in a foreign tongue. It is more foreign even than the thought of the Greeks and Romans. I do not see what literary *culture* our undergraduates can possibly derive from any English writings anterior to Chaucer's. And even Chaucer, whom I sincerely and heartily relish, is—shall I say—*double-faced*? He is a colossal sphinx. We look at him from one side, and his smile is sunny and inviting, and we hail him as one of ourselves, as indeed our literary *father*. But when, by dint of patient exploration, we have struggled around to the other side, we discover that our so-called father is the veriest *enfant perdu* of all the grossness, folly, superstition, and prattle that go by the name of the Middle Ages. By all means let us read our Chaucer. He is too poetical a poet to be ignored. But when we read, let us remember that he is not wholly one of us. There is a gulf between him and the meanest of the great Elizabethans.

I have expressed doubt as to the utility of Anglo-Saxon in a course of English literature. But if Anglo-Saxon be taught, let me make one suggestion. Our present method is a wrong one. We put our students into the most difficult and archaic poetry, and ignore the easy prose vernacular. This is anything but wise. Granting that Beowulf is a spirited poem, the noblest relic of ancient Germanic spirit, is it not too obscure for the non-specialist? And if, by dint of commentaries, we help the student over the hard places, have we given him the best insight into the language, which is—after all—the chief object of the study? My experience teaches me that pure Wessex prose, the language of Orosius and the Pastoral, will do better service than the rather mongrel dialect of poetry. The most serious drawback to the study of Anglo-Saxon is the want of a practical grammar and corresponding dictionary. The grammar by Sievers is a monument of acumen, but, even if translated, it is too difficult for the beginner. As to Groschopp's Glossary (Grein's condensed), it is quite behind the present philological requirements, and is moreover almost useless for prose. The most available general reader is that by Sweet, which has an

excellent glossary. Zupitza's reader is an admirable little book, including not only Anglo-Saxon, but Early English. If I had to restrict myself to one book, I should prefer it to all others. But the glossary is not so well put together as it should be. And if any one of the longer Anglo-Saxon poems is to be read, let me urge the substitution of *Elene* for *Beowulf*. Zupitza's latest edition leaves nothing to be desired, and the poem offers no such difficulties as those in *Beowulf*.

On one point, at least, I have no doubts, viz., that every *teacher* of our literature should have made careful study of Anglo-Saxon and Early English. There are in modern speech hundreds of linguistic survivals which the trained eye sees through at a glance, but which are a perpetual stumbling block to the empiric. How grievously even an accomplished editor may fail, from want of linguistic training, may be illustrated by the following specimens. In Dryden's *MacFlicknoe*, line 65, occurs the phrase "and Barbican it hight." Mr. Hales, in his "Longer English Poems," notes p. 274 comments thus: "Hight= was called. Sometimes it has a present sense, sometimes it is a participle . . . It is a later form from the Anglo-Saxon *hatan* (pret. *hatte*) which has both an active and a passive sense; so German *heissen*, which is of the same root; hence the double use of *hight* in later English both as passive participle and as a verb of active form and passive meaning . . . There was another Anglo-Saxon verb *hatan* to command; the preterite of which (*het*) is often confounded with that of *hatan* to call." Can we imagine a worse jumble? Yes, here is one, p. 276 the word "yeoman" is thus elucidated. "This word is variously connected with Frisian *gaeman* a village; Anglo-Saxon *ge-maene* common; Anglo-Saxon *geonge* young; Anglo-Saxon *geongra*, a vassal; fancifully, with *yew*." Comment would be superfluous. In discussing the lines in Johnson's *London*:

"All that at home no more can beg or steal,
Or like a gibbet better than a wheel,"

Mr. Hales is so eager to ventilate the etymology of the word "gibbet" that he fails to bring out the point of Johnson's satire, viz., that the wheel was a Continental instrument of punishment, and the gibbet an English. Were Mr. Hales an ordinary editor of school-books, I should not waste words over him. But, on the contrary, he is an uncommonly well-read man, and I regard

his little volume as one of the greatest helps that the teacher can find. But when he ventures on his so-called etymologies, I tremble. Nothing but a six months drill in Sievers's grammar can cure such dilettanteism.

2. Passing from this preliminary discussion of negatives to the more positive question: How is English literature, as literature, to be taught, I wish to say a word or two upon the importance of teaching it by *periods*. Whatever be the amount of time at our disposal, we shall not do our whole duty by our pupils, if we neglect to impress upon their minds the observance of the great lines of division. They are only two—the first ends with the death of Milton; the second, with the death of Samuel Johnson. Of course these lines are not the hard, fixed lines of the geometrician or the statistician. They are ideal lines, merely serving to keep us within proper bounds. What does it matter that Dryden's authorship overlaps Milton's? Such juxtaposition only heightens the contrast. Matthew Arnold has called Milton "the last of the Immortals." In general I do not subscribe to Mr. Arnold's literary dicta. But this once certainly he hit the mark. Milton is the direct successor and last survivor of Sidney, Spenser, and Shakespeare. So far as he is of any age and not for all time, he is of the great Elizabethan age. Mr. Hales says p. 214, very appositely, "In 1667 appeared *Paradise Lost*, in ten books. It was in that same year that Dryden brought out his *Annus Mirabilis*. Thus in that year the great poetic leader of the setting age and the leader of the rising age stood strikingly contrasted." To me, the contrast is more than striking, it is overwhelming. *Paradise Lost* and *Annus Mirabilis*! I know no other such jostling in literature. With regard to the first great period, although it begins with Spenser and ends with Milton, we are to remember that its typical form is the drama, and our chief efforts should be directed towards the proper treatment of Shakespeare. For the study of Shakespeare himself there is no lack of appliances. Yet I do not believe that the great dramatist is rightly studied. He is isolated too much. We put our students into reading him before they are prepared. Thanks to Mr. Ward's excellent history of the English drama (now supplemented by Mr. Symonds on the Predecessors of Shakespeare), the teacher can give, by lecture, an adequate treatment of the origin of the English

drama. But this is not enough. The student should catch the tone and temper of the pre-Shakespeareans by reading them. Just here, alas, we break down. Mr. Morley's *English Plays* is not only an unwieldy and expensive book, but it is wretchedly planned and swarms with errors of every kind, yet it is the only book that attempts to cover the ground. The selections made by Charles Lamb, fifty years ago, are palpably inadequate. What we need is two volumes of selections, of equal size, say corresponding to Lamb's selections, one giving the quintessence of the best pieces prior to Shakespeare (but excluding Marlowe), the other treating in like manner Ben Jonson and the others down to the reign of Charles I. I exclude Marlowe for the reason that his two leading plays, *Faustus* and *Edward II.* are now procurable in very good shape.

I have often tried to imagine to myself what results a year of this work might produce. A year that should include the first book of the *Faery Queen*, and some of Sidney's *Sonnets*; selections from *Gorboduc*, from *Lylly*, *Greene*, *Kyd*, three entire plays by Shakespeare, selections from Ben Jonson, Chapman, Webster, Ford, down to Shirley, and Milton's *Comus*. Such a year, would make, I think, an indelible impression upon the class. The second section, beginning with Dryden and ending with Samuel Johnson, is less interesting, because less poetic, but is perhaps more directly useful. With the aid of Mr. Hales's book, Arnold's selections from Johnson's *Lives*, and Mr. Minto's *Manual of English Prose*, the teacher can scarcely fail to make his pupils understand how the founders of our modern style thought and expressed themselves.

The third section, again, is difficult, but not for lack of books or good material. The difficulty consists in knowing precisely where and how to begin. I have been for years in the habit of training my pupils to look upon Wordsworth, and especially upon his *Tintern Abbey*, as the starting-point of our nineteenth century poetry. Even this meets with objection from some quarters, I have perceived. Yet I cannot give up the position until some one offers me a better.

But how is it with our prose? We all feel that there is a difference between the prose of to-day and that of Johnson, Gibbon, and Hume. Yet how are we to indicate the transition,

and in which author are we to typify it? I am at fault.² Besides, a still more troublesome question haunts me. Are we not to end with the year 1860? With what Mr. Stedman would call the idyllic school of Tennyson? I cannot shake off the suspicion that we are at this moment living in a new period, which has just begun and which is slowly and unconsciously evolving something, the precise shape of which no one foresees. For this reason, I should be loath to undertake any work later than Tennyson's *Idylls*, or to undertake Browning at all in the class-room. Although Swinburne and Morris are attractive, they will lead me, neither they nor I know whither. The same with Browning's dramatic art. Not because of his difficulties, which have been absurdly overrated, but because of his *unexpended impetus*, do I regard Browning as one outside of the class-room of to-day. I must admit my failure to view him and the new school in all their bearings. Hence my reluctance to teach them.

3. Let me now touch upon several pressing needs, of a general nature.

a. We need, first and foremost, a history of England and its people, especially adapted to literary study. I do not mean so much a text-book, to be recited upon, as a work for consultation and collateral reading. No one of my hearers will, I devoutly trust, adduce Mr. Green's *Short History* as a quasi answer to such a demand. I have tried that book thoroughly in two separate classes, as a manual of history, and have found it utterly wanting. The author's style, to begin with, is rhetorical, wordy, overheated, his views are often prejudiced, and his general treatment is so vague and incoherent that it fails to make a lasting impression on the student's mind. Besides, even were the book all that its author and his coterie claimed for it, it is not the kind of book that I am after. I wish a general essay upon those social, legal, political and religious movements which have engaged and affected the cultured classes, the school and university life of England during and

² Perhaps Scott will answer. No one, to my knowledge, has called attention to the double nature of Scott's prose style. In temper and in personal sympathies, he is quite in accord with Wordsworth and with the Romanic movement. On the other hand, there is in his prose style a marked formalism at times, which savors strongly of the Dryden-Johnson period. This is not surprising, when we remember that Scott was engaged for years in editing Dryden and Swift. At any rate, Scott will make a tolerable prelude to Lander, De Quincey, and—at a longer interval—Carlyle.

since Chaucer's day. If a scholar like Mr. J. Bass Mullinger, well versed in the history of England and English education, would only read through the autobiographic and satiric poetry (at least the leading pieces) of the last five centuries, noting down as he read the politics-social allusions, and would then proceed to construct his history on the lines thereby suggested, he would approximate at least to my ideal. This ideal is a clear understanding of the relations and contrasts between town and country in England, between the small towns and London, between the universities and the grammar-schools, between the aristocracy (including the landed gentry) and the bourgeoisie, between churchman and dissenters (including Roman Catholics). Consider the bearing that such questions must have on the position of Shakespeare, as against Spenser and Sidney, of Milton, of Dryden and Pope, of Gray as against Samuel Johnson, of Shelley as against Keats. How much a historian like Mullinger could teach us Americans, if we could only subject him to cross-examination.

b. We need, no less sorely, a general treatise upon the foreign relations of English literature. It has grown into a habit to speak of this literature as "insular." For one, I fail to see this assumed or conceded insularity. At what time, may I ask, has English thought held itself aloof from Continental influences? Certainly not in the past, certainly not until the full effects of the battle of Waterloo, and the withdrawal of England from continental politics made themselves felt. Tennyson is the first great English poet that I have discovered to be distinctively insular. And most of his contemporaries and younger successors range outside of his narrow pale. Under foreign influences, of course, I do not include Greco-Roman culture. I mean the culture of Italy, Spain, France, and Germany. Let me illustrate the point by a single example. What a deal of trash used to be printed on the subject of Euphuism, only clouding knowledge with words. And then, two or three years ago, a young German, Landmann, published his doctoral essay on Euphuism and showed how it could all be traced to the works of the Spaniard Guevara. In 1866, Craik, in his *History of English Literature* I, 294, denied—at considerable length—any connection between Chaucer's *Troilus and Cressida* and Boccaccio's *Filostrato*. Only one year later a young German, Alfons Kissner, in preparing his doctoral dissertation, bethought him of the

simple test of reading *Troilus* and the *Filostrato* side by side (a test which seems never to have occurred to Craik or his English predecessors). What was the result? A *mathematical demonstration*, from the recurrence of the same rhyme-words at the same intervals in both Italian and English, that the author of *Troilus* must have had the *Filostrato* before him. I do not wish to weary you with examples. Consider the Italian studies of Milton, the French tone in vogue during the times of Dryden and Pope, the connection between Le Sage and Smollett, the German speculations underlying Coleridge and Wordsworth, the cosmopolitan range of Byron. Who will venture to assert that any one of these topics has been seriously approached? I have a tolerable familiarity with the leading English biographies, e. g. Boswell's Johnson, Lockhart's Scott, Moore's Byron, and, of the forty odd volumes in the English Men of Letters Series, I have glanced at most, read many carefully and studied several exhaustively. Yet *nowhere* do I find the slightest attempt to connect any one writer with the thought of continental Europe. This insularity—not on the part of the writers themselves, be it observed, but on the part of their biographers—is discouraging. It betrays a want of method for which the English university system is to blame. Oxford and Cambridge discourage original work in literature. They hold their prize-students rigidly to the beaten road. They have no place for investigators like Landmann and Kissner, above mentioned. I should have great difficulty in imagining works such as Hettner's great *Literaturgeschichte* or Brandes's *Hauptströmungen* the product of English university training. Those who wish to generalize upon English literature will have to sit at the feet of German masters, I fear. The office of tracing continental influence in England belongs properly to one who has made continental literature his specialty and his base of operation. Starting from Romance and German literatures, he will the quicker recognize their styles, schools, and fashions in England. And we who are chiefly interested in England can profit by his observations.

c. There is great need of a convenient hand-book of English metres, a book to be used continually by pupils, if not actually recited upon. It is not surprising, from one point of view, that no such book exists, for if any branch of modern poetic literature has been worse neglected than another, it is precisely this. Until two years ago, when the first volume of Schipper ap-

peared, there was no work that the teacher even could consult with safety. I speak quite within bounds. Guest's History of English Rhythms, published 1838, was based upon unqualifiedly wrong conceptions of metre in general and of the connection between English and foreign metres. Guest was a blind leader of the blind for nearly half a century. How a scholar like Skeat could be induced to reprint the book simultaneously with the appearance of Schipper's work, is to me a mystery, one of those conundrums in which philological study in England abounds. Schipper's work is all that one could desire, so far as it goes. But only one volume has appeared. The second—and to us the more important, as it will deal with the Renaissance and subsequent periods—is still in manuscript. Besides, Schipper's *Metrik*, like Sievers' *Grammatik*, is not a book for the beginner, as one can see at a glance. When complete, I should like to see it reduced to a volume of not more than one hundred and fifty pages, giving specimens of every kind of verse from Chaucer down, with brief introductory remarks and notes. Such a manual, if generally used, would rid us forever of the ghosts of delusions that have haunted English criticism for three centuries. We would not have to teach our classes the absurdity of believing that Waller and Denham introduced the "heroic couplet" into England, or that the Alexandrine had anything to do with Alexandria, or combat Mr. Symond's lucubrations on the subject of English blank-verse. Is such a study idle, unprofitable? Only four weeks ago, in the Academy for November 30 (1884), Mr. Caine ventured to criticize Mr. Symonds for using in his sonnets a line of eleven syllables, adding "the use of the line of eleven syllables in the sonnet is, I think, new to me!" Whereupon, in the following number of the Academy, Mr. Waddington had to hurry to the rescue and inform a learned public "that the Italian sonneteers almost invariably use the line of eleven syllables, and that that composition of *mute-sonnets* with lines of ten syllables is usually restricted by them to comic subjects." Truly, one is almost forced to suspect that Mr. Caine had never heard of Petrarch, but fondly imagined that the sonnet was invented by William Shakespeare or Sir Philip Sidney. If scholars like Mr. Caine can blunder after this fashion, what are we to expect of college students and newspaper reviewers? Our poets have, in this respect, always felt more than our critics have known. We can scarcely imagine a

Tennyson blundering in his remarks upon metre. The study of this formal side of verse is not mere form. There is a subtle correspondence between verse-flow and thought. If any one doubt this, let him try to reconstruct *In Memoriam* in heroic couplets, or the *Divina Commedia* in blank verse. The poetic judgments of the eighteenth century are apt to be weak. But they are never weaker than when they deal with metrical form. The beau ideal of critics like Johnson was the heroic couplet. Blank verse was a puzzle to them. Why? Because, as I suspect, they never studied the evolution of blank verse, its varieties in different writers and even in the same writer. Now I can think of no more fascinating occupation than the study of the growth of our blank verse. Borrowed, as I believe from Italy early in the sixteenth century, it took its first stand in *Gorboduc*. From *Gorboduc* to Marlowe is another great leap. In Shakespeare it reached apparently its perfection. Yet Milton demonstrated that not even Shakespeare had exhausted it. Then followed a period of decline, of disintegration. Dryden is reproached for writing his dramas in rhyme. But what was the blank verse of his stage? Little more than prose counted off by ten syllables. It had lost all flow, all rhythm, and Dryden, inverting Marlowe's example, resorted to rhyme to make his verses felt as poetry. You will observe that I am indicating lines of research, rather than stating results. How are we to connect the blank verse of Wordsworth and Tennyson with the great Elizabethans? And, hardest task of all, where are we to place the blank verse of *Manfred* and *Cain*? When I first studied these poems for the class-room, I judged the metre to be halting and defective. This was probably because it had not the flow that I was used to. But subsequent, more careful reading, satisfied me that Byron's blank verse, while it might be a trifle careless here and there, had nevertheless a character, a *timbre* of its own, and that at its best it was inferior to nothing in Shakespeare or Milton. Does this sound heterodox? Bear in mind the circumstances amid which *Cain* for instance moves. Byron knew that he was writing something against the popular grain. He knew that his readers would not be willing captives. He was bent on dragging them out of their ruts of prejudice. Remembering this, let us re-read the striking passages of *Cain*. Observe how seldom the pauses fall full and sonorous, how the caesura seems to vacillate. Unlike Shakespeare pouring forth

his passion, unlike Milton sublime in his confidence, Byron has to *insinuate* his doubts and cavils. And the metre sympathizes with this mood. Pray do not misunderstand me. I am not seeking to present to you Byron in the attitude of a Shaeffler. His movements are not those of an awkward bungler, a faint-hearted would-be doubter. *Cain* was the work of Byron in his prime. But precisely because he was then in his prime and knew what he was about, Byron made his blank verse unlike any other in the language. It is, so far as my observation extends, the first signal example of the blank verse of speculation and misgiving.

But I am straying too far. Let me return to the starting-point. I want for my classes a small carefully selected volume of specimens that will illustrate every variety of metre and stanza that has been used successfully in our language. I wish to see represented not only blank-verse and the Spenserian stanza, but the songs of the Elizabethans and the Cavaliers; also the complicated French forms recently introduced or revived by Dobson, Lang, and Swinburne. Our literature is rich enough to enable the specialist to make selections that shall be at once good metre and good poetry. And I take the liberty of believing that English poetry thus studied will become more intelligible, more vivifying to our collegians than ever before.

VII.—*The French Language in Louisiana and the Negro-French Dialect.*

BY ALCÉE FORTIER,

PROFESSOR OF FRENCH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN TULANE
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA, NEW ORLEANS, LA.

I.

IT may be of some importance to the professors of French in the United States to know something about the history and form of that language as used in the Old French settlement of Louisiana. It is a well-known fact that the descendants of the French in the colonies have always retained the language of the mother country. In America, as a general rule, the children of Germans, of Spaniards and Italians know very little of the speech of their fathers, while we see Americans of French origin retaining the language of their ancestors as a mother-tongue down to the fifth and sixth generations. The same thing can be observed in Canada and my friend, Prof. A. M. Elliott, has shown with what tenacity the Canadians have clung to their original language, and how the French element, contrary to the general law of the philosophy of history, seems to be absorbing the English population to such an extent that the country tends to be "Frenchified," and that a Jones or a Smith speaks French better than the language of his ancestor, the English conqueror, or of his father, the English settler.

The colony of Louisiana was founded by Iberville in 1699, and New Orleans by Bienville in 1718. The French immigrants, with a few exceptions, belonged to a good class of society, and the language spoken by them was pure and elegant. In 1763, the infamous King, Louis XV, after having lost Canada and the Indies, begged his cousin, Charles III of Spain, to take off his hands that Louisiana which had cost so much money and brought none to the government. The Louisianians, though they had never been well treated by the mother country, loved her and were proud of their name of Frenchmen, remembering only the France of the seventeenth century, of the glorious days of Louis XIV, of Rocroy, of Lers and even of Denain

and forgetting Rosbach and the reign of the *Cotillons*. There was a revolution in 1768, when the Spaniards took possession of their new dominion, and the Louisianians, despairing of remaining Frenchmen, proclaimed a republic on the banks of the Mississippi and expelled the Spanish governor. History tells us how O'Reilly treated the noble conspirators, and how the Spanish rule imposed by force, was afterwards mild and paternal. From 1763 to 1801, Louisiana was a part of the Spanish empire, but French continued to be the language of the colony, and Spanish was merely the official tongue. Most of the Spanish officials married ladies of French descent, and the language of the mother was really that of the family. A great many Creoles of Spanish origin do not know a word of Castilian, but speak French as well as native Frenchmen. The Spaniards in Louisiana have left as traces of their supremacy a high and chivalric spirit, a few geographical names and a remnant of their laws to be seen in our civil code, but have exerted very little influence on the language of the country.

When Napoleon took away Louisiana from Spain and, not being able to keep the colony, sold it to the United States, French was almost exclusively the language of the inhabitants. They soon came to love with ardor the great republic to which they had been bound, and on the field of Chalmette, the new Americans were just as patriotic as the men from Tennessee and Kentucky, and Andrew Jackson praised the gallantry of the French Creoles. Nevertheless, however, attached to the institutions of the United States, the Louisianians cherished the language of their ancestors and, for a long time, did not care about learning English. They were not less Americans in the sense of nationality, for did not the Roman provinces defend the Republic and the Empire as well as Italy herself? Are the Swiss less patriotic because there are four different languages spoken in their country? Are not the Catalans as jealous of the honor of Spain as the Castilians themselves?

For about forty years after the cession to the United States, the Louisianians of French descent studied little English and, in reality, did not absolutely need that language in their daily pursuits. The Hon. Charles Gayarré, the venerable historian of Louisiana, has told me that in the legislature of the State there was a regular interpreter appointed for each house, at a salary of \$2,000, whose duty it was to translate, if required, the

speeches and motions of the members. It was, it seems, very amusing sometimes to see a Creole representative abusing an American colleague, who remained perfectly unconcerned, until the interpreter, having translated the hostile address, the party attacked would suddenly rise and reply to his adversary in vehement terms, which had also to be translated before the opposing member could reply. The last interpreter, Mr. Pitot, died a few months ago at the age of eighty. In the courts of justice the jury, which was always composed in part of men who did not understand English, had to be addressed by two lawyers, of whom one spoke French and the other English.

Of course, such a condition of things could not last, for the population coming from the other States, soon outnumbered the descendants of the original settlers, and English became the official language of the State. The laws, however, are to this day published in French and in English, and when the public schools were organized in Louisiana, the two languages were taught equally as well. I regret to say, that through a ridiculous economy, French is now banished from our public schools.

The Creoles of Louisiana, and I mean by that expression the white descendants of the French and Spanish colonists, were generally, before the war, men of education, and occupied a high standing in the community. The second governor of the State of Louisiana, Jacques Villeré, was one of them and we had after him Derbigny, Dupré, Beauvais, Roman, Mouton, Hébert and, in 1880, Louis A. Wiltz. Many Creoles went to Congress and many were distinguished as judges, lawyers and physicians. They were, in short, men of energy, in spite of Mr. Cable's assertion to the contrary, and they spoke, as a rule, very good French.

The Louisianians generally pronounce French well, and are remarkably free from any provincial accent. They have not, perhaps, the exact peculiarities of Parisian pronunciation, but speak like the inhabitants of Touraine and of l'Orléanais, who certainly use quite an elegant idiom, by some accounted the best.

The French spoken in Louisiana by the higher classes of society is much better than that of the Canadians. It is easy to account for this: the Canadians were separated from the mother country in the middle of the eighteenth century and, even long before that time, immigration from France was limited, and the

population was increasing rather by the extraordinary fecundity of the inhabitants than by the influx of immigrants. The language of Canada has remained stationary, and is almost the idiom of the seventeenth century, that is to say, it is sometimes quaint and obsolete. In Louisiana, immigration continued for a long time, and in the beginning of the century, a great number of exiles came from the French Antilles, and added many persons of high birth and refined manners to the original settlers.

We received, however, in 1765 and in 1785, the immigration of the unfortunate Acadian exiles, who, surely, did not contribute toward keeping the French language in a state of purity. They were received in the most friendly manner, and settled in the parish of Acadia, now called St. James, in the Attakapas country, and the Bayou Lafourche. They were simple, laborious and honest, and form at present a great part of the population of lower Louisiana. Many have risen to high positions, and they are all very much respected, but I must say that the great majority of their descendants are as ignorant as the companions of *Evangeline*. I have often gone to the beautiful Tèche region and have met the Acadians. Very few can speak a word of English, and their French is not very elegant. They employ a great many "j'avions" and "j'étions," and use the pronoun "on" for the first person, saying: "on va" for "je vais." They say, "haler la porte" for "tirer la porte," "il est paré" for "il est prêt," "il mouille" for "il pleut," "le désert" for "le champ," "un vaillant garçon" for "un garçon de mérite," "un ferré" for "une pelle," and many other words which a Frenchman certainly could not understand. Speaking of those people, I refer, of course, to the lower class of society, for there are in the Attakapas parishes many persons who speak very correctly, though I may add, with a slight drawling accent.

Another cause of the purity of our language in Louisiana, is the fact that during the old regime almost all young men of rich families were educated in France. They received an excellent classical education, but learned no English. My father has often told me that on his return home, after a seven year's course in a French college, he could only say in English: "shut the door," and had to go North for some time to study the language of the country. My grandfather, who was born during the Spanish dominion, spoke French only, and did not allow English to be spoken in his family. We are not so exclusive at

present, and we are very anxious that our children should know English perfectly well, but we still consider French as the mother-tongue, as the language of the family. We are just as good Americans, however, as the men of New England: the Creoles fought valiantly for the late Confederacy, and would fight no less valiantly for the restored Union.

In the last century we had, I may say, no schools in Louisiana, and those who could not go to Europe had very little education. The Ursuline nuns taught the girls, and the Jesuits, the secular priests, and private teachers taught the boys. There was, nevertheless, great luxury in the colony, and the manners were those of the best society.

In the beginning of the century, the college of Orleans was established in New Orleans, and became quite a good institution. Mr. Gayarré, who is now eighty years old, was educated there. He has often spoken to me of the president of the college, Rochefort, a Frenchman, and says that French was better taught than English, and instruction in Latin was very good. It is a curious fact that the great republican and regicide, Lakanal, was one of the last presidents of the college of Orleans. The Louisianians have not forgotten his memory, and have lately sent their little piece of marble for his statue.

The French language has always held a high rank in the schools of Louisiana, but as I have already said, is no longer taught in the public schools. To supply partly this great want, *l'Union Française*, a French benevolent society in New Orleans, has for the past two years opened a free school of French for indigent children of the French and Creoles. The school gives tuition to about fifty pupils and has met with such favor that *l'Union* is trying to make arrangements to receive a larger number of boys. In our schools for girls, French is perhaps better taught than in our private institutions for boys, and the young lady graduates are always quite proficient. I may add, however, that no attempt has thus far been made to teach the language scientifically, and that very few men in Louisiana have ever read a word of Old French. I am happy to state that, at the Tulane University, I have begun an historical and scientific course in French, and that I intend to pursue it much farther. It may be proper to say here that no student can take a degree at this University without studying French at least two years, and in one course four years. It must be borne in mind that

French is not a foreign language in Louisiana, and that it must be taught in a very practical manner. It is, besides, easy to learn other modern languages in New Orleans as the student has always the opportunity to practise the idiom he is learning, be it French, German, Spanish, Italian, and even Portuguese.

Though French is still the mother-tongue of many thousands of Louisianians, the fact cannot be denied that it is not as generally spoken as before the war. In order to perpetuate our language in Louisiana and to encourage the study of French literature, *l'Athénée Louisianais* was established in 1876. It is now a literary society of great influence, and has done a great deal towards encouraging the study of French. We give each year two prizes, one for ladies and one for gentlemen, for the best composition written in French in Louisiana, and we have a magazine which appears every two months, and which is read by many persons of note, both here and in Europe. Our distinguished chieftain, Genl. G. T. Beauregard is the president of *l'Athénée*, and his name has helped materially the cause for which we are struggling.

We wish, above all, to encourage the study of the French language, but also to raise the level of education in Louisiana and to induce our people to take advantage of their natural intelligence to become a literary community. Thanks to the munificence of Mr. Paul Tulane, we now have a University that will do for Louisiana what your Harvard, your Yale, your Johns Hopkins, your University of Virginia have done for Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland and Virginia.

II.

While speaking of the French language in Louisiana, it is necessary to say a few words about that very peculiar dialect, if it may be called so, spoken by the negroes in lower Louisiana. It is quite interesting to note how the ignorant and simple Africans have formed an idiom entirely by the sound, and we can understand, by studying the transformation of the French into the Negro dialect, the process by which Latin, spoken by the uncivilized Gauls, became our own French. However ridiculous the Negro dialect may appear, it is of importance to the student of philology; for its structure serves to strengthen the great laws of language, and its history tends to prove how

dialects have sprung from one original language and spread all over the world.

To the negroes of Louisiana may be attributed the same characteristics that Prof. James A. Harrison recognizes in the American blacks of the South, that is to say, humor and a naïveté bordering on childishness, together with a great facility for imitating the sounds of nature and a wonderful aptitude for music. Their language partakes necessarily of their character, and is sometimes quaint, and always simple. Their plantation songs are quite poetical, and I may say, charming in their oddity.

Of course, there is no established orthography for the Negro-French, and this obscure dialect of a Romance tongue is written, like the Spanish, without regard to étymology and simply by the sound, though the letters, in passing from the language into the dialect, have not kept their original value. It is this misconception in hearing that has given rise in Negro-French to the word-decay so important in the formation of dialects, but we may also observe in the language of the negroes a great many examples of abbreviations due entirely to the want of energy of the person speaking, a principle well established by linguists, and of great value. The negro does not wish to say *embarrassé*, *embêter*, *appeler*, *entendre*, *vouloir*, *aujourd'hui*, *écorcher*, *laddéans*, *capable*, but will say: 'bété', 'pélé', 'tendé', 'oulé', 'jordi', 'corché', *ladan*, *capab'*, cutting off as many letters and even syllables as possible, as we have done with the Latin for our French.

The process of agglutination is very frequent in Negro-French, and we see such expressions as *in nomme* (un homme) and *dé nomme*, *in dézef* (un oeuf), *dé lacloche* (deux cloches), *troi dézo*, (trois os), *in lari*, (une rue), which may appear very strange, but are not more so than our *deux tierres* and *le lendemain*.

The genitive of the Old French exists purely in the Negro language, and if the student of *la langue d'Oil* finds it strange to see such expressions as "en son père verger," he will be quite astonished to hear the Louisiana negro say: *chival file mouri*, which might indicate that Jules was a horse, if we did not know that he was the owner of the animal. My friend, Dr. Alfred Mercier, even says that there is a dative in Negro, imported by the blacks from St. Domingo, such as *zié à moin*, my eyes, *tchor à li*, his heart. I believe, however, that this mode of speaking is very rare, and that the possessive adjectives are much more used: *mo zié*, *so tchor*.

PHONETICS.

With regard to the phonetics of the Negro-French, we may say that the letters have not changed as much as in Negro-English. Cf. Prof. Garrison's article in "Anglia."

VOWELS.

a

is pronounced :

1. a in French : asteur, anon (allons).
2. o " moman, popa.

e

1. e mute in French : nomme, fame.

2. é " 'pélé, kéke (quelque), tête.
3. i " piti, chimin, li, (le).
4. in " donnin (donné).

i

as i in French : 'rivé (arrivé).

o

1. o in French : côté.
2. o in French word cotte : rose.
3. i in French : michié (monsieur).

u

1. i in French : lari, pini, vini, jige.
2. ou " la nouitte, tou souite.
3. oua " mo oua ça (jai vu cela).

y

1. z in French : zié (yeux). as consonant.
2. y " bayou. as vowel.

DIPHTHONGS.

oi

1. é in French : frét (froid) drét (droit).
2. oi " dézoi (des oies).
3. oin " moin (moi).
4. o " zozo (oiseau).

ai

1. as ai in French : lair (l'air).
2. as in " connin (connais).

eu

1. ai in French : bonair (bonheur), lonair, (l'honneur).
2. é " vié (vieux).

ou

o in French : 'jordi (aujourd'hui).

au

au in French: au bor dolo (au bord de l'eau).

oe

é in French: sér (soeur).

o " tchor (coeur).

Of the nasal sounds, *an* and *in* are as in French: *on* is pronounced:

1. on in French: bonjou (boujour), moun (monde).

2. o " mo, to, so, (mon, ton, son);

un is *in* in French, pronounced *inne*, when it represents the numeral adjective *un*.

CONSONANTS.

b

is as in French.

c

1. tch: tchor (coeur).

2: k in French: connin (connu).

3. s " cila (celui-là).

d

1. d in French: donnin (donné).

2. dj Djé (Dieu).

f

is as in French.

g and j

often like z: manzé, (mangé), zonglé (jonglé).

h

is always mute, and consequently disappears in writing: so lonair (son honneur).

k, m, n, p

are as in French.

l

1. y: yé (les).

2. n: anon (allon) cf. Old French aner from Latin adnare, whence aler and aller.

r

generally disappears, as pou for pour, nég' for nègre, vendé for vendre, or comes before the vowel, as dromi for dormi.

s

1. s in French: so.

2. ch " chongé (songé).

t

1. t in French: tombé.
2. k " to kenne (le tien).
3. tch " tchombo (tenu)

and is always pronounced at end of words.

q and x

are not necessary, as k takes the place of q, and Negro-French being written phonetically does not need x, which represents cs or gs.

v

1. v in French: vini.
2. w in English: li oua (il a *vu*).

y

z in French (zié) (see vowels above).

z

is pronounced as in French, but is used to mark the plural, the sound of the plural s being represented by z: dé dézo (deux os); ez disappears, as that sound is represented by é.

PARTS OF SPEECH.

THE ARTICLE.

Just as the French have simplified the Latin pronoun ille, illa, illud into le, la, les, the negro has formed his article by taking la for both genders singular: nomme la, fame la, and by changing les into yé for the plural, and joining it to the singular la: nomme layé, fame layé

masculine singular: la
 feminine singular: la
 masculine and feminine plural: layé.

The partitive article does not exist in Negro, as the words des or du are changed into dé and di, and joined to the noun as one word: mo manzé dipain é dipomme. De la disappears: mo boi labière. If we wanted to use the word with an article, we would say: labière la bon, divin la mauvais.

du becomes di
 des " dé
 dela disappears.

The indefinite article a or an is represented by *in* pronounced *inne* for masculine and feminine. The article is the most extraordinary peculiarity of the Negro-French; the French article is

always joined to the noun and the Negro added, even in nouns taken in a partitive sense.

The elided article l' is represented also by la for masculine or feminine: *nabe la* (*l'arbre*); *dolo la* (*l'eau*).

THE NOUN.

There is no distinction of gender in Negro-French. The article la serves for masculine and feminine singular, and yé for the plural, and the adjectives are therefore always invariable. The grammar of the noun is consequently very elementary. The only difficulty is to know how to form the noun, and that difficulty can be overcome by applying attentively the rules of phonetics given above, and by observing the invariable agglutination of the article to the noun.

A peculiar expression is that used for *grande personne* and *enfant*: *gran moune* and *piti moune*, personne not being considered.

THE ADJECTIVE.

The qualifying adjectives are all kept in the masculine, and we have such expressions as *bon michié la*, *bon michié layé*; *bon madame la*, *bon madame layé*.

POSSESSIVE ADJECTIVES.

masculine and feminine singular.	masculine and feminine plural.
mo, to, so.	mo, to, so, with yé placed after the noun: (mo piti yé).

DEMONSTRATIVE ADJECTIVES.

cila for masculine and feminine singular:	nomme cila fame cila.
cila yé for " "	plural: nomme cila-yé fame cila yé.

NUMERAL ADJECTIVES.

in, dé, troi, cate, &c., primié, déxiéme, &c.

INDEFINITE ADJECTIVES..

The indefinite adjectives are the same as in French, but pronounced differently: kéké (quelque), ki (quel), pligiére (plusieurs), &c.

The comparison of adjectives is by pli (plus) and aussite (aussi), and of course there is no irregularity, and meilleur is always pli bon.

THE PRONOUN.

PERSONAL PRONOUNS.

First person.	Second person.
mo (^{je} _{me}), moin (moi), nou.	to (tu and toi) toi, vou.

Third person.

li (le, lui and la), yé (les).
yé also represents ils, elles, eux, leur, se, en, y and soi.

INTERROGATIVE PRONOUNS.

Qui moune, qué, qui ça.

RELATIVE PRONOUNS

are not often used as "la chose que je t'ai dite," kichoge la mo té di toi. (Observe kichoge formed from quelque chose, and used as one word).

DEMONSTRATIVE PRONOUNS.

masculine and feminine singular: cila, cila la.
" " plural: cila yé, cila layé.
" " singular: ça.

POSSESSIVE PRONOUNS.

In the possessive pronouns the t is changed into k. cf. M. Müller's remark on the subject—"Science of Language," pages 181 and 182. Vol. II.

mo kenne	nou kenne
to kenne	vou kenne
so kenne	so kenne

INDEFINITE PRONOUNS.

The only point of interest about the indefinite pronouns is that our very convenient word *on* is changed into yé: yé di ça, (on dit cela), and that rien becomes arien.

THE VERB.

In all the Romance languages, the verbs are complicated and difficult. However, in that very remote Romance dialect, the Negro-French, the verbs are very simple and easy. There is no distinction for the conjugations and hardly any for the tenses. The forms *apé* from *après*, *té* from *été*, *sra* and *srai* from *serai*, *malé* from *allé* being sufficient to indicate the present, the past, and the future.

COUPÉ. (COUPER).

PRESENT INDICATIVE.

mo	apé	coupé	contracted into	mapé	coupé
to	"			tapé	"
li	"			lapé	"
nou	"			noupé	"
vou	"			voupé	"
vé	"			yépé	"

IMPERFECT.

mo	té	apé	coupé	contracted into	motapé	coupé
to	"	"			totapé	"
li	"	"			litapé	"
nou	"	"			noutapé	"
vou	"	"			voutapé	"
yé	"	"			yétapé	"

PAST DEFINITE, INDEFINITE, ANTERIOR, AND PLUPERFECT.

mo té coupé	contracted into	mo coupé
to "		to "
li "		li "
nou "		nou "
vou "		vou "
vé "		vé "

IMPERATIVE.

Coupé—anon coupé — couri coupé.

FUTURE.

malé	coupé	—contracted into	ma	coupé
talé	"	"	"	ta
li	alé	"	"	la
nou	"			
vou	"	"	{	not contracted.
yé	"	"		

FUTURE ANTERIOR.

mo	sra	coupé
to	"	"
li	"	"
nou	"	"
vou	"	"
yé	"	"

CONDITIONAL PRES. AND PAST.

mo	sré	coupé
to	"	"
li	"	"
nou	"	"
vou	"	"
yé	"	"

The subjunctive does not exist in Negro-French. "Il faut que je coupe" is "I' fo mo coupé," the infinitive being used instead of the subjunctive.

All the verbs are conjugated on the model given above of *couper*. The auxiliaries change entirely, and *avoir* disappears, and is replaced by *gaingnin* from *gagner*. So the conjugation of *avoir* is:

mo apé gaingnin or mapé gaingnin
to “ “ “ tapé “

etc., the same as for *couper*, substituting *gaingnin* to *coupé*.

The verb *être* only exists in the forms *té*, *sra*, *sré* used in compound tenses and in the expression *yé* of the present, from *est*, viz.: "Où êtes-vous?" *Où vou yé*. "Où sont-ils?" *Où yé yé?*

The passive is always replaced by the active form, and the present indicative of *être aimé* is:

Future—yé sra laimin moin, etc.

Conditional—*yé sré laimin moin, etc.*

IMPERSONAL VERBS.

They are also expressed by *ye*.

Present Ind.—vé négé.

Future —yé sra négé.

Imperf. Ind. — vé té négé.

Cond. —vé sré négé.

IRREGULAR VERBS

Aller—is generally replaced by *couri* as “il est allé” *li couri*, except in *anon.*

envoyer—becomes	voyé	sortir — becomes	sorti
dormir	“	dromi	ouvrir
mentir	“	menti	courir
venir	“	vini	mourir
boire	“	boi	coudre
naître	“	nette	connaître
prendre	“	prenne	vivre
rire	“	ri	s'asseoir
valoir	“	vau	voir
vouloir	“	oulé	oua.

ADVERBS.

Contrary to all Romance languages, the Negro-French does not form its adverbs of manner by the suffix *ment*, Latin *mente*. Instead of saying: "Il est mort bravement," the negro says: *li mouri ben brave* or *trè brave*; *ben* or *trè* indicating manner.

Adverbs of place—*icite*, *là*, *ala* (*voilà*), *enhau*, *enba*, *dihor*, *divan*.

Adverbs of time—*dipi can*, *dimin*, *asteur*, *touzou*, *zamain*, *jordi*.

Adverbs of quantity—in *pé*, *boucou*, etc.

Adverbs of interrogation—*cofer*, *combien*, etc.

Adverb of doubt—*pététe*.

Adverbs of affirmation and of negation, as in French.

PREPOSITIONS.

The prepositions are almost the same as in French. The Negro, however, never says *sur* or *sous*, but *enhau* and *enba*, viz.: "en hau la table, en ba la table." Pour becomes *pou*.

The principal conjunctions are: *é*, *ou*, *ni*, *main*, (*mais*) *pasqué* (*parce que*), *pisqué* (*puisque*).

INTERJECTIONS.

As in all languages, any word may be used as an interjection in Negro, to express a sudden emotion of the mind, but with the exception of the universal *oh!* and *ah!* *Bon Djé!* (*Bon Dieu!*) is most used.

FORMS OF ADDRESS.

Michié, *madame*, *mamzelle*, *maite*, *timaite*, *viémaite*. Remark that *mamzelle* is used very often by the negroes even while speaking of a married lady, in the same way as the French did, down to the seventeenth century, when not addressing a lady of noble birth, as "Mademoiselle Molière," the great Molière's wife.

Mr. Littré, in his "Histoire de la langue française" says that the *Iliad* can be translated more easily in Old French than in our modern language, and he gives the first book of Homer's poem written in the language of the thirteenth century. I believe that Old French, in its turn, can be translated very well into the Negro dialect, and I give below a few lines of "la Chanson de Roland" in our Louisiana patois.

Li quens Rollanz se jut desuz un pin,
envers Espagne en ad turnet sun vis,
de plusurs choses a remembrer li prist:
de tantés terres cumé li bers eunquist,
de dulce France, des humes de sun lign,
de Carlemagne sun seignur kll nurrit,
ne poet muér nen plurt e ne suspirt,
mais lui meſſme ne volt metre en ubli,
claimet sa culpe, si priet den mercit:

veire paterne ki unkes ne mentis,
saint Lazarun de mort resurrexis,
e Daniel des luns guaresis,
guaris de mei l'anme de tuz perils
pur les pecciez que en ma vie fis!
sou destre guant à deu en purofrit,
sainz Gabrieſs de sa main li ad pris
desur sun braz teneit le chief enclin,
juintes ses mains est alez a sa fin.
deus li tramist sun angle cherubin
e saint Michiel de la mer del peril.
ensemble od els sainz Gabriel i vint:
l'anme del cunte portent en pareſs

Conte Roland assite enba in pin,
côté l'Espagne li tournin so figuire,
li commencé pensé boucou kichoge:
tou laterre yé li prenne comme in brave,
la France si doux, nomme so famille,
é Charlemagne so maite, qui té nourri li
li pa capab' péché crié é soupiré.
main li vé pa blié li même,
li confessé so péché, mandé bon Djé
pardon

'mo bon popa qui jamin menti,
saint Lazare qui té ressuscité,
e Daniel qué lion té pas oulé,
sauvé mo zame dé tou danzer
pou péché qué dans mo la vie mo fai
so dégant drét li ofri bon Djé,
saint Gabriel prenne li dans so la main
enhau so bra li tchomlo so latéte,
so lamain yé jointe, é li mourri enfin.
bon Djé voyé so zange chérubin
é saint Michiel dé lamer péril,
avec yé saint Gabriel vini
é yé porté so zame dans paradis.

I offer this paper as a very imperfect sketch of the Negro-French dialect, but claim some indulgence, as the work treats of a field new and almost entirely unexplored.

VIII.—*A Modern Classical Course.*

BY F. V. N. PAINTER, A. M.,

PROFESSOR OF MODERN LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES IN ROANOKE
COLLEGE, SALEM, VA.

IN discussing a Modern Classical Course for our colleges, I wish to begin with a word in reference to the nature of education. By so doing, I hope not only to prevent the cry of low utilitarian views, but also to lay a solid foundation for the discussion that is to follow. I accept the definition of Comenius that education consists in complete human development. Man comes into the world endowed with certain physical and mental capacities. These are at first in a germinal or undeveloped condition; but they contain within themselves large possibilities and a strong impulse toward development. The object of education is to lead the several parts of man's nature to a harmonious realization of their highest possibilities. The finished result is a complete manhood, the elements of which are a healthy body, a clear and well-informed intellect, sensibilities quickly susceptible to every right feeling, and a steady will whose volitions are determined by reason and an enlightened conscience.

The educational or developing process in relation to mind involves two factors, which, though logically distinguishable, are practically inseparable. These are exercise and the acquisition of knowledge. The great law underlying mental, as well as physical growth, is self-activity. The various faculties of the mind must for a long period be brought into frequent exercise in order to become active, obedient, and strong. Facts, relations, truths, present the occasion of this activity. Self-activity in the appropriation of knowledge is the condition of healthful mental growth. This is the truth which should govern the arrangement of any general course of education.

The great problem at present in collegiate education is the arrangement of a course of study which, together with the highest degree of mental discipline, will afford the largest amount of valuable knowledge. In the solution of this problem, two mis-

takes are possible. On the one hand, studies may be chosen for their utility as sources of valuable information; on the other, for their value as a mental gymnastic. Encyclopedias may be adopted as text-books; or Sanscrit and Arabic be given prominence. Both mistakes are equally serious. In the one case, the student becomes a repository of facts which he cannot use wisely in the conduct of life; in the other, he acquires a discipline that leaves him ignorant and helpless in the presence of the manifold duties of manhood. In neither case, to use the language of Milton, is he fitted "to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously, all the offices both private and public, of peace and war." And this must be, in its external aspects, the end of a liberal education.

With these truths in mind, I proceed to an examination of the chief course offered American students; namely, the ancient classical course. This, I believe, concedes too much to the disciplinary part of education. When the great modern literatures were in their infancy, and Latin was still the language of the learned world, this course was no doubt the best that could have been devised. Apart from disciplinary value, it possessed practical utility. But by national growth, the progress of art and science, and the development of refined modern tongues, Latin and Gr̄eek have lost most of their value for practical life. Thus the ancient classical course has fallen out of due relation to the needs of the present time. It is true that an acquaintance with ancient life, because of its relation to modern civilization, is indispensable to every educated man. But this can be obtained without a profound knowledge of Latin and Greek. Ancient life and thought have been made accessible in modern tongues by the historian and the translator. As President Eliot has said: "It is a very rare scholar who has not learned much more about the Jews, the Greeks, or the Romans through English than through Hebrew, Greek, or Latin." To give the ancient languages pre-eminence simply for their disciplinary and etymological value seems a waste of time.

These and other considerations have given rise to a widespread dissatisfaction with the unmodified ancient classical course. Significant voices in our own and other lands have been raised against it. In Germany this dissatisfaction has found practical expression in the "real schools," which omit Greek entirely, restrict Latin, and provide extended courses in the modern lan-

guages and natural sciences. In this country, it has given rise to our various elective, scientific, and philosophical courses, which, however much they may differ in other respects, agree in reducing the amount of Latin and Greek. Even in the ancient classical course itself, Latin and Greek have been somewhat forced back from their former prominence.

The principal alternative course in our American colleges has been the scientific. This course omits Greek, reduces the amount of Latin, and provides, in connection with additional studies in the modern languages, extended instruction in the natural sciences. It corresponds essentially to the "real schools" of Germany. As compared with the ancient classical course, it reduces the amount of linguistic study fully one-third. By the substitution of natural science for language, the scientific course seems to attach too much importance to the knowledge factor of education. As at present pursued in most of our colleges, the study of natural science consists chiefly in memorizing facts laid down in text-books, and hence possesses but little value as a disciplinary exercise. It does not give the manifold discipline acquired in linguistic studies. After a considerable period of trial, the scientific course is coming to be considered defective as a means to education. Amherst College has abolished it. The philosophical faculty of the University of Berlin has declared that "the preparatory education acquired in the real schools is, taken altogether, inferior to that guaranteed by the *gymnasia*." It seems probable that in the near future the scientific course, except for special students, will be relegated to a very subordinate position.

The modern classical course, to be described in the next paragraph, seems to avoid the mistakes of the other two courses. It makes linguistic study the basis of education. It makes a partial substitution of modern for ancient languages, at the same time it gives Latin and Greek recognition, because of their grammatical excellence and etymological relations to the modern tongues. While making ample provision for the training of the mind, it keeps in view the relations and needs of modern life.

The nature of this course will appear more fully from a specific statement of the changes proposed. For the degree of Bachelor of Arts, our best Southern colleges require about six years in Latin, about five years in Greek, and usually two years

in either French or German. This is the ancient classical course, which requires in the aggregate about thirteen years of linguistic study other than English, occupying nearly one-half of the student's time. In the modern classical course here advocated, it is proposed to retain about the same amount of linguistic study, but with a different apportionment of time. Four years should be allowed to German, four years to French, three or four years to Latin, and not less than one year to Greek on account of its relation to our technical nomenclature. This year in Greek, which should come in the collegiate rather than in the preparatory course, should have special reference, like the study of Anglo-Saxon, to English etymology. In institutions of higher grade, the same ratio between the modern and the ancient languages might be observed in laying out a more thorough course. These changes would not affect any of the other college departments, though it might be found expedient to make a year or two of Latin elective with natural science.

This course should hold equal rank with the ancient classical course and lead to the same degree. In view of existing dissatisfaction with the two courses now most in vogue, the modern classical course appears well adapted to meet a popular want. It affords a fine mental discipline, it gives a large acquaintance with English etymology; it imparts a thorough knowledge of general grammar; it prepares the student for the numerous exigencies of business and travel; it introduces him to the two richest modern literatures after his own; it prepares him to appreciate the master-pieces of antiquity when read in translations; and what needs especially to be emphasized, it furnishes him with a good working knowledge of two foreign languages, whose treasures of thought he can use at will throughout his literary or professional life.

Of these several considerations in favor of a modern classical course, there are two which I wish to consider more in detail. The first is the disciplinary worth of the modern languages—a fact that has not been duly appreciated. After careful consideration and experiment, I am prepared to claim for French and German equal rank with Latin and Greek as disciplinary studies. An inquiry into the nature of the discipline resulting from language study will, I think, justify this position. The memory is cultivated in acquiring a vocabulary of words and in mastering

the principles of grammar. The attention is trained in the work of translation. The sense of discrimination in regard to the meaning and force of words is sharpened. The literary taste is developed by contact with the classic page. And above all, the reasoning, judging, and combining faculties are in constant exercise. All these elements of a manifold mental training enter fully into the study of French and German. And when we consider the increased interest with which these languages are studied; their freedom from the abuse of translations; and the additional mental quickening connected with conversational exercises, it is not too much, perhaps, to claim for French and German superior advantages over Latin and Greek as disciplinary studies.

The other point of which I wish to speak in detail is the comparative worth of ancient and modern literature. As to matter, the superiority of modern literature is conceded. Says the Hon. D. H. Chamberlain, in his reply to Mr. Charles Francis Adams: "I do not mean, by any means, and I do not understand the classicists so-called anywhere to mean, that Greek literature expresses the best results of human thought in science, morality, philosophy, or religion. It does not; it could not. Greek literature was produced in an age of the most limited knowledge of the great subjects which most concern men in modern times. It is not in the Greek literature of the classic period that we find what may be called the best results of human thought as applied to the material world of nature and life, or to those problems which concern the present moral duties or the future destiny of man. The materials of modern literature are incomparably richer, the results of modern thought are immeasurably more valuable and beneficent."

But the superiority of modern literature being conceded as to substance, the question still remains as to form. And after all, in polite literature, this is the most valuable element. I have been at a good deal of pains to satisfy myself on this point. I have placed Milton by the side of Homer and Virgil; Goethe and Racine by the side of Euripides; Hume, Gibbon, and Macaulay by the side of Thucidides and Livy; Bacon by the side of Plato; and the result has not been unfavorable to the moderns. I consider the judgment of Prof. John S. Blackie entirely correct. "I claim for the ancients," he says, "no fault-

less excellence, no immeasurable superiority. The raptures which some people seem to feel in perusing Homer and Virgil, Livy and Tacitus, while they turn over the pages of Shakspeare and Milton, Hume and Robertson, with coldness and indifference, I hold to be either pure affectation or gross self-delusion ; being fully satisfied that we are in no want of models in our English tongue which, for depth of thought, soundness of reasoning, for truth of narrative, and what has been called the philosophy of history, nay, even for poetical beauty, tenderness and sublimity, may fairly challenge comparison with the most renowned productions of antiquity."

In view of the foregoing considerations, I think we may confidently appeal at least to the public in behalf of a modern classical course.

IX.—*The Place of English in the College Curriculum.*

By TH. W. HUNT, PH. D.,

PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AND OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN THE
COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY, PRINCETON, N. J.

IT is now customary among the most advanced students of modern education to divide the area of collegiate studies into the three great departments of Science, Philosophy, Language and Literature. Although within the sphere of a liberal training there are some studies not strictly included in this division, it is for all practical purposes a convenient and comprehensive one. It is with the last of these three departments that the present paper will deal. We mean by English,—the English Language and Literature as including, also, the subject of English style and criticism. The place of English as thus defined among other collegiate branches is one of the many open questions before the educators and the educated public of to-day. It is a question so prominent and so urgently pressing for discussion and adjustment, that it must in some way be met. In the recent Modern Language Convention held at Columbia College, N.Y., it elicited special interest and clearly indicated the drift of modern opinion regarding it. It is the object of the present informal discussion to say a word on its behalf, if so be the department of English in our American Colleges may be more truly appreciated and a more generous provision be made for its needs.

I.

THE PRESENT PLACE OF ENGLISH (IN OUR COLLEGIATE SYSTEM)

It is patent to every careful observer of our educational methods that this place is one of decided inferiority. A cursory examination of the catalogues of our leading institutions will clearly reveal such an inferiority. In the oldest and what may be supposed to be the best regulated college of the country, we are told "that less than one-half as much instruction is offered in English as in the ancient tongues." A more extreme statement

may be made as to most of our important colleges. There are a few institutions indeed that constitute a pleasing exception. Such is Lafayette, "the first American College," as Prof. Owen states "that fully recognized the claims of English studies." This was as early as 1857. Such is Cornell University. Such, also, is The University of California, where the English schedule is especially full. Such, strange to say, are some of the smaller and weaker colleges of the South and West. In the great body of our colleges, however, the place of English is quite subordinate to that of all other related departments. This is true as to the time allotted it, and the results expected from it so that the average graduate knows everything else among liberal studies better than he knows his own language and literature, and can do almost anything else better than express his ideas in clear, vigorous and elegant English. Todhunter, in his *Conflict of Studies*—makes no reference to English whatever, as if, indeed, it had no place at all in an educational scheme. Mr. Staunton, in his *Great Schools of England*, laments this neglect as he says, "Of all the chief modern languages, English is, perhaps, the worst spoken and written by educated men." Mr. Thwing in his "*American Colleges*" writes, "Most colleges offer very meagre opportunities for the study of the origin and growth of either our language or our literature." In a carefully prepared table showing the number of hours assigned to the different departments in twenty of our best colleges, he clearly proves this strong assertion.—(*Amer. Colleges*, p. 23).

It is in point to allude to one or two causes of this neglect: as seen in Defective Teaching and Want of Appreciation.

No department of college work has so suffered as the English at the hands of novices. In no department is there greater need of what might be called, Collegiate Service reform. Men are often appointed to English chairs apparently for no other reason than that they are able to speak the language grammatically and have a general society knowledge of the literature. Men who are still experimenting as to what their life-work is to be are willing, in the mean time, to do English work as a means to a higher end and on such terms are accepted by Boards of Trustees. Shamefully prevalent as this is in the lower schools, it is not without frequent illustration in our higher institutions. Hence the department is committed to those who have had no experience in conducting it; who do not and cannot appreciate

its scope; who know nothing of its best methods and whose presence in it is mainly for personal ends. The anathemas of Alfred, of Chaucer and of Addison should rest upon them. The common sentiment, that any one can teach his vernacular, has been a curse to the English Department and largely accounts for what we see in the line of neglect and accepted inferiority. We agree with President Eliot "that there is no subject in which competent guidance and systematic instruction are of greater value." In this day of specialties, English is no exception. Its sphere is unique and it calls for special preparation. It may be noted further, that the inferior place assigned to English is partly due to that strange depreciation of the department which obtains so generally among parents, preparatory teachers, Boards of Trustees, Faculties of Arts, and with the general public. Some of this is comparatively thoughtless and innocent. Much of it, however, is blameworthy and is none the less so because it is based on educational traditions. It is the habit to underrate the vernacular. It is not one of the "substantial and necessary" departments as we are told. Its philology, it is said, takes us back to the barbarous days of the Anglo-Saxons; its literature ranks among the self-acquired accomplishments of the student rather than among the difficult and "regular" studies, while its actual expression in composition and literary criticism must be left to natural methods. It occurs to us that there is nothing more trying to a sensitive English scholar than the attitude which many college professors in other departments are pleased to assume, relative to the English. This attitude is at times one of indifference. At times it is patronizing and cynical. The reference here is not to scientific men whose interests as instructors are in widely different lines but to those who are identified with the departments of philosophy and the ancient languages and who are thereby presumed to have a just appreciation of all that pertains to the humanities. The English Department in our colleges has had to fight its way not only against illiteracy and ignorant prejudice but, also, against the persistent opposition of those from whom better things were expected. Whatever the causes, however, of the fact may be, the fact itself remains, that the historical place of English in our higher institutions has been a mere apology for a place, and it now claims a more generous acknowledgment. It insists, moreover, that its claims are reasonable and should at once be heeded.

II.

THE RIGHTFUL PLACE OF ENGLISH (IN THE CURRICULUM).

This, we hold, should be a *prominent* one, not meaning by this a place of precedence or supremacy, but an equitable position among other important linguistic and literary studies. President Eliot, in his suggestive article on "Liberal Education" (Century, June, '84), makes, perhaps, some extreme assertions. The drift of the paper, however, is in the right direction, and approaching changes in educational methods will prove the wisdom of most of his propositions. Among the statements not extreme is this: "The first subject which is entitled to recognition as of equal academic value with any subject now most honored is, "The English Language and Literature." These words may be accepted as the text of our discussion in this paper. It states just the truth, and in the most concise form. It is not so traditional as to say with the ultra conservative classicist that no change in the adjustment of the ancient and the modern is to be for a moment tolerated, nor is it so erratic as to insist that the old landmarks must be erased and the newer studies take precedence of all else. President Eliot is not arguing against the older so much as he is arguing in favor of the more recent regime. He is contending for the interests of modern history, of social, political and natural science and of English. The claim is that English should have "equal academic value" in the schedule with any other department of value. Instead of retaining that grossly unjust disproportion of time which Mr. Thwing's tabulated statement reveals, being, in some cases, ten hours to one in favor of the foreign tongues, the proposal would secure something like a fair adjustment. It is not our purpose to discuss at this juncture the open question of classical teaching now before the American colleges. It touches the English question, however, just at this point and needs a passing notice. The question is not, Must the classics go? nor is it the more specific question, Must the Greek go? It is only the bigot and charlatan who would entertain, for a moment, either of these questions as related to college courses. The question is, will the classics as taught in our colleges make any concessions of their large amount of time to the modern languages appealing for such time? More specifically, will they make such concession to the

English? We are within the department of language and literature. In that department, the place of English has been almost a cipher. The ancient languages have had the field. English now applies for more space in the department—for its rightful place. Inasmuch as the modern European tongues are themselves in need of similar allowances, these concessions must be made on the classical side. From the outside departments of science and philosophy it is evident that nothing can be justly asked. It may be said, therefore, that the acknowledgment of this claim depends on the attitude of the classical brotherhood and on the strength of the English movement behind the claim. If such concessions are made voluntarily by classicists, the question will be solved beneficently to all concerned. If such concessions are stoutly denied, then the desired result will be secured more slowly and irregularly, but will still be secured, by the simple pressure of the modern upon the ancient. This has already been partially illustrated. The elective classical courses in our colleges are, in the main, a reluctant concession to educational pressure from without and these courses are increasing rather than lessening, beginning in Harvard even in the first year, and in some other institutions not later than the second. The demand of the English in common with that of some other studies is,—Give us a fair place in the general adjustment. Let us work together as languages on a common ground and for a common end, but no longer on this enormous disproportion. Such a claim is made, partly, because of what the English is in itself as a language and literature and partly because we are living in an era when the vernacular must be understood as never before,—when all that is English must have “ample room and verge enough” to give it its proper expression in the national history.

Within the general sphere of college studies, science made such a claim, and being denied, has established its separate schools of a professional order. Within the general department of philosophical study, similar claims are made by teachers of historical, political, and social science, and as these claims are unheeded, movements are even now in progress looking to the founding of separate schools, as in Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania.

Similar claims are made and similar schemes are agitated as to the French and German. It is not impossible that a persistent

denial of the reasonable demands of English may lead to the organization of special schools where it can be taught with sufficient fulness. Whatever might be true of other departments, such an order of things would not be well as to English, in that the various branches of the one department of language and literature are so coördinated as to make their combined study logically necessary. In that "Renovated Curriculum" to which Professor Bain refers, a desirable adjustment can be reached on more rational methods. In some way or another the claims of the vernacular, so long and so urgently pressed, must be heeded and adjusted. Such an adjustment, we believe, will be practically effected within the experience of men now living.

III.

CONSEQUENT CHANGES AND BENEFITS.

a. It is evident, at once, that from such a reconstruction of the English curriculum important results would ensue. There would be, as first in order, *A more serious attention to elementary English in our preparatory schools.* Up to the present time there may be said to have been no well-established English course in the large majority of such schools. The colleges have not required it and the schools have had no occasion of furnishing it. It is so at the present hour. Even where such a course has a place, it is nominal and superficial. Students and masters alike understand that it is aside from the "regular work" and may be compressed into a few exercises just preceding examination at college. We speak here from an actual knowledge of the repeated testimony of entering students. Such applicants are annually appearing from our "best schools" who in the press of classical and mathematical work have scarcely opened the pages of an English grammar; who know next to nothing of American history, and who, after all their preparatory language study, are unable to construct a correct and forcible English paragraph. They know but little, if anything, of the laws of English sentence structure and the practical content and use of the English vocabulary. In a word, their "preparation" is exclusive of English. President Eliot is right when he says: "So little attention is paid to English in preparatory schools that half of the time, labor and money which the University (Harvard) spends upon English must be devoted to the mere

elements of the subject." In other words, the college must do what long before should have been done. The fact is that the commercial colleges and scientific institutes of Technology and the common schools of the country give the only approximately good elementary drill in English that is now given. Hence, the anomaly appears that of two classes of students applying for admission, those who come from the classical schools only are by no means as well prepared in English as are those who early in life passed through the public school. In a fair competition as to English, the latter have the decided advantage. It is precisely of this condition of things that President Porter is speaking in his *American Colleges* as he says: "The neglect of such culture (elementary English) in ~~too~~ many of the so-called classical schools of this country is inexcusable, and so long as this neglect continues, the colleges must suffer under reproaches which should not properly rest upon them." So radical have been the deficiencies that until quite recently no requirements in English have been demanded by most of our colleges. In many of our institutions even now these requirements are rather nominal than real. It is especially lamentable, we think, that this condition of things in our fitting schools should be most pronounced in those whose reputation in other departments is especially high and, in a sense, national. We refer to a number of the best classical schools of New England and the adjacent West, in which it would seem to be true that special pains are taken to shut out or suppress the study of English.

In a preparatory school recently established at Lawrenceville, N. J., we are glad to note what appears to be a fairly adjusted English schedule. We commend it to the attention of educators as a mark of advance in the right direction. If asked what specific modification of preparatory English the rightful place of English in college would secure, we answer, the *remanding of the first year of collegiate English to the lower schools*. This would effect the double end of arranging English justly both in school and at college and place the entering student at once upon a basis from which the best results would be reached. In addition to a more thorough knowledge of what is at present required, the student should appear tolerably well acquainted with the history of the English language in its outline facts and periods: with a fair knowledge of English etymology and structure; with a substantial familiarity with the composite ele-

ments of the English vocabulary and conversant with, at least, the primary facts of historical English literature from the time of Bacon. All this is elementary, but essential. It would at once awaken new impulses in the student's mind, would open out a wide and an attractive field of study and would start him on his college work with an impartial judgment as to the claims of this or that department of activity. Mr. Hales, in his essays on Liberal Education, contends for this in reference to the schools of England. President Porter pleads for it in reference to the schools of America. Nothing will secure it but the proper position of English in the colleges. Could a few of our first colleges have the wisdom and the heroism to state these high terms of entrance and hold to them, the problem would be solved. In the present unseemly rivalry as to numbers among our leading institutions, it is Utopian, we fear, to expect this. Here, again, public opinion may compel educators to do what they refuse voluntarily to do. Perchance, the lower schools themselves, under the influence of such popular pressure, may compel the colleges to elevate their standards.

b. Closely connected with this result attendant upon a rightful adjustment of collegiate English there would ensue, *A healthful change in the methods and benefits of the teaching itself.* Instruction purely primary and limited having had its proper place in the elementary course, would now give way to a more advanced order of work. The purely historical method of dates and names, incidents and events, would now be secondary to the philosophic and critical methods. By safely gradationed stages the study of the English language would rise from a somewhat formal examination of phraseology and structure to a real philological study of the tongue in its content and its great linguistic changes, its inner spirit, and its possibilities. The study of mere grammatical laws as formulated by Brown would yield to the higher methods of such masters as Earle and Morris. Words would become, in Baconian phrase, "the footsteps and prints of reason." Principles and processes would take the place of mere detail and the interest resulting be commensurate with the increased profit. So as to the study of literature and style. This at once would become critical and comprehensive in distinction from being merely chronological.

The main facts being already in the possession of the student, an advance could at once be made to something like the pro-

cess of generalization. The inductive principle in literary study is as valuable as it is in other realms and can be fully applied only in the event of assigning a larger place to English work. The current errors, that English literature is a subject for the desultory reader in his leisure hours rather than an intellectual study for serious workers; that it ranks as an accomplishment only, and that the terms literary and philosophic, are mutually exclusive, are errors that have been strengthened by the superficial methods on which the subject has been taught in most of our institutions. The enlargement of the collegiate course in English will correct all this. It will substitute the disciplinary for the æsthetic method and give true literary inspiration rank above mere verbal finish. The soul of the authorship will determine its excellence. The study will become psychological. It is this order of study and teaching that President Eliot has in mind when he insists that the purely disciplinary value of English literary study has been greatly underrated. If it begin and end with fact only, it is easy to see that apart from the training of the memory, there is no exercise of the intellectual powers in it. If, however, by reason of preceding drill in the schools, the collegiate teaching may at once assume high ground, the study will take its place thereby with all other studies of a philosophic order and the result will be mental breadth and vigor. As President Porter remarks, "The critical study of English Literature cannot be overestimated. It is thus that the spirit of independent activity can be most effectively directed."

As a natural result of this better method our college classes would receive what could justly be called a thorough English education. As a matter of fact, they are, at present, greatly deficient in this regard. Nor are we speaking here of an ignorance of that general English knowledge which is obtained by all students from the various branches of their collegiate work, but of those specific subjects formally falling under the English Department. Such deficiency on the part of the average graduate is greater than in any other important branch. Upon leaving college, he knows less of his vernacular than of any other language that has come before him and knows that little with less thoroughness. He has never been called to master the speech and letters of England as he has mastered those of other lands. Assuming an innate knowledge of these subjects not really possessed, he is led to deprecate and neglect them. For such a

state of things the present narrowness of the English course is responsible, and the remedy lies in enlargement and thoroughness. The pupil would then have time under the guidance of judicious instruction to make himself substantially conversant with First English Philology in Cædmon, Bēowulf and Alfred; to study its characteristics and structure; to mark its transition through the middle English of Layamon and Langlande to Chaucer and Spenser; to mark the great historical periods of Modern English from the Elizabethan to the Victorian; to study it in its relation to other Teutonic tongues—in fine to take up for the first or more minutely a thousand questions on which the college student should be informed and in virtual ignorance of which he is, at present, compelled to graduate.

So, in the province of English criticism and Literature, as the field here is still wider, the deficiencies of the average graduate and the benefits of an enlargement of the course are all the more marked. In such leading institutions as Yale and Princeton, it would seem to be in the line of travesty to assign to the professor of English Literature not more than two hours a week for one-half of the course and expect him to ground his classes therein. An application of Dr. Taylor's classical method or of Professor March's Philological method to the study of Shakespeare alone would scarcely conduct the student beyond the first half-dozen plays in the two years. Any proper study of the grand department of English Prose Authors would more than fill up such an allotment of time. What a host of topics—historical, linguistic, legendary, poetic and rhetorical—gathers about one such poem as the *Faerie Queen* or *Comus*! What deep and broad reaching questions of theology, metaphysics, social economy and literature center in *The Essay on Man*! Who could study the *Dunciad* and not make himself familiar with a vast amount of English biography and history? The study of the great forms of poetry, of the principles of poetic art, of the leading canons of style as illustrated in English classics, of the life and times of an author as related to his literary productions, of the influence of other literatures upon the English—the study of such germinal topics as these now necessarily passed with discursive comment, would by the readjustment of the course receive something like the attention they deserve and "furnish forth" the student with the knowledge he so much needs. Every graduate of an American college should

be thoroughly conversant at his graduation with just such a body of English teaching as we have outlined. He owes it to himself as an English-speaking man to be thus "thoroughly furnished" and so prepared to do his work in the world among his English fellows.

c. It is pertinent here to remark that it is only by such a widening of the course in English that the *important problem as to efficient English teachers can be solved*. In no surer way would the training of a body of high class English instructors be secured. It is often said by way of adverse criticism that despite the urgent need of competent teachers of English, the English department in our colleges fails to provide them. The charge is a just one and the explanation lies in the direct line of our discussions. The course is too restricted to do anything more than give the barest outline and introduction of the subject. Certainly, nothing can be done in the way of making teachers or awakening in students such a desire. The only remedy is, in that expansion of the course by which the student would be truly educated in English. Dr. Porter, in his article on Preparatory Schools, makes timely allusion to this duty of the college. It is one of the first obligations of every important department of college study to furnish competent teachers in that department. One of the best tests of the efficiency of a department is found at this point. No pastor should more certainly look for converts under his preaching and pastoral care than should the college professor look among his classes for those desirous of becoming teachers and able to do so. The departments of classics, mathematics and philosophy have partially succeeded in this from the fact that what has been denied the English has been accorded them. If the trustees of our colleges desire a succession of superior English professors, then must the English course be made by them "of equal academic rank" with any other department. The curse of Jehovah is still on the theory of bricks without straw. Students properly educated in English would call at once for graduate courses in such studies, by the agency of which a continuous body of high class English scholars would be ready on demand. The reactionary influence of this upon the colleges and the lower schools would be stimulating in the extreme.

d. We allude to a single further benefit of the rightful adjustment of English.—The *marked increase of English*

Literary Culture in our colleges and in the country. As to the special absence of this, at present, nothing need be said. The need is obvious to every observer. It would scarcely be aside from the truth to say that with the exception of one or two of our American institutions, our colleges are, in no true sense, literary centers. We are using the term literary in its specific sense as related to the study of English, quite distinct from that other literary influence connected with classical studies or from that general literary culture which results from the pursuit of the liberal arts. General literary culture and special classical culture are often found where a definite English literary culture is lacking and this we are bound to maintain, is for English speaking students the highest form of culture. In speaking of our colleges as the literary institutions of the country, special emphasis is to be given to that form of literary culture which is distinctively English. No amount of general culture and no amount of any specific culture from other sources than English study will give it. It must have the home flavor. In the sphere of English literary criticism what lamentable failures are daily seen on the part of those critics who bring no special English culture to their work but come to it only as general students, or as those conversant with the foreign tongues—ancient and modern. We insist that every American College should be instinct with English literary thought and life, so that faculty and students alike should feel it; so that those who come from the outside world to these institutions should feel it, and so that the effect of it upon the national life would be potent and elevating. We are speaking now to a point second to no other in the department of English as it stands related to academic and public life. We can but express our meaning here by raising the question so often raised, What are our colleges doing specifically for English Literature in America—for American Prose and Poetry? We are told on every hand that our literature is on the decline; that the heroic age of American Letters has no counterpart in modern times, and that in the main our literature is confined to fiction, periodicals and lighter verse, rather than to the great departments of creative prose and song. These questions are worth heeding. It is said by those acknowledging the charges, that the mission of America is not literary but industrial; that we are to expect an inferior order of literary art and a sluggish popular interest therein. It

is stated, also, by way of palliation, that the country is too young as yet for any decided development along these higher lines of national endeavor. These replies are partial and evasive. The difficulty lies deeper. Most of it is found in the want of a more distinctive literary English culture in our colleges. Students are not kept long enough in contact with the inner life of English Letters to take on something of that spirit which is resident therein. They fail to receive that literary bent and impulse which is the result of abiding "communion with the visible forms" of English authorship. They are not sufficiently indoctrinated.

Hence, the large majority of our graduating classes go forth quite indifferent to the claims upon them of doing subsequent literary work, quite ignorant of the meaning and methods of such work, and quite uninterested, also, in the success or failure of the chosen few who may devote themselves to such activities. It is certainly not too much to say that in every graduating class of one hundred members there should be a goodly number of special English literary students—men who would be willing to survey, at least, the literary outlook in America and insist upon the assignment of good reasons why they should not make the attempt to do something in the field of national letters. What Milton terms "a complete and generous education" surely includes more fully that culture of the English mind and taste and heart, through the agency of which those possessing it will know all that is true and beautiful and good of an English character and be enabled to furnish such literary product for the appreciation of others. It is interesting to note that in the case of some of our earlier American authors, the high literary work of their maturity was somewhat anticipated in their collegiate days. It was thus with Motley, Prescott, Emerson, Everett, and Ticknor at Harvard. It was eminently so with Hawthorne and Longfellow at Bowdoin, as with Willis at Yale and with Bryant in his partial course at Williams. These and other writers that might be mentioned may be said to have begun their literary career at college. In addition to all that they owed to natural gifts, they owed something to that distinctive culture which was more prominent then in academic circles than it is now.

It were highly desirable that more of our graduates might go forth with a similar preparation and purpose. If it is answered here, that the profession of literature is not lucrative, we have

but to turn to the lives of some of these very authors, as Hawthorne and Bryant, or to such non-collegiate men as Irving, Halleck, Cooper, and Bayard Taylor, to note through what personal struggles they went to realize their aims. It is surprising to mark how many of them reached literature through law, journalism and even business, or combined one of these pursuits with authorship itself. American literature is looking, as never before, to our colleges for her literary men,—her writers and critics, and this result, we repeat, will mainly depend upon a more serious attention in colleges to English work.

The place of English, therefore, in the college curriculum should be that of prominence. As the department of language and literature should rank with that of science or of philosophy, so, within the language department itself, the invidious distinctions that have so long had sway against the vernacular should yield by gradual concessions to a more equitable regime. In a division of hours among the Latin, Greek, French, German, and English, let the honest one-fifth of the time be set apart to each. President McCosh, in his last report to the trustees of Princeton College, writes: "As much as we appreciate other languages, we should set the *highest value* on our own."

President White, of Cornell, remarks: "It is impossible to find a reason why a man should be made B. A. for good studies in Cicero and Sophocles which does not equally prove that he ought to have the same distinction for good studies in Corneille, Schiller, Dante and Shakespeare." Recent statistics tell us "that notwithstanding the largely increased number of colleges in our country, the students in proportion to the population have been steadily decreasing for the last thirty years." The reference here is to colleges giving the degree of A. B. Among the assignable causes for such an anomaly it might not be amiss to ask whether an ultra conservative protest against the enlargement of the modern studies, and most especially of the vernacular, is not a possible one. Such an enlargement is at present before the American colleges with justifiable claims. It is noticeable that its attitude is becoming ever bolder and its educational and popular backing ever more formidable. Careful observers will not fail to note cheering signs of promise. Not only is it true, as Mr. Thwing asserts, "that the facilities for learning modern languages have vastly improved," but special facilities are at hand in the sphere of English. At no former period

have such means been available. English philology has already taken its place in scholarly esteem side by side with that of any other tongue, while in English literature and criticism better and better results are realized. The question is practically before the colleges—whether this literary development is to be made safe and reputable by being under collegiate guidance. It lies, we believe, within the province and the high privilege of our liberal institutions to hold such a control over national culture and furnish the main material for its propagation. Literary culture should be more and more a scholarly culture. In the timely proposal that a larger place should be given to the modern studies, we press the claims of the native speech “to equal academic rank” with any other study of value. This should be done for its own sake as a language and literature, for the sake of our historic and providential relations to it as our vernacular, and by reason of the present era as eminently modern and English. On the ground, also, of those various benefits which such an expansion of English in the college curriculum will secure to the lower schools, to the colleges themselves, to the general American public and to American letters—we commend its temperate claims to the intelligent judgment and practical support of all those among us who have to do with educational reform.

X.—*The Collective Singular in Spanish.*

BY HENRY R. LANG,

TEACHER OF MODERN LANGUAGES IN THE SWAIN FREE SCHOOL,
NEW BEDFORD, MASS.

THE part of grammar which, with the exception of French and to a certain degree of Italian, has been almost entirely neglected in the study of the Neo-Latin idioms, is, we need not hesitate to say, syntax; for the more or less extensive treatises which we find devoted to it in the available grammars, intended mostly to serve practical purposes, cannot meet the expectations of the scholar nor yet always those of the practical learner. A scientific statement of the syntactical forms of the Spanish language, for instance, has as yet not been attempted, unless the *Diccionario de construccion y régimen de la lengua castellana*, por D. Rufius José Cuervo, the first number of which, recently published at Paris, we have not been able as yet to obtain, prove to be such an one. The numerous practical grammars intended to teach modern Spanish almost uniformly base their rules of syntax on the language of Cervantes, thus confusing two widely different epochs and presenting constructions and terms which are now obsolete. Even Paul Foerster's excellent "Spanische Sprachlehre" is not always reliable in stating the age or the extent of use of a construction. Thus, to give only one instance, in treating the uses of the preposition *de* with the infinitive, § 486, 27, he represents the construction: 'hacerse *de* rogar' as unusual, and leaves one to infer that it occurs only in *Don Quijote*, whereas it is the usual construction, found again 'Galatea,' l. vi: *La mal camarera tan comedida como hermosa, sin hacerse de rogar, cantó de esta suerte*; used two centuries and a half before Cervantes by Don Juan Manuel in the *Conde Lucanor*, cx. xvii:

En lo que tu pro pudieres fallar,
Nunca te fagas mucho de rogar;

again by Luna in the *Lazarillo de Tormes*, p. ii, c. 11: *Hícelo, sin hacerme de rogar*; and so on, up to the present time, where we find it, for instance, in the 'Escenas Matritenses' by Mesonero Romanos: *La vieja se hacia de rogar*; in *Fernan Caballero*: *El no se hizo de rogar* (*Familia de Alvareda*, p. 21, Brockhaus

ed.). Considering this neglected state of Spanish syntax and the vast material waiting for a systematic arrangement, we need not be surprised that many of its peculiarities should have been insufficiently treated, while others have been entirely overlooked even by the master of Romance Philology, Friedrich Diez, and those following in his wake. One of the constructions not mentioned in Diez' Comparative Romance Grammar, nor in any of the special grammars of the several Neo-Latin idioms, though in Spanish at least it is frequent enough to thrust itself upon one's notice, is the use of the singular of concrete nouns for the plural in a collective sense, commonly termed the collective singular. It is the purpose of this paper to call attention to the existence of this construction in the Romance languages, and particularly in Spanish. As neither the time nor the material at hand permitted us to extend our researches over the whole of Spanish literature, ancient and modern, we had to content ourselves for the present with the study of the most important works of the former, inclusive of the time of Cervantes, using for the modern language some of the better novelists. We regret especially not having been able to adduce late and mediæval Latin for our present presentation of the subject, but hope to do so in the near future.

For the twelfth century we have read the 'Poemo del Cid'; for the thirteenth three of the poems of Gonzalez de Berceo, the 'Libre de Apollonio,' the 'Libro de Alexandro,' the 'Poema del Conde Fernan Gonzalez, a considerable part of 'La Gran Conquista de Ultramar,' the Romances contained in Wolf's *Primavera y Flor de Romances*; for the fourteenth the 'Libro de Patronio' and the 'Libro de los Estados' by Don Juan Manuel; for the fifteenth the *Crónicas de los reyes de Castilla*, and the 'Celestina'; for the sixteenth the *Lazarillo de Tormes*, the epic poems 'La Araucana' by Ercilla, 'La Austriada' by Juan Rufo Gutierrez, 'El Monserrate' by Virues, and the 'Guerras Civiles de Granada' by Hita; for the seventeenth the epic poems 'Bernardo del Carpio' by Valbuena, 'Napoles recuperada' by Borja, and all the prose-works of Cervantes; for the nineteenth, some of the novels of Fernan Caballero, B. P. Galdós, P. A. de Alarcon, A. de Trueba and E. Castelar.

Here and there we shall be able to cite instances of the construction from the Portuguese, French and Italian. For the Portuguese we read Hardung's 'Romanceiro portuguez,' and

compared passages of the New Testament with those in the Greek original. Neither Mätzner, Hölder nor any of the French and Italian grammars which we consulted, give any information on the subject. In the very last moment, Brinkmann's 'Syntax des Französischen und Englischen' fell into our hands, where the occurrence of the collective singular in French is for the first time pointed out.

The tendency to conceive a number of objects, particularly inanimate things, as a unit, is general in Indo-European Speech. We discover it in the familiar fact that neuters either use no plural sign or take the ending of an abstract noun in the feminine singular, as in the Germanic languages and the Greek and Latin, and that Greek neuters plural have a singular predicate. To the working of the same tendency may be attributed the formation of feminine singulars in the Romance Languages from Latin neuters plural.

Representing a multitude of things, animate or inanimate, as a unity, lends life and individuality to language; hence it is done especially in poetry and in such works as adopt a poetical manner of treatment. We may look for it in the proverb, in the proverbial phrase and similar modes of expression. From poetical language it passes over into prose, where, however, its use is very limited, and restricted to concrete nouns of frequent occurrence.

In Latin the collective singular, as far as it is known, occurs with the names of persons, nations, animals, plants, materials, parts of the body and sundry other concrete nouns. Draeger, 'Historische Syntax der Lat. Sprache,' gives a large, though not complete, list of such cases. The adjectives of quantity *multus* and *plurimus* are frequently joined to nouns in the singular, a usage which we shall find to be quite common in the language of Cervantes.

In Spanish the construction is used with the following nouns:

1. NAMES OF PERSONS: VARON, FEMBRA, CABALLERO, HIDALGO, DONCEL, MUJER, DUEÑA, VECINA, HOMBRE, BARBA, SERGENTE, CONFESOR, PODESTAT, PEON, MENESTRAL, SENYALL, ACOSTADO, CRIADO AND THE LIKE.

Mucha duenna . . . andaban afontadas. (G. de Berceo, 'Vida de S. M.' c. 374).

Que tanta buena duenna sea desamparada. ('Milag. de N. Señora.' c. 566).

A mucho buen doncel auien caras costadas. ('Libre de Apollonio.' c. 16.)

Mucho buen menestral, . . . mucho buen senyall. c. 202.

Nunca varon ha fembra, nin fembra ha varon

Non seruió en este mundo de mejor corazon. c. 241.

Mucho varon rascado. c. 283.

Llegósse hi mucho buen omne e mucha riqua podestat. c. 643.

Que a cabo de III meses fuessen todos iuntados,

Peon e cauallero todos bien aguisados. ('Libro de Alex.' c. 178).

Un fijo e dos fijas, mucha buena vezina. c. 821.

Auien mucho hombre bueno fecho sin calauera. c. 981.

Azia mucho hombre muerto e desondrado. c. 997.

Auien muertos con ella mucha barba hondrada. c. 1205.

Con mucho cauallero e mucho bon sergente. c. 1225.

Non popó cauallero nin escuso peon. c. 1241.

Auien a parte echada mucha barua cavosa. c. 1846.

Muchos vasallos bonos, mucho bon acostado,

Muchos bonos amigos, mucho bon criado. c. 1866.

Non dexaron a vida nin mugier nin varon. c. 2080.

Muchas virgines e santas e mucho buen confesor. (P. del Conde F. G. c. 156).

Cuánto del hidalgo moro. (Wolf, P. y F. de R. i, p. 236).

Para tanto caballero chica cabalgada es esta. l. c. p. 249.

Y al perro cristiano astuto se diera muerte afrentosa. (Guerras civ. de Granada. p. ii, c. 14).

Lloran tanto caballero como allá se hubo perdido. (Romance del Rey Chiquito de Granada).

Mucho cristiano mancebo. (Rom. del maestre de Calatrava).

Por ruego ni intercesion de persona alguna, varon ni mujer. (Crónica de los reyes F. y I.).

Apénas puedo creer que hombre mortal tal brazo alcance. (Bernardo del Carpio. l. 3).

Mortificó á los curiosos el espectáculo de tanto hombre muerto, siquier fueran franceses y renegados. (Galdós, 'El Equipaje del rey José.' cap. 15).

Pero la verdad es, que si no hubiera tanto discípulo necio, no habria tanto perverso maestro. (Fernan Caballero, 'La Gaviota,' p. ii, c. 1).

Tanto nuevo maestro! y cada cual enseña una cosa. l. c.

Abajo habia tanto hombre, que parecia un hormiguero. l. c. c. 9.

Cristianos! yo no sé de dónde salió *tanta criatura!* l. c.

Pero, ¿ de dónde salió *tanto músico?* l. c.

Ninguno tan juguetón entre *tanto niño travieso* como pululaba por las campiñas durante nuestra infancia. (Castelar, 'Santiguillo el Posadero.' c. 2).

Los soldados del Cid se alojaron en suntuosos palacios . . . y *el peón* tuvo esclavos que le sirviesen. (A. de Trueba, 'Las hijas del Cid,' c. 7).

In Latin we find the collective singular used with miles, eques, pedes, hostis, funditor, tibicen, bucinator, remex, infans, amicus, civis, heres, homo, hospes, victor, armatus, mercator, cliens, accusator, adversarius, the usage spreading from the times of Livy and Tacitus.

From the Portuguese Reinhardstöttner, 'Gramm. d. port. Sprache,' p. 400, cites one instance: *Muito cavalleiro* em França tanto como esses val, Hard. Rom. ii, 22, and remarks that the construction is very rare in the language. Other cases of it coming under this head are:

Os braços já tem cansados De *tanto morto* virar. (Hard. Rom. i, 7).

Anda *tanto cavalleiro* n'aquella terra sagrada. l. c. i, 72.

Já agora não ha *Judeu* nem *Gentio*; nem *escravo*, nem *livre*; nem *macho*, nem *femea*; porque todos vós sois hum em Christo Jesus. Galatians, iii, 28.

For the French we may cite a few instances found in Brinkmann, 'Syntax des Franz. u. Engl.'—As the individual is not divisible, it may be called a collective use of the singular when Sand, 'Consuelo,' says: Je ne connais point *d'homme* qui ne soit sans défaut, or when we read in Scribe, 'Bertr. Rat.' iii, 9: Il n'a d'ami que lui.—The singular of *soldat* is used in a collective sense by Souvestre: Ah! c'était le père *du soldat* (representing Napoleon as the father of his soldiers).

2. NAMES OF NATIONS: CRISTIANO, MORO, TURCO, ARAUCANO.

Fizo a *muchá mora* viuda de su esposo. (G. de Berceo, 'V. de S. D. de Silos,' c. 128.

Mucho cristiano mancebo, y mucha linda cristiana. (Wolf, 'P. y F. de R.' i, 286).

El moro se fué á Andarax, llevando todo su campo. (Rom. de la batalla de las Alpujarras,) (cited from 'Guerras civ. de G.' p. ii, c. 15).

A recibir al *araucano pica*. ('La Araucana.' canto 9).

El moro, su furor ejecutando, pasaba como rayo acelerado, alzando tras de sí en aquel distrito un numero de gente infinito. ('La Austriada.' canto 4).

El moro invoca su deidad propicia, los nuestros al apóstol de Galicia. l. c.

El turco en popa, y *el cristiano* á remo, desigualmente parten el camino. canto 22.

A cuyo nombre ilustre y lirios de oro, reverenció *el cristiano* y tembló *el moro*. (Bernardo del Carpio. l. 1.)

Pero como ellos llegaron, y vieron en lugar de los moros que buscaban *tanto pobre cristiano*, quedaron confusos. (Don Quijote, p. i, c. 41).

In Latin, the singular of names of nations for the plural is found with increasing frequency from Livy down. Cicero, Fam. ix, 25, 1 has: equitem Parthum. In Livy, Tacitus and later writers we find Romanus, Poenus, Volsius, funditor Balaris, Lusitani, Samnis, Bactrianus, Scytha.

From the other Romance languages we can cite no instances at present, save two from the French, given by Brinkmann, vol. i, p. 4:

Le Sarmate á cheval t'embrasse avec fureur . . . L'Anglais, pour te garder, signala son courage. (Voltaire, 'À la liberté.')

Peindre Bellone en feu tonnant de toutes parts,
Et le Belge effrayé fuyant sur ses ramparts. (Boileau, sat. 7).

A case from the Portuguese was given above: Já agora não ha *Judeu* nem *Gentio*. (Galat. iii, 28).

3. NAMES OF ANIMALS: CABALLO, PALAFRE, YEGUA, MULA, PERRO, OVEJA, GALLINA, CONEJO, ANGUILA, TRUCHA, LIEBRE, SERPIENTE, BESTIA, ANIMAL, BALLENA, PESCADO.

Quien vio por Castilla *tanta mula preciada*,
E *tanto palafre que bien anda* . . .? (P. del Cid. 1966-67).

Tanta gruessa mula e tanto palafre de sazon,
Tanta buena arma e tanto buen cauallo corredor. 1987-1989.

Tanta gruessa mula e tanto palafre de sazon. 2114.

Tanto cauallo corredor, tanta gruessa mula, tanto palafre de sazon. 3242-4.

Comiendo pan y agua, non *anguila* nin *trucha*. (Berceo, V. de S. M. c. 145).

Fazies en medio un fremoso ualleio, de *muchas buena liebre*, de *mucho buen conejo*. (Libro de Alex. c. 450).

Andaua *mucho cauallo* connas riendas colgadas. c. 1198.

De muchas maranijas de *muchas bestia granada*. c. 1936.

Salia *mucho cauallo vacio* con *muchas silla*. (P. del Conde F. G. c. 539).

Mucho caballo lijero. (Wolf. P. y F. de R. i, 75).

Cuánta de la *yegua baya!* l. c. p. 236.

Vieron *tanta yegua overa, tanto caballo alazano*. p. 268.

Muchas vacas, *muchas oveja*, p. 286.

Duerme *el fiero animal y la serpiente* inclina su cabeza. ('La Austriada,' canto 13).

Focas, *ballena* y redes delicadas, (Bern. del Carpio, l. 9).

Tanto animal yendo y viniendo, y ni un solo para mí! (Galdós, 'El Empecinado. c. 28).

¿Qué tal? Se ha recojido hoy *muchas gallina*? (Zaragoza, c. 14).

Ella nos trae sal y *pescado*. (Fern. Caballero, 'La Gaviota,' p. i, c. 6).

El era el que proveia de *pescado* al convento. l. c.

Pero en lugar de *pescado*, no habia dentro mas que calaveras. l.c.

Cuando padre Adan se halló en el paraíso con *tanto animal*, les dié á cada cual su nombre; á los de tu especie los nombró borricos. l. c. c. 12.

Latin: porcus, haedus, agnus, agna, canis, leo, jumentum, victima (sacrifice), lepus, gallina, anser, avis, ales, passer; piscis, conchylium.

In French we find *poisson*, *saumon* and *truite* in the collective singular. La table fut servie en chair et en *poisson*. (Moz. Pesch.) See Brinkmann, l. c. p. 319.—N'i menjue (elle n'y mange) *saumon* ne *trute*. Rutebeuf, ii, 165, as quoted by Littré, Dict. s. v. *truite*.

4. NAMES OF PARTS OF THE BODY: CUERNO, UÑA, DIENTE, CABEZA, MOLLERA, CABELLO, BRAZO, MANO, ALA.

Tanto brazo con loriga. (P. del C. 2404).

Auie *muchas cabeza* echada en el prado. (Libro de Alex: c. 977).

Quebró *muchas mollera*. c. 2059.

Naturaleza . . . dióles la fuerza, el *cuerno*, la *uña*, el diente. ('La Austriada,' c. 9).

Tiempo vendrá que estos nublados rompa *nueva ala*. (Bern. del. Carpio. l. 9).

Cuajados de preciosa pedreria peto, celada, grevas, *brazo* y *mano*. l. c.

Medio-pollito tomó el portante, batió *el ala*, y cantó tres veces. (Fern. Caballero. 'La Gaviota,' p. i, c. 9).

In Latin we find the singular with *pluma*, *squama*, os. Horace C. iv, 10 uses *pluma* in the collective sense of "down" for the usual *lanugo*, probably influenced by the Greek $\pi\tau\pi\lambda\sigma\sigma$. Pliny, nat. hist. x, c. 35, 72 says: Abeunt et merulae turdique et sturni simili modo in vicina, sed hi *plumam* non *amittunt* nec *occultantur*. . . . Verius turtur *occultatur pinnasque amittit*.

Dante, Inf. xxiv, 47 has: Seggendo in *piuma*, in fama non si vien. So before him Juvenal, vi, 88 and Martial, ep. xii, 17: dormire in *pluma*.

With names of parts of the body occurring in pairs the singular may serve the especial purpose of expressing the faculty or sense which these parts represent, whereas the plural refers to the external parts. Thus the Spaniard says: tener sangre en el *ojo*, 'to have a keen sense of honor,' where the eye is taken as the mirror of the soul, but: estar empeñado hasta *los ojos*, 'to be in debt up to one's eyes,' *ojos* here referring to the mere material meaning of the word. Still, the use of the singular in such cases is not as regular in the Romance languages as it is, for instance, in German.

Dante puts *pié*, *mano*, *ala*, *occhio* in the collective singular.

E proseguendo la solinga via tra le schegge e tra'rocchi dello scoglio, *lo pié* senza *la man* non si spedia. (Inf. xxvi, 18). Sì che possiate mover *l'ala*. (Purg. xi, 38).

Quale il cicognin che leva *l'ala* per voglia di volare. l. c.— To express the faculty of seeing, sight, he uses both *occhio* and *occhi*:

Ma perchè sappi chi ti seconda contra i Sanesi, aguzza ver me *l'occhio*. (Inf. xxix, 134).

Questo (fumo) ne tolse *gli occhi* e l'aer puro. (Purg. xv, 145).

Forse maggior cura . . . fatto ha la mente sua *negli occhi* oscura. l. c. xxxiii, 126.

In French this singular is not uncommon. So Feuillet, 'Roman d'un jeune homme pauvre,' says: Mlle. Marguerite fronça *son noir sourcil*.

The Romans had a decided preference for the plural, though such expressions as *manum conserere* for *manus conserere* occur.

5. NAMES OF WEAPONS AND OTHER OBJECTS PERTAINING TO MILITARY LIFE: ARMA, ESPADA, FIERRO, LANZA, ARCABUZ, ADARGA, QUADRIELLO, FLECHA, DARDO, HONDA, PALO, PICA, PIEDRA, GALGA, CAÑON, PENDON, DIVISA, BANDERA, ESTANDARTE, SEÑAL, TROFEO; SILLA, ESPUELA, ESTRIBERA; CAMPANA.

Tanto buen pendon meter en buenas astas. (P. del C. 1970).

Tanta buena arma. 1988.

Tanta buena espada con toda guarnizon. 3244.

Tenie en escudo fito mucho quadriello. (Alex. c. 2060).
Salia mucho caballo vacio con mucha silla. (P. del Conde F. G. c. 539).

Mucha adarga bien labrada, mucha lanza relumbraba, mucho estandarte y bandera por los aires revolaba. (Wolf, P. y F. de R. i, 75).

Cuánta de la lanza en puño! Cuánta de la *adarga blanca*!
Cuánta de la espuela de oro! Cuánta de la *estribera de plata*!
 l. c. 236-7.

Tanta lanza con dos fierros, tanto del fierro acerado
 con *tanta adarga* ante pechos. l. c. 268.

Con *piedra, pala, flecha, lanza y dardo* le persigue la gente.
 (La Araucana, c. 8).

Proveido recaudo en toda parte a recibir al *araucano pica*.
 l. c. c. 9.

Hasta la gente bárbara se espanta de ver lo que los nuestros han sufrido de espesos golpes, *flecha y piedra tanta*. l. c. c. 11.

Tanta bandera descogida al viento, tanto pendon, divisa y estandarte, trompas, clarines, voces, apellidos, relinchos de caballos y bufidos. l. c. c. 21.

La furia que zumbaba á la redonda de *galga, lanza, flecha, dardo y honda*. l. c. c. 28.

Con *muchas lanza, mucho arcabuz fino* llegaban a Granada.
 (La Austriada, canto 3).

De quien *tanto trofeo*, tanta historia viven. l. c. c. 5.

La vista de *tanto cañon tomado*. (Galdós, El equipaje del rey José, c. 25).

Enrique V. está en Marsella, y *cuanta campana* hay en Francia, repicando, *cuanto cañon* existe, haciendo salvo. (Fern. Caballero, Lágrimas, c. 11).

From the Latin we can cite only one instance belonging to this class: *instrumentum*.

Graviorum artium instrumento. (Cic. Brut. 97).

Quid ex *instrumento* hibernorum relinquere cogeretur. (Cæsar, B. G. v, 31).

The French use the singular of *canon* in a collective sense:

Le prince de Bade, après avoir perdu trois cents hommes, son *canon*, son champ de bataille. (Voltaire, Louis xiv).

Les gardes-françaises arrivent avec *du canon* et commencent une attaque en forme. (Thiers, Histoire de la révolution française).

Les assiégeants disaient que le *canon* de la place était dirigé sur la ville. l. c.

6. WEARING APPAREL: ALJUBA, ALBORNOZ, CAPA, CAPYLLA, BAYO, CAMISA, GARNACHO, LAZO, MARLOTA, PENA, PLUMA, CAPELLAR, VESTIDO; ALJÓFAR.

Tanta buena capa e mantones e pelliçones. (P. del C. 1989).

Dieronle muchos mantos, *muchas pena vera e grisa, mucha buena garnacha, mucha buena camisa.* (Libre de Apollonio. c. 349).

Mucho vestido negro, rota mucha capylla. (P. del Conde F. G. c. 599).

Cuánta de marlota verde! Cuánta aljuba de escarlata! Cuánta pluma y gentileza! Cuánto capellar de grana! Cuánto bayo de borceguí! Cuánto lazo que le esmalta! (Wolf, P. y F. de R. i, 236-7).

Tanto albornoz colorado. l. c. 268.

Muchos oros, *muchas aljófar*, muchas perlas estimadas. (Rom. del Marqués de Velez). De *aljófar menudo* una cadena caido ante sus piés. (Bern. del Carpio. l. 9).

From the Latin only *vestis* is known in the collective singular: De muro *vestem* argentumque jactabant. (Cæsar, B. G. vii, 47).

7. NAMES OF FRUITS AND PLANTS: GRANO, UVA, HIGO, PASA; ROMERO.

Feliz la milgrana que dió *tanto buen grano.* (G. de Berceo, V. de S. D. de Silos, c. 675).

Podrien cogerse los frutos de la tierra, que eran grandes, de *uva, higo, pasa, peros, servas y membrillos, avellanas, nueces, castañas, almendras y otras cosas semejantes.* (Hita, Guerras Civ. de Gr. p. ii, c. 14).

Como entre los tomillos y *el romero* del fértil monte Hibla. (Bern. del Carpio. l. 9).

There are comparatively very few instances of this class in

Spanish. We find a great number of them in Latin: *faba*, *vicia*, *lens*, *raphanus*, *ficus*, *morus*; *rosa*, *fagus*, *abies*, *arbor*, *cedrus*, *hedera*, *vitis*, *herba*, *spina*, *fraxinus*, *populus*, *laurus* (Tac. Hist. ii, 70).

For the Portuguese we can adduce one passage from Camoens, *Os Lus.* canto ii, 4:

E se buscando vás mercadoria que produze o aurifero Levante, *canella*, *cravo*, ardente especiaria, ou droga salutifera y prestante.

In French *faine* and *gland* are used in the collective singular:

Après la feste Sainte Crois, que Sainglier encroissent de nois, de nois, de glans *e de favine*. (Parton. v. 529, quoted by Littré s.v.).

La nourriture de l'écureuil sont des fruits, des amandes, des noisettes, *de la faine et du gland*. (Buffon).

Le russe, las de pain noir et de *gland* veut manger notre pain blanc. (Béranger, Gaulois).

Le vent chasse loin des campagnes *le gland tombé* des rameaux verts. (V. Hugo, Odes).

8. NAMES OF MATERIALS: PIEDRA.

Agua recia, *piedra espesa* las intrincadas nubes despedian. (La Araucana, c. 9).

Como suele caer *la piedra espesa* que cierzo arroja de la nube fria. (La Austriada. c. 10). De *piedra seca* alzaron gran trinchera. l. c. c. 15.

In Latin *lapis* and *tegula* are found in the collective singular.

9. NAMES OF OBJECTS OF NATURE: MONTE, FUENTE, RIO.

Nin de *tanta buena fuente*, nin *tanto buen rio*. (Libro de Alex. c. 281).

Riscos, árboles, *monte*, hombres armados. (La Austriada. c. 2.)

From the Portuguese the following instance may be mentioned under this head:

Palavras que o Rei mando aos cavalleiros que *tanto mar e terras* tem passados. (Camoens, *Os Lus.* c. ii, 76).

10. NAMES OF PLACES AND BUILDINGS: PUEBLO, POBLADO, CIUDAD, OTERO, YERMO; CASTIELLO.

Auien mucha tierra, *mucho pueblo* ganado. (Libro de Alex. c. 1487).

Ally fue el maestro solil e acordado, non olvidó *çindat*, nen

castiello poblado, nen olvidó enperio, nen nengun bon contado, nen rio nen *otero*, nen *yermo* nen poblado. c. 2415).

Con *mucho bon castiello*, con uillas naturales. c. 2416.

We know of no instance of this class in Latin.

II. PROMISCUOUS APPELLATIVES: NOVELA, PALABRA, SENTENCIA; GUERRA, TERTULIA, LACRIMA, MACETA.

Fablaba de la lengua *muchas palabras locas*. (G. de Berceo, V. d. S. D. de Silos, c. 293).

Iaziendo á la puerta, vertian *muchas lagrimas*. (V. de S. M. c. 145).

Los que creen rafez *muchas palabras vanas*. (Libro de Alex. c. 1809).

Ca predicó por su voca *muchas malas sentencias*. P. del Conde F. G. c. 8).

Qué de calamidades, *cuánta guerra*, sectas, muertes! (La Austriada, c. 1).

Los introductores de *tanta palabra* de último gusto, en honor á la verdad, no han recibido ningun sofion por eso. (Fernan Caballero, Lágrimas, c. 11).

Qué larga será la cuenta que haya de dar á Dios de *tanta palabra vana*! (La Gaviota, c. 10).

La tia María estaba á su lado, llorando á *lágrima viva*. l. c. c. 15.

Así es que teneis las ideas tocidas y los gustos viciados por *tanta novela francesa* de malas tendencias. (Un Verano en Bornos. carta 20).

Mucha maceta en los balcones; *muchas tertulias* en la puerta de las tiendas. (Alarcon, La Alpujarra, p. 212).

The following instances from the Latin may find their place here: *funalis* (Cic. de sen. 44), *tabella* (Tib. i, 3, 28), *olla* (Mart. ep. xii, 18, 21).

In Hölder's Grammatik der franz. Sprache, p. 177, we read: Personne ne veut *du journal*, personne ne veut *de la brochure* (J. Janin), where we are inclined to consider *du journal* and *de la brochure* collective singulars for *des journaux*, *des brochures*, not *one* individual thing, as Hölder explains, but rather a number of them being taken in the lump and represented by the singular.

Dante, Inf. xiii, 46-49 says: S'egli avesse potuto creder prima, rispose il savio mio, anima lesa, ciò, ch'ha veduto pur con *la mia rima*, non averebbe in te la mano distesa, where the sense at least

would seem to justify the explanation of *con la mia rima* as a collective singular. The same may apply to Purg. vi, 133-5: *Molti rifiutan lo comune incarco*; *ma il popol tuo sollecito risponde senza chiamare, e grida: io mi sobbarco*, where *lo comune incarco* means *i comuni incarchi*, the public burdens. Such cases as these are very common in the Romance languages, and are commonly explained in grammars by the use of the definite article which gives the singular the power of referring to the whole class of individuals; but inasmuch as the singular stands for the plural, there seems to be no reason why they should not come under the definition of the collective use of the singular.

12. ABSTRACT NOUNS, ESPECIALLY NOMINA ACTIONIS.

The Romans often used the plural of abstract nouns to denote the repetition of the same thing or its occurrence at different times or in different objects, whereby such nouns become concrete. Abstract nouns with a concrete meaning may take the collective singular as concrete nouns. This occurs in Spanish, as the following passages will show:

Golpada, porrada, cuchillada, majadura, lanzada, ferida; historia, ventura, mentira.

Magar auie priso *muchas mala golpada*. (Libro de Alex. c. 1414).

Rretenia en los yelmos *muchas buena cuchyllada*, davan e rresçebyan *muchas buena lançada*, e davan e rresçebyan *muchas buena porrada*. (P. del Conde F. G. c. 322).

Deçian del criador *muchas fuerte majadura*. l. c. c. 600.

De dardos e de lanças façian *muchas ferida*. l. c. c. 688. Sabet que yo he visto *tanta buena ventura?* (Libro de Alex. c. 284).

Auien en escudo *muchas bella estoria*, la gesta que fezieron los reyes de Babilonia. l. c. c. 943.

De quien *tanto trofeo, tanta historia* viven y vivirán en todo el suelo. (La Austriada, c. 5).

Como si ellos fueran gente que habian de dejar imprimir *tanta mentira junta*. (D. Q. p. i, c. 32).

Foerster, Spanische Sprachlehre, § 391, anmerkung, explains *muchas* in *muchas bella estoria* (Alex. c. 943) as the adverb *mucho* made to agree with the feminine adjective, an attraction which is indeed quite frequent. But *estoria* referring in this passage to the exploits of the Kings of Babylon represented on the shield, may be considered the collective singular for *historias*.

'accounts,' accompanied by the adjective of quantity *muchas*. Cf. *tanta historia*.

Under this class of collective singulars may probably be mentioned the following expression found in a modern writer: *Los circunstantes celebraron á una el relato, aunque muy conocido, y encarecieron al cantor, aunque muy celebrado. Pero entre tanto plácame, sólo una persona estaba callada, el conde....* (E. Castelar, *Santiaguillo el posadero*. c. 5).

The act of applauding relating individually to all those present, we should expect the plural *tantos* for *tanto*. Here, as in all other instances, the singular is the more forcible expression, in bringing the sum total of all individual cases more prominently and vividly before the eye than the plural.

Some peculiarities are to be noticed in the instances of the collective singular given in the above text.

As has already been remarked, the Spanish language has, in common with the Latin, the use of adjectives of quantity in connection with the singular. This use is found much more frequently in Latin than one would suppose from what is said about it in grammars. It may not be out of place here to mention a number of such cases not given by Draeger, *Hist. Syntax der Lat. Sprache*, i, 4-5 and ii, iv:

Multus: multa in rosa (Hr. C. i, 5) multo milite (Hor. C. i, 15) multa prece (Hor. c. iv, 33) multa hostia (Verg. Aen. i, 334) multa victima (Verg. Ecl. i, 33) multa agna (Ovid, Fust. iv, 772) multa avis (Ovid, Am. l. iii, 5) multa tabella (Tib. i, 3, 28) multus moriens (Luc. iii, 707) multus serpens (Sil. i, 2, 547). Proverb: multus amicus, nullus amicus.

Plurimus: *plurimus* in Junonis honorem aptum *dicit* equis Argos (Hor. C. i, 7) nux plurima, (Verg. Georg. i, 18) oleaster plurimus (Verg. Georg. ii, 182) plurima rosa (Ovid, Fasti, iv, 441) plurimus aeger (Juv. iii, 231) plurima mappa (Mart. ep. viii, 59). During the classic period this usage was, as far as we know, confined to poetry; in prose it is first found in the younger Pliny.

In Spanish it is the most common form of the collective singular. Of the 182 passages quoted, over two-thirds have either *mucho*, *tanto* or *cuanto* joined to the noun with singular. In the older language we find the singular for the plural in the partitive genitive, the indefinite pronouns *tanto* and *cuanto* (of

mucho we have found no instance) agreeing with the dependent feminine noun:

Cuánta de la yegua paya! *Cuánta* de la lanza en puño! *Cuánta* de la adarga blanca! *Cuánta* de marlota verde! (Wolf, P. y F. de R. i, 236). *Tanto* del fierro acerado. l. c. i, 268. It is well known that this partitive genitive with retrogressive influence on the gender of the indefinite pronoun occurs frequently with *poco*, *mas*, etc., in the singular as well as the plural. See Diez, Gramm. iii⁴, 151-2.

The collective singular is sometimes coöordinated with the more usual plural:

Tanto palafre que bien anda, cauallos gruessos e corredores sin falta. Tanta buena capa e mantones e pelliçones. Tanto brazo con loriga, tantas cabezas con yelmos. (P. del Cid.). Con mucho bon castiello, con uillas naturales. Muchos uasallos bonos, mucho bon acostado, muchos bonos amigos, mucho bon criado. (Libro de Alex.). Muchas virgines e santas, e mucho buen confesor. (P. del Conde F. G.). Muchas armas reluciendo, mucha adarga bien labrada. Tanto del fierro acerado, tantos pendones azules. Muchas vacas, mucha oveja. Mucha aljófar, muchas perlas estimadas. (Romances). Espesos golpes, flecha y piedra tanta. Tanta bandera descogida, tanto pendon, divisa, estandarte, trompas, clarines, voces, apellidos, relinchos de caballos y bufidos. (La Araucana). Cuánta guerra, sectas, muertes, riscos, árboles, monte, hombres armados. El moro invoca su deidad propicia, los nuestros al apóstol de Galicia. (La Austriada). De uva, higo, pasa, servas y membrillos. (Guerras C. de G.). Focas, ballena y redes delicadas. Entre los tomillos y el romero. (Bern. del Carpio).

Such coöordination occurs in Latin, but, according to Draeger, l. c., is unclassical and not found before Livy. An instance of it in French is the passage quoted from Buffon: *La nourriture de l'écureuil sont des fruits, des amandes, des noisettes, de la faîne et du gland*; one from the Portuguese is: *Palavras que o Rei manda aos cavalleiros que tanto mar e terras tem passadas*. (Camoens, *Os Lus.* ii, 76).

Frequent as the collective singular is in the early epic poetry of Spain, its use seems to have been very limited in prose. We have met with no clear case of it in the *Gran Conquista de Ultramar*, written under Alfonso the Learned, such expressions as *muchas viandas e ganado* (l. ii, c. 12) being doubtful on account

of the collective meanings of the words *vianda* and *ganado*, 'food' and "cattle;" with none in the works of Don Juan Manuel, the master of Spanish prose in the fourteenth century, nor with any in the novelists before Cervantes. In the prose-works of the latter only two instances are found. In modern works of fiction it is not uncommon, and appears oftenest with one of the indefinite pronouns *mucho*, *tanto*, *cuanto*.

Though our present treatment of the subject is far from being complete, we think it has been shown beyond doubt that the collective singular is used with sufficient frequency and liberty in the Spanish language to form a distinctive feature of its syntax, and that, notwithstanding the silence of the respective grammatical works, it also exists, more or less extensively, in at least three of the other Neo-Latin idioms, the Portuguese, the French and the Italian. As for Portuguese where the adjectives of quantity *muito* and *tanto* may accompany the singular noun as in Spanish, it is of some interest to note that this language employs the construction far less frequently than the Spanish, though, according to the statement of some of its writers, its syntactical forms have been studiously and largely moulded and enriched by those of the Latin.

In French we found the collective singular used with names of persons, such as *soldat*, *homme*, *ami*; of animals, like *poisson*, *saumon*, *truite*; of fruits, like *faine*, *gland*; and with *canon*. It occurs in negative sentences with the noun in the partitive genitive.

The small number of instances quoted from Dante allows no inference in regard to the use of the construction in Italian. That the conjunction of the indefinite pronoun *molto* with a collective singular is not unknown to the language, appears from the following passage in Boccaccio: *Nel mezzo del quale (giardino) a nostro modo, avendo d'acqua viva copia, fece un bel vivaio e chiaro, e quello di molto pesce riempì leggiermente.* (Decam. G. x, 6).

In view of the facts given above, there would seem to be good reason to believe that a careful search in the literatures of the Neo-Latin idioms would disclose a far more extensive use of the collective singular than one might be inclined to infer from the limited number of instances which we have been able to gather, and would result in a valuable contribution to Romance Grammar.

XI.—*A Review of Edmund Gosse's "From Shakespeare To Pope."*

BY HENRY E. SHEPHERD, LL. D.,

PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE OF CHARLESTON, CHARLESTON, S. C.

To the student of English literature from a merely popular point of view, this work of Mr. Gosse's, cannot fail to commend itself. Its mode of treatment is pleasing—the style is lucid, the narrative is lightened by the judicious introduction of biographical sketches and entertaining reminiscences. Despite its many agreeable features, it lacks both the depth and breadth of philosophic or scientific investigation, and the critical student of our literary evolution, will lay it aside, with a mingled feeling of disappointment and regret. The volume contains a series of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute, and the Johns Hopkins University, during the season of 1884 and 1885. The restraints that are naturally imposed by the presence of popular audiences, will no doubt serve in some measure to account for the superficial manner of dealing with the subject, which is a distinctive characteristic of the work.

Perhaps no writer of our time is more capable of tracing the delicate process of transition from Shakespeare to Pope, than the author of these discourses, a reflection which tends only to enhance our sense of regret, that so rare an opportunity has not been so fully availed of, as the peculiar gifts and attainments of the author had induced us to expect. We fail to discover the delicate insight, the keen penetration, the complete grasp of the subject, which are a conspicuous feature of Mark Pattison's studies in our poetry, and we do not consciously exaggerate when we say, that in the Prefaces to his editions to Pope, Pattison has exhibited the salient features of the transition era, more effectively than Mr. Gosse has done, in his series of discourses upon the same period. We purpose in the present paper, a brief criticism of that portion of Mr. Gosse's work, which traces the development of the classical style—between the death of Shakespeare and the rise of Pope—as well as the

influence of the classical school upon the literature of our own era. The purely biographical features of the volume must be passed over, first, from lack of adequate space; secondly and chiefly, because they are so charmingly conceived and gracefully expressed, as to be in no regard obnoxious to criticism. If we leave out of consideration also, the description of those fitful struggles of departing life which Mr. Gosse has dignified with the name of "reaction," the essence of the work, the discussion of cause and effect, and that alone directly concerns us in the present review, resolves itself mainly, into the first lecture, and the closing pages of the last. In introducing his theme, Mr. Gosse is disposed to attribute the transition from the creative energy and wanton exuberance of Elizabethan days to the critical procedures, the scrupulous regard to propriety of diction and symmetry that attained their climax under the dispensation of which Pope was the acknowledged oracle, in the first place to that tendency developed by most European literatures during the seventeenth century towards structural perfection, and in the second, to a conscious and deliberate revolt during the first half of the century, against the "hysterical riot," the licentiousness and grotesqueness of the preceding era. It is perhaps difficult to reconcile these two explanations—one of which is general, the other, specific in character. If the transition from the unrestrained energy of the Elizabethan age, to the artistic and regulative fashion of our classical school, was merely one phase of a simultaneous movement of European literatures, it must have been undesigned and unconscious; if it was a deliberate reaction against the dominant tendencies of the preceding epoch, it assumes the character of an organized artistic movement. We note, we think, in Mr. Gosse's work, a disposition to insist too rigidly upon the division into *periods*, a tendency in which Mr. G. is by no means alone. However convenient or desirable, the *periodic* division may prove for the practical ends of classification and instruction, if carried out to its extreme results, it tends to obscure that oneness of spirit, that logical continuity, which characterize alike our history and our literature, in every phase of their complex life.

As an illustration of this tendency, it is simply necessary to cite the mode in which historians of our language and our literature, deal respectively with the age of Elizabeth and the age of Anne. The former of these is tersely disposed of as the age of

creative power. The latter as the era of critical refinement and expansion of our language. As mere facts of philological history, these statements are in their essential features, accurate, but the inferences that may be drawn from their broadly generalized form, are liable seriously to mislead the immature and uncritical student of our speech. They confer upon each of these periods a character of exclusiveness, at variance with the reality, ignoring for instance, so far as the Elizabethan epoch is concerned, the important truth that during the first thirty years of Elizabeth's reign, the English language underwent a thorough re-formation and reconstruction, patient scholars, brilliant knights, grave and thoughtful statesmen, even royalty, engaging with affectionate assiduity in the task of expanding and invigorating the unregulated vernacular.¹

The English of Shakespeare received a discipline, not less thorough, if less exact, than that of Pope and Addison. It is probable that a more searching and scientific investigation of our literary history than has thus far been made, would demonstrate that every form of literary activity may be found in each epoch, some being more conspicuous in certain periods and under specific stimulating conditions, but all existing in greater or less measure in every phase of our intellectual development. Shakespeare, Bacon, and Ben Jonson were contemporaries; the same is true of Addison and De Foe, of Swift and Pope. Macaulay, whose style is the supreme outcome of the critical school, lived in the same age with Thomas Carlyle, the Titanic energy of whose periods would seem to place him among the colossal minds that were "cast in the mighty mould" of the Elizabethan demigods. We regret too, that Mr. Gosse has dealt so sparingly with the complex but most fascinating history of the seventeenth century, as a means of elucidating, as well as illuminating his subject. It is to be deplored that the zealous enthusiasm and discriminating judgment of his "friend," Mr. Gardiner, have not been more freely availed of in this respect. With all its bewildering intricacy, there is an absorbing interest connected with the history of the seventeenth, notably from the accession of Charles I, 1625, to the constitutional revolution of 1688, to which few periods in our annals present a parallel. In

¹ See Dr. Drake's *Life and Times of Shakespeare, Formation of Elizabethan English*, *Southern Review*, October, 1872. *Shepherd's History of the English Language*, chapter xix, page 253.

view of the increasing light which the scientific study of history is reflecting upon the processes of philology, an obligation that philology has not failed gratefully to acknowledge, it is a source of peculiar regret, that Mr. Gosse has touched with so tender a hand upon the historic issues in course of evolution during the period embraced by his literary investigations. - It is in the records and memoirs of Charles the First's reign, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, that we trace the growth of those influences which prepared the way for the advent of the critical dispensation, the classical economy of Addison and Pope. Mr. Gosse, it seems to us, fails to apprehend the depth, as well the significance, of the Puritan movement, and to appreciate imperfectly its impress upon the literary character of the age which is the special theme of his researches. We cannot acquiesce unreservedly in the view that the classical movement of the seventeenth century, was a mere revolt against the "Jacobean riot," the wantonness and prodigality of the Elizabethan day. We can readily believe with Mr. Gosse, that the movement in its inception stages was not sensibly affected by French influence, though no one, we suspect, will dispute the existence of that influence at a later time, when the example of Boileau, was almost omnipotent in England, as in France. Is it not a more rational and philosophic solution of the origin of classicism in England, during the seventeenth century, to regard it rather as the manifestation of the *modern spirit* in literary development, the same spirit whose presence may be distinctly perceived in the expansion of physical science and in the wonderful unfolding of political consciousness during this same period, than as an expression of mere satiety, of rebellion against grotesqueness and eccentricity? The writer can distinctly remember that when he was a boy of twelve or fourteen, the poetry of Lord Byron was regarded with a kind of idolatrous admiration by his youthful contemporaries. Since the American civil war, Byron seems to have fallen into a strange oblivion with the generation which was at the stage of childhood during that "winter of our discontent," while almost every school girl of this present era, has some acquaintance with "In Memoriam," and "The Death of Arthur." Yet this marked change has come over us quietly, perhaps unconsciously, we see the result, we did not observe the process. It may be at least assumed that it was effected in accordance with natural law, and that satiety or surfeit was not

instrumental in bringing it about. The poetry of Byron may experience a palingenesy, when "some ages are passed over." Puritanism was in its leading features an energetic assertion of the modern spirit, though marred by those inconsistencies and aberrations which are characteristic of all essential innovations upon established order and ancient precedent. Let us select 1642 as a critical point in its development, and note the strange conveyance of events in that momentous year. In 1642, Gailileo dies, and Sir Isaac Newton is born; Richelieu, the great apostle of absolutism, is called to his account, and the civil war, precipitated by the invincible perfidy and stupid obstinacy of Charles I, begins with the setting up of the royal standard at Nottingham. In all this complexity, we see the manifestation of the modern spirit, in the development of physical science by scholars and thinkers during the distractions of the civil war, in the vital issues involved in the great conflict, as well as in the breaking down of our ponderous syntax, and the dissolution of our "overflowing" stanza. The civil war of 1642-1646, was merely the first hostile phase of the struggle that transformed England from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy, the aims of the leading spirits in the Long Parliament, were essentially one with those that animated the less heroic men of 1688, who consummated the labors which the reformers of 1640-41, had only begun. Under these varying aspects of progressive life, political, scientific, literary, there prevails a unity of spirit, as impressive, as it is unmistakable. The entire political development of the seventeenth century from the assembling of the Long Parliament, 1640, to the revolution of 1688, was critical or regulative in character, the revolution itself being a criticism of the constitution, an endeavor to ascertain and fix in precise forms and definite propositions its scope and intent. The famous Bentley-Boyle controversy, was another exhibition of the dominant spirit. Even during the Restoration, when there was an apparently hopeless revulsion in favor of absolute monarchy, the action of the same progressive temper is clearly discernible. The student of Macaulay, Buckle, and Green, will require no confirmation of this statement.

We hold then, that the transformation experienced by our prose and poetic style, for the breaking down of our ancient syntax and the dissolution of the old stanza, were analogous and coördinate movements, as Mark Pattison has pointed out, was

not the outcome of a satiated fancy, but rather one phase of the prevailing critical or rationalistic temper of the English intellect during the seventeenth century. Literary style participated in the general movement—it accommodated itself to the spirit of the incoming dispensation, for literature is “the artistic expression of what men think and feel.” The modern spirit has tended to obscure bold and well sustained individuality in literature, perhaps in some degree in all forms of human activity. With its disposition to substitute the general for the special, the abstract for the personal and the concrete, we discover the probable explanation of the descent of the supreme monarchs of song, from their thrones. It was not so much reaction or satiety, as the dominion of a spirit that discouraged the colossal individuality of Shakespeare, and tolerated, if it did not foster, the common place and the mediocre. There is no just cause of astonishment, that with the extension of such a temper, Shakespeare should have suffered a partial eclipse during more than a century, and the terse but trite couplets of Pope should have become the recognized ideals of grace and elegance in poetic diction. Writers approached more nearly the average intelligence of their patrons, and a reading public, if not created, was at least stimulated by the popular tone of the discussion elicited during the revolution of 1688. It is the essentially commonplace nature of so many of Pope’s utterances, that has engrafted them so firmly upon the structure of our speech—contrast him with Milton in this regard. His popularity as a master of graceful and finished platitudes outlined the shock of the romantic revival that marked the closing decades of the eighteenth century.

So far as Mr. Gosse’s views in respect to the influence of the classical period upon our modern style, prose as well as poetic, are concerned, they contain a strong element of truth, perhaps not unmixed with error. The training to which our language was subjected during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, has probably exhibited its richest results in the “golden cadence” of Macaulay, most of whose tastes and sympathies identified him with the age of Pope and Addison, rather than with the men of his own era. Yet the olden creative fire seems to have been reproduced in Thomas Carlyle, whose style suggests no relation with the classic school, and reveals none of its influence. Even in the “harping symphonies” of John Henry Newman,

whose English is the ripe outcome of the richest culture, there are occasional manifestations of the ancient spirit, the fervor and brilliancy of Milton and Taylor. Take, for example, his celebrated passage upon the relation between the science of music and the spiritual life, and especially his farewell to the church of England. The fervid enthusiasm that marked the poetry of the romantic school, perpetuated itself in some of the noblest expressions of our modern prose, indeed, no era has been richer than our own in what the late Principal Shairp so happily described as "prose-poets." That the romantic epoch ushered in at the close of the eighteenth century, being almost coincident in its origin with the outbreak of the French revolution, did not degenerate into hysterical extravagance, is in great measure due to the conservative influence of the classical age, for so deep has been its impress upon our literary character, so salutary its restraining power, that even in seasons of reaction and revolt, they have sufficed to prevent a mere *Saturnalia*, to guard against wantonness, and ridiculous excess. We part from Mr. Gosse's Lectures with a feeling of genuine regret. His graceful and pleasing treatment of his theme, cannot fail to commend him to the cordial regard of all students of our language and our literary history. We trust that at some future day, he will afford us that broad, philosophic, and comparative exposition of his fascinating subject, of which we believe him to be eminently capable.

XII.—*German Classics as a Means of Education.*

By JULIUS GOEBEL, PH. D.,

INSTRUCTOR IN GERMAN IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
BALTIMORE, MD.

GOETHE.

IN one of those short utterances, containing the wisdom and experience of a whole successful life, in the "Sprüche in Prosa" Goethe says:

"Möge das Studium der griechischen und römischen Literatur immerfort die Basis der *höheren Bildung* bleiben!"

Chinesische, indische, aegyptische Altertümer sind immer nur Curiositäten: es ist sehr wohl gethan, sich und die Welt damit bekannt zu machen, zu *sittlicher* und *ästhetischer Bildung* aber werden sie uns nenig fruchten."

It seems strange to me, that the fanatic defenders of classical education have not made better use of these words, for could they find a sharper and more successful weapon than the wish of the greatest modern poet since Shakespeare: forever to base our higher education upon the study of Greek and Roman literature? And, uttered by him, does it not sound like the modest confession, that we cannot find this higher education in his and his great contemporaries' works? The prospect of success would certainly be a very dark one for the study of modern languages if this was really Goethe's opinion as well as the truth. For all we could claim would be that English, French and German were useful for practical purposes and the process of learning them required some beneficial exercise for the youthful mind.

Perhaps it is not only interesting, but also necessary, to show how Goethe, in the words quoted above, yielded almost too much to the powers and influences to which he owed a great part of his own education. And, without pointing to the fact, that neither he nor Schiller were real classical scholars with sufficient knowledge of Greek, I believe we are able to prove

that Goethe's own life and works, his ideal conception of his high mission are a contradiction to the principles stated above. Before attempting, however, to do this, we must consider what Goethe really means by "higher education."

Accepting the distinction between "formaler und materieller oder humaner Bildung" which German educational science makes, it cannot be the former which Goethe had in view. For the imparting of information concerning certain facts, laws and truths will certainly train the intellect, strengthen the memory, increase knowledge and produce a skill in using the reasoning powers, but this is not the highest ideal of education. It is not necessary to study Latin and Greek in order to attain this intellectual training, and we need but look at the scholastics of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries who possessed it long before the Renaissance urged a more thorough study of the ancient languages. But the Renaissance itself was a protest against the onesided cultivation of the intellect by the scholastics. The discovery of a new ideal of man disclosed the fact that the human mind did not consist of reasoning alone, and the Greek works of art and literature showed a harmonious unity of human nature, which the humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries tried to re-acquire. The German humanists, following their Italian teachers, forgot in their hate against barbarism, that their own national poetry contained elements similar to those admired in Greek poetry. The silent wish of attaining a higher humanity by the study of the classical authors, although for a time suppressed by the scholastic orthodoxy of the seventeenth century, became a conscious aim in the programme of the eighteenth century. And we are wrong if we suppose that only the poets pointed to Greece as the land, where they had found their ideal by looking for the true nature of man. Great philologists like Fr. A. Wolf and W. von Humboldt, while recognizing the importance of grammatical training, still find the principal value of classical studies in that higher culture of our inmost nature which we may attain by pursuing them. For all the leaders of the great intellectual movement of the last century are aware that a large amount of knowledge does not mean real culture, and they are also convinced that other human faculties have to be developed beside those necessary for making money, in order to reach the highest destiny of man. They themselves

had found pure and lasting enjoyment in the higher education, and they were eager to impart it to the younger generation.

It is evident that Goethe's words, which define this higher education as an *ethical* and *aesthetic* education, are but an expression of a movement beginning with the Renaissance and culminating in the eighteenth century. But is it not a most curious fact, that all these men endeavoring to attain the Greek ideal would hardly have been recognized as Greeks by the ancient Greeks themselves? Niemand kann aus seiner eignen Haut fahren. And I do not think it to be a difficult task to show, how the German poets of the last century, in spite of their Greek efforts, developed a *distinctly modern human ideal*, an *ideal of culture*, which can be made the basis of our higher education.

I do not know how much there is done in our colleges with the German classics in this respect, but I am afraid that we rather parse than read them. It is easier to treat them in this superficial way than to teach the youthful mind how to obtain access to the treasures of feeling and thought which are stored up in them. I believe there are too many teachers who think the poets wrote for the purpose of illustrating grammatical rules, and there are even some, I am afraid, who almost make it their daily prayer that God might reveal to them a new grammar. Still I do not want to be misunderstood. We cannot read the German classics with the object of attaining a higher education, without having mastered the grammar in every respect, and therefore, I should urge a more thorough drill in German grammar in the lower classes of our colleges. If German has to take the place of one of the ancient languages, then we have to compete with our classical brethren in respect to grammatical accuracy and thoroughness. Still grammar should not be the sole object of our instruction, as it belongs to those studies which give a purely formal education.

Now turning to Goethe as the greatest of German classics, it shall be my task to show whether his poetry contains ethical and aesthetic elements of education such as he ascribed to the ancient authors. Should we, however, find thoughts and feelings capable of elevating our own culture, why should we hesitate to introduce a more thorough study of his works into our institutions of learning? We must not be dismayed by the weak, and sometimes ineffectual attempts in the same direction, made in

Germany. For there, also, the old prejudice is gradually vanishing and the reproach of "Amerikanismus," which is equal to barbarism, will not meet us, if we begin to study their own classics in a more thorough manner than they themselves do.

It is interesting to observe what and how many roads have already been taken to approach the secret of Goethe's poetry. The superficial interest of dilettantes as well as the scientific endeavors of the learned "Goethe-Wissenschaft," which increases year after year an endless literature, are only an expression of the consciousness that we have to deal with a man, demanding our study more than any other modern poet. That "Kreis der wenigen Edlen" as Klopstock calls those who see in the poet their mental and moral leader, has grown to the great "Goethe-Gemeinde," which has its members among the educated of all nations. And so rich, many-sided and comprehensive is the life and work of this man, that not only his commentators are in danger of giving their own thoughts and feelings instead of the poet's, but also the most different sects claim Goethe as their apostle. Even orthodox theologians,¹ usually not Goethe's best friends, did not fear to join in the great fight over his soul, which, resembling the contest of the good and evil spirits at the death of Faust, has been raging since Goethe's death. And yet, they also may dimly have anticipated that a religious contemplation of the world, for which our present age is yearning in the depth of its soul, can only be reached after we have passed through Goethe's school.

Neither will the philosophical standpoint of any school-philosophy help us to understand Goethe or to derive that profit from his study, which we may justly claim. For Goethe's influence upon the development of German philosophy has been far greater than the philosophers are willing to admit; and since many of their fundamental ideas have originated with Goethe it is impossible for us to recognize them as an impartial criterion for judging his poetry. On the other hand, we are in constant danger of being treated with the philosophers' own thoughts, for which they frequently and with great satisfaction quote passages from our poet. An excellent illustration of such philosophical reasoning on poets furnished Ulrici's book on Shakespeare. The reader will indeed be greatly surprised to

¹ Cf. The ridiculous endeavors of Vilmar and his school.

find there, that Shakespeare, three centuries ago, fully anticipated the system of the German philosopher.

It is almost time now to abandon all religious, philosophic or personal prejudice, and treat Goethe as an historical personality. But how may this be done better, than by going back to the original meaning of poetry itself, and particularly by inquiring into the conceptions which the great poets of the eighteenth century themselves concerning the nature and task of their vocation? Evidently all those fundamental ideas, depending upon the central conception of poetry are to be found embodied in the language of the different authors. And having investigated their language with the same accuracy and philological care which we devote to poets of earlier periods, we shall obtain not only a precise knowledge of their principal ideals, but also a truly historical and adequate basis for our criticism. With the exception of a few attempts this method has not yet been followed in the study of Goethe, although I am convinced that while thus trying to arrive at a more thorough understanding of the poets' aims and intentions, we gradually grow into the rich inheritance of thoughts and feelings which they left to us.

“Was du ererbt von deinen Vaetern hast,
Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen.”

The strongest and deepest motive in all the mental struggling of the great German poets of the eighteenth century is beautifully characterized by Goethe as “Liebe zur Wahrheit.” But there is a fundamental difference in this struggle for truth compared with that of any other period in the history of the human mind, filled with similar interests. While during the Reformation e. g. the authority of scripture was proclaimed as the highest truth, accompanied by a tranquilizing effect upon the masses, the poets and thinkers of the last century do not recognize such exterior authority. They seek for truth in the human soul itself, and thus the whole period has a more restless, but also a more satisfactory aspect. Lessing's words, praising the investigation of truth far above its possession, are widely celebrated. Nor do we less find Klopstock filled with the same passion for truth, when demanding truth, for the beautiful form of poetry and a beautiful form for the expression of truth. And Herder has made it the gigantic task of his life, to penetrate, by the study of the poetry of all times and nations, to the very depth

of human nature, in order to begin from there a regeneration of mankind. Goethe's and Schiller's utterances in this direction are too well known to need to be quoted here.

It almost seemed as if the poets had entered into a contest with philosophy, the highest aim of which is also the knowledge of truth. Both, philosophy and poetry aspire towards truth as above mere reality, but there is a great chasm separating them. As the highest utterance of mental activity they try to create order and harmony in the world of phenomena, a world that comes to our perception without order. But while both agree in one aim, in the creation of an organic unity, they differ in the method. If it is the way of the philosopher to divest reality of its appearance and to erect the phantomlike edifice of his system upon settled principles, then it is the method of the poet to hold fast the appearance, and by its play of colors reveal to us his ideas. Since the earliest times the power of abstraction has been the soul of occidental philosophy, while the oldest endeavors in poetry show us reality transformed into an image. And while the philosopher enters into the realm of the ideal by reasoning, the poet has gained it through imagination. He transforms the trivial world into a wonder, and his inmost secrets he expresses by images, well knowing that otherwise they are not accessible to us.

Now it is not that truth, which an infallible school-philosophy claims to have alone in its possession, guarding it with painful anxiety. I should like to call it "Menschenwahrheit," truth concerning man, which poets proclaim; that truth which we attain, when we comprehend our relation to ourselves and to the world about us, as Goethe expresses it. And wonderful enough: while the systems of philosophers follow each other like great dreams of mankind, the revelations of Homer, Sophokles, Shakespeare and Goethe will last forever, as long as a human shall beat and yearn for clearness and freedom. Long ago abstract school-philosophy and superficial reasoning therefore have seen great rivals in the poets, and the reproach, that poets are liars, has often been repeated. They deceive us, it has been said, with the semblance of truth, conjuring up a world that does not exist. Far back in Greek philosophy we meet this accusation. Aristotle has it in his Metaphysics and Plato, although himself endowed with great poetic gifts, has banished the poets from his ideal state. Even in old naïve German poetry we find

scruples about the truth of poetry. Modern time begins with this doubt. Opitz and Gottsched have it, and young Goethe himself had to fight with it in his earlier days, as his letters to Friderike Oeser show, and even later, in the year 1790, we find in the "Venetianische Epigramme" the words:

—— "denn *Gaukler* und Dichter
Sind gar nahe verwandt, suchen und finden sich gern."

Accusations of this kind have not ceased to exist. For Schopenhauer is probably not the last philosopher who will find his imitators, when declaring a poet cannot exist without a certain inclination to dissimulation and falsehood.

Indeed all great poets will have to meet and conquer these doubts, which are spared only to a happy and thoughtless mediocrity. Being attacked at the very centre of their existence, it is, however, interesting to observe how they defend themselves. And here is the point from which the great poets of the eighteenth century start to secure for their art the proper position among the mental endeavors of man. They are fully aware of the fact, that precisely by illusion (*Schein*) do they produce their greatest effects, for this is the source where imagination finds its thousandsfold colors. And while, therefore, a superficial reasoning, has seen false prophets in the poets, they themselves pronounce it as an axiom of their art, *that illusion (Schein) alone can give us truth.*

It is an ancient thought, running through the myths and religions of all nations, that naked truth is pernicious and inaccessible to man. He who has seen God must die, not only according to the Old Testament; the same thought has found a most striking expression in Schiller's deep poem: "Das verschleierte Bild von Saïs." And just at the time of their most intimate intercourse Goethe and Schiller gave the profoundest study to this question, which was of special interest to Schiller's philosophic mind (cf. Schiller: *Briefe über ästhetische Erziehung*). Here alone is also the point from which we may understand the long conflict between poet and philosopher in Schiller's mind, a conflict as great as if the long contest of ages had concentrated in his person. And Schiller, whose vocation was to fix the æsthetic laws of that period, has settled the question not only in his philosophical writings, but also poetically in one of his most important poems: "Die Poesie des Lebens."

“Wer möchte sich an Schattenbildern weiden,
 Die mit erborgtem Schein das Wesen überkleiden
 Mit truegrischem Besitz die Hoffnung hintergehn?
 Entblösst muss ich die Wahrheit sehn.
 Soll gleich mit meinem Wahn mein ganzer Himmel schwinden,
 Soll gleich den freien Geist, den der erhabne Flug
 In's grenzenlose Reich der Mœglichkeiten trug,
 Die Gegenwart mit strengen Fesseln binden:
 Er lernt sich selber ueberwinden;
 Ihn wird das heilige Gebot
 Der Pflicht, das furchthare der Not
 Nur desto unterwuerf'ger finden.
 Wer schon der Wahrheit milde Herrschaft scheut
 Wie trægt er die Notwendigkeit.”

So rufst du aus und blickst, mein strenger Freund,
 Aus der Erfahrung sicherm Porte
 Verwerfend hin anf alles was nur *scheint*.
 Erschreckt von deinem ernsten Worte
 Entflieht der Liehesgötter Schaar,
 Der Musen Spiel verstummt, es ruhn der Horen Tänze,
 Still trauernd nehmen ihre Kränze
 Die Schwestergöttinnen vom schoen gelockten Haar,
 Apoll zerbricht die goldne Leyer
 Und Hermes seinen Wanderstab,
 Des Traumes rosenfarbner Schleier
 Fällt von des Lebens bleichem Antlitz ab:
 Die Welt scheint, was sie ist, ein Grab,
 Von seinen Augen nimmt die zauberische Binde
 Cytherens Sohn; die Liebe sieht, sie sieht in ihrem Götterkinde
 Den Sterblichen, erschrickt und flieht.
 Der Schoenheit Jugendbild veraltet,
 Anf deinen Lippen selbst erkaltet
 Der Liebe Kuss und in der Freude Schwung
 Ergreift dich die Versteinerung.— —

Similar thoughts we find often expressed by Goethe. Thus he says in “Wahrheit und Dichtung :” “The highest aim of every art is to produce by the appearance (Schein) the delusion of a higher reality.” The grandest expression of this truth is found, however, in Faust's monologue at the beginning of the second part, culminating in the verse :

“Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben.”

The poets have thus secured two great objects : their right to be proclaimers of eternal truth concerning man, and the only

true mode of representing this, the illusion of a newly created reality.

“Aus Morgenduft gewebt und Sonnenklarheit
Der Dichtung Schleier aus der Hand der Wahrheit,”

as Goethe says, in his beautiful and significant manner of expression.

This is not the occasion to trace the further development of these grand thoughts, which afterwards were carried to a mistaken extreme by the Romantic school. I shall rather try to unfold the “ideal of the poet” as it lived in the minds of those poets, under the sunlight of the sublime conception of their vocation.

The ideal of the poet has had its historical development in the literature of Germany. The beautiful expression which it had found in old German poetry was lost as soon as the humanists began to introduce ancient ideas. We soon observe how the imitation of the great ancient poets becomes the highest aim in the programme of the poets; and it is quite amusing to see the poetasters of the seventeenth century addressing each other as Virgils, Horaces and Homers. Fame and immortality afterwards were the crown they fought for, until Klopstock destroyed all these paltry idols by calling the poet a deep sage (*tiefsinniger Weiser*). But he not only showed to his contemporaries the idea of the *creative mind*, the Genius, he also realized it by his own grand example. It is well known, how Herder took up this thought with the whole passion of his powerful mind, and how he became the leader of that wonderful movement, the highest aim of which was a regeneration of mankind. The poets are the men to accomplish this grand work, and therefore, the “ideal of the poet” grows up to the greatest fullness. He is now the incarnation of unlimited *creative power*.

We may easily imagine how young Goethe must have seized these ideas. And so we find him very soon looking about for heroes like Cæsar, Sokrates, Mahomet, etc., who, as such men of Genius, contributed to the development of mankind. Conscious of his great personal gifts, and filled with a dithyrambic enthusiasm, he even at times believes himself to be God in this new creation. (Cf. *Wanderers Sturmlied*, *Mahomets Gesang*, *Prometheus*, etc.).

“Bin ich ein Gott?”

is the question of Faust-Goethe, and almost at the end of his

life we meet the very same thought in the verses of the "West-östliche Divan : "

"Allah braucht nicht mehr zu schaffen,
Wir erschaffen seine Welt."

Goethe doubtless spoke in perfect earnest, when calling the poet here a God, and it is our duty to understand these words, which, uttered by any other person than Goethe, would sound like a vagary or a blasphemy. A passage from the "Wanderjahre" will perhaps help us here. Defining the nature of the poet, he says: "they say of the poet that the elements of the moral world are deeply hidden in his nature and only need gradually to be drawn out of him, that nothing in the world comes to his perception which previously he has not had in his intuition." As very often in the language of the eighteenth century, the word "moral" here has the meaning of human or all that concerns man. And upon this moral world Goethe's consummate art is founded, as is the art of every great poet. "We know of no other world than that in relation to man, he says, and we do not want any other art than that which is an image of this relation."

It is clear from this that Goethe meant the moral world in which the poet acts as God, as the creator of a new life. But while we may well conceive this sublime ideal of the poet, which never in the whole history of poetry appeared in such greatness, the question still arises: was all this not a mere ideal, or has it been realized? The answer must necessarily contribute to the clearness of the ideal of the poet; it will further show us the nature of the truth which the poets proclaim. Finally it will place the whole problem of modern culture before our eyes, pointing to its final solution of which the poets dreamed in their happiest hours.

In order to give such an answer, which will prove whether Goethe's poetry contains the elements for a higher ethical education, we must look at the very source of poetry, and we shall not be surprised to find it also shining among the inspiring ideals of the poets.

Even the attentive reader and student of Goethe is so frequently fascinated by the beautiful form of all that flows from his lips, that he easily forgets to ask for the last source from which all this comes. And yet we cannot deny that a dim

presentiment of it is prevalent. Almost everywhere we find acknowledged that Goethe belongs to the greatest lyric poets of all ages, who, at the right moment and with almost unparalleled skill knew how to mould the emotions of his tender soul. But contents as well as form not only of his lyric productions, but of all his great works flow according to his own confessions from one spring: *sentiment*. Trivial as this may sound, as all great poets substantially created from the same source, it will, however, gain another aspect, if we remember the significance of the term "sentiment" in the eighteenth century, which nowhere has found a clearer and more ideal expression than by Goethe. The German language of the present has lost the real meaning of sentiment, for the word (Empfindung) is used now either as a term of psychology or to express that sickly state of the soul, which abounds in tears. In the language of the eighteenth century, however, it means both: the passive conception of the world within and exterior to us, as well the intuition of truth and the productive activity of the poet as a creator. Numerous passages from different writers could be quoted to show the gradual development of this notion, which comprises "in nuce" all the other ideals of poetry and the poets. Klopstock, the great prophet, standing at the opening of the new period of German literature, is the man who first of all proclaimed the right and freedom of individual feeling against the dry learning of the seventeenth century, its foolish desire to know everything and its ridiculous pedantry. Goethe, too, as a true child of his time suffered from this disease inherited from the seventeenth century, when a student at Leipzig and Strassburg, and with all his heart he could exclaim with Faust:

Habe nun, ach! Philosophie, etc.

But very soon he becomes through Herder acquainted with the new movement which Klopstock had inaugurated and Hamann and Herder had carried further. His former passion to know everything now turns into the passion of feeling all things and of feeling for all men. We must read his glowing writings of those days in order to understand how he was filled with this new gospel, and how he tried to preach it to his environment. Thus he says in a review on Lavater's "Aussichten in die Ewigkeit:" If Mr. Lavater had written as a *seer* for the *feeling part of humanity*, he would have done wrong to write

these letters. *He would have felt for all.* A seer, a prophet the poet has become here, who, by the gift of true sentiment, possesses truth and rules over the hearts of men as their leader. The same thought is expressed in the following verses of Faust:

“Mein Busen, der vom *Wissensdrang* geheilt ist,
 Soll keinen Schmerzen künftig sich verschliessen,
 Und was der ganzen Menschheit zu getheilt ist,
 Will ich mit meinem *innern Selbst* geniessen,
 Mit meinem Geist das Höchst' und Tiefste greifen
 Ihr Wohl und Weh' anf meinen Busen häufen
 Und so mein *eigen Selbst* zu *ihrem Selbst erweitern*,”

and in the “Zahme Xenien:”

Seht mich an als *Propheten*
 Viel denken, *mehr empfinden*
 Und wenig reden.

But the poet after having thus developed the beautiful life of sentiment in his own bosom, must naturally influence his fellow-men. This sublime vocation of the poet is characterized by Goethe in the following verses:

“Und *edlen Seelen vorzu fühlen*
 Ist wünschenswertester Beruf.”

And so he calls himself quite frequently a liberator, who, feeling for all, induces his fellowmen to leave the dark cave of their Ego in order to come to light and freedom.

Indeed, the enthusiastic proclamation of sentiment is an act of liberation, resting upon the firm conviction of their *inspiration*. For, according to the belief of the poets, *God* is the origin of all their beautiful and sublime feelings and the *poet* or the *Genius* is a *part of the deity* revealed to man.

With this liberation, which is at the same time true education, with this worldly gospel, as Goethe calls his poetry, we find the great poets of the eighteenth century true inheritors of the spirit of Reformation. For all the efforts of the modern mind unite in the liberation of the Ego from all fetters. The rising of Luther against the power of an infallible church, the French revolution fighting against the theory of the state as expressed in the famous word of Louis XIV. all the endeavors of modern philosophy are but manifestations of the same spirit. And inspired by it the poets of the eighteenth century, and above all Goethe have continued that work of Reformation. *The libera-*

tion of the ideal man within us is the highest aim of their efforts as well as of the development of modern culture.

Having comprehended the power, beauty and greatness of these ideals not with dry reasoning, but with the whole soul, with the loving mind of Goethe, it is not difficult to see their development in the life and work of this great man. For he tried to realize them also in his life. His earliest period of thinking and creating is but a struggling toward them. Then, in the excitement of his "storm and stress period," they appear before his eyes with all the splendor of their beauty and grandeur. He soon abandons, however, the youthful illusion of creating a new humanity in an instant, like a second Prometheus. Nevertheless he maintains the ideals. We see him retire then to a small circle, creating here in himself that higher life, which he afterwards proclaims in the best productions of his mature age. We scarcely need to add that he was not fully appreciated by his contemporaries.

Naturally a paper like this cannot rise above the nature of a general sketch, but I hope to have shown by these fragmentary remarks that a more thorough study of Goethe may safely be substituted for the attainment of that higher ethical and æsthetic culture which, in his modesty, he sought with the ancients. And if it be the ideal of modern education to bring the idea of man to a harmonious display, how may this be reached better than by the study of a poet, in whom the idea of a higher humanity found its most beautiful expression? But where may this sooner be realized than in a free country like ours, where the development of the individual as well as of the nation is hindered by no fetters? Indeed, it sounds like a prophecy of America as the land of the fulfilment of his ideals, when old "Faust-Goethe" at the highest and last moment of his life says:

"Solch ein Gewimmel möcht ich sehn :
Anf freiem Grund mit freiem Volk zu stehn."

The life and work of a man like Goethe do not belong to one nation alone, they are, like Homer and Shakespeare, the possession of the whole educated world. We especially enjoy the happy position of reaping the fruits of the culture of all centuries and nations, in order to begin with this seed our own intellectual work.

But I cannot close without quoting Goethe's grand vision of the golden age of culture to be brought on by the poets, and especially by him. Once more it will contradict the words from which we started at the beginning, once more it will show the greatness of Goethe's mission by revealing the deep religious back-ground, upon which it rested in his own conviction.

Sah gemalt in Gold und Rahmen,
Grauen Barts den Ritter reiten,
Und zu Pferd an seinen Seiten
An die vierundzwanzig kamen;
Sie zum Thron des Kaisers ritten
Wolempfangen, wolgelitten,
Derb und kraestig, hold und schicklich
Und man pries den Vater gluecklich.

Sieht der Diehter, nah und ferne,
Söhn und *Tæchter*, lichte Sterne,
Sieht sie alle wolgerathen,
Tuechtig, von gepruesten Thaten,
Freigesinnt, sich selbst beschrænkend,
Immerfort das Naechste denkend,
Thaetig treu in jedem Kreise,
Still beharrlich jeder Weise;
Nicht vom Weg, dem graden, weichend,
Und zuletzt das Ziel erreichend:
Bring'er *Tæchter* nun und *Soehne*,
Sittenreich, in *holder Schoene*,
Vor den Vater alles Guten,
In die reinen Himmelsgluten,
Mitgenossen ew'ger Freuden!—
Das erwarten wir bescheiden.

XIII.—*What Place has Old English Philology in our Elementary Schools?*

BY FRANCIS B. GUMMERE, PH. D.,

PRINCIPAL OF THE SWAIN FREE SCHOOL, NEW BEDFORD, MASS.

A Plea for Local Higher Instruction.

NOT long ago, the president of a famous American college, writing in praise of Greek and Latin as the basis of higher instruction, classed the study of Anglo-Saxon with the study of Icelandic or of Quaternions. All three were “intellectual luxuries.” If such is the judgment of so prominent and learned a man, what will that robust personage, the “average citizen,” impatient as he is of all that is recondite and out of touch with the practical, say to my subject and the implied connexion between an intellectual luxury for colleges and the every-day fare of our ordinary schools? Considerable divinity doth still hedge the college, and what is done there:—

If 'tis not sense, at least 'tis Greek;—

but no such reverence hovers about the school, or indeed about our mother-tongue. The college is mainly in the hands of that “remnant” concerning which Mr. Arnold has discoursed; but our schools are entrusted to the management of the average citizen. On him and his opinions hang many destinies. Our concern is with his opinions in regard to the teaching of Elementary English. For I assume that the fortunes of English Philology in college and university are no longer doubtful. But the hardest and by no means the least important battle remains to be fought; and only when the early stages of instruction in English are put on a sound philological basis, can we talk of victory.

What are the faults of our present common-school system? For the purposes of this paper, I name as decided faults:

1. Lack of sensitiveness, on the part of the general instruction, to advances and changes in the world of scientific research.

2. Lack of independent scholarship on the part of the teachers.

3. Too great reliance upon systems and methods, upon technical skill in imparting knowledge.

The great body of our teachers can give the pupil nothing more than what they learned in the same school. Even the Normal School, if I am rightly informed, pays little attention to the actual subject, and directs its main efforts toward method and system. It is just the other way with college training; so that I surely do not sacrifice truth to antithesis when I say that a college professor is regarded as a scholar who may or may not be a teacher, while a school-master is regarded as a teacher who may or may not be a scholar. We do not encourage the teacher to be a master and lover of some one department of knowledge; forgetting that from nothing comes nothing,—that the teacher who is not a scholar cannot train up a race of scholars. Perhaps we shall yet have done with the false idea that it is not what a man knows that makes a teacher of him, but the mere skill to impart to others. To impart what? This "power to impart" often means nothing more than the vicious art of limited scholarship to make its pupils think their own acquisition unlimited. A teacher of this kind is like those guides who stand at the entrance of the Louvre in Paris, ready to show one in an hour or two everything worth seeing. This is what the American public demands of its teachers. What chance for them to become scholars,—except, indeed, for those few whom favoring Jupiter has loved, and who succeed in climbing out of their Hades into the upper air of study and research? Yet what is a teacher worth who does not come down to his work, as Emerson finely put it, from a higher level; who does not bring with him the enthusiasm born of intimate and personal knowledge? Readers of Goethe's life will perhaps remember a letter which he wrote to his drawing-master, Oeser. "What do I not owe to you," he exclaims; "my taste for the beautiful, my skill, my judgment,—do I not have all these through you? How clear and true has become for me that strange, half inconceivable proposition, that the workshop of a great artist does more for the development of the budding philosopher, the budding poet, than the lecture-room of the scholar and critic! Instruction does much; but encouragement, enthusiasm, does all;—*Lehre tut viel, aber Aufmunterung tut alles.*" Now in

philological instruction, the scholar or critic is the artist; his study is his workshop; his critical research, embodied in treatise or lecture, is his work of art. True, there is something in the fact that a school is expected to devote itself to *Lehre*, the college being devoted to *Aufmunterung*; but I am inclined to think Goethe's words applicable to the teacher in any grade. What is drill, what are methods, compared with the enthusiasm of scholarship? Of this latter we can almost say that it makes its own drill, its own method:

Es trägt Verstand und guter Sinn
Mit wenig Kunst sich selber vor.

To be sure, the graduate from college is likely to spurn *Lehre* altogether, fire over his scholars' heads, and make sad confusion; but somehow this seems a more human error than the frigid blundering of the missionary from the Normal School. The former slays his thousands, the latter his tens of thousands. One man with a belief, said somebody, is worth ninety-nine with an opinion; one teacher with the full spirit of his subject is worth ninety-nine with a "method." I do not forget the good which must always result from a frank discussion of the merits of this or that system; I do not forget the splendid work of our common schools: but I am quite sure that the tendency for many years has been to exaggerate the importance of method, to diminish the importance of sound scholarship. We live in the era of the Able Paper: everybody interested in education is writing Able Papers on the best way to teach his particular 'ology. The school officials (I speak not now of teachers) must keep themselves before the public: hence annual reports pointing out sweeping errors, urging sweeping reforms; hence the teachers' institute or convention; hence the Able Paper. I think it is the natural reaction against this excess of Able Papers which gives such extent and welcome to the new correspondence—schools for private study. While I most energetically deny that Lake Chautauqua is better than all the waters of university and college lore, while I think the result of these superficial studies is too often that fault which Socrates feared for his sons, and for which he hoped they would be punished,—"if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing," as Jowett translates;—nevertheless, I must regard these efforts toward

the increase of knowledge on the part of teachers as efforts which are based on the soundest principle.

But my subject is English Philology in the School. It would ask a Jeremiah to set forth aright the blackness of thick darkness which broods over this "field of study." Dark-lanterns of grammar flit about; you hear voices clamorous of method and system; but the dark-lanterns are worse than no light at all, and the voices, for all their clamor, hardly better than the gibbering of a ghost. Worst of all, you know that little feet are pattering confusedly after the lights and the voices, and little hands are learning that mournful art which reverses the process of gathering grapes from thorns and figs from thistles.

I believe it is taken for granted that every person who teaches arithmetic in our schools has some knowledge of geometry and algebra. In the same way, one would think, we ought to demand of every teacher of English that he be in some measure acquainted with the sources and development of our language,—no matter how elementary the teaching actually required. We all know that such is not the case. The schools teach English on medieval principles. Hence an intolerable gap between the old tone of the school instruction and the new tone of college or university teaching. The schools, as we saw above, depend mainly upon themselves for teachers; the serpent swallows its tail; the wheel turns in the air;—there is no progress, and "es erben sich Gesetz' und Rechte wie eine ew'ge Krankheit fort." From the very start, our schools (not, of course, in all cases) do a work which has to be undone, if it can be undone, with infinite labor on the part of the college professor. True, there is improvement, if we compare our schools of to-day with those of the past. We have almost banished the old monstrosity of pedantic and blindfold grammar; we have excellent text-books available for language-lessons in the most elementary schools; but for some reason the teachers are bound in their old chains, and do not possess the scholarship necessary to the best use of a text-book. The very start is false. What child does not grow up in the fatal error that a "letter" is a sacred thing, to be "pronounced" now this way, now that;—that it is the written symbol, and not the spoken sound, which is the starting-point of language? This, you tell me, hath a very ancient and fish-like smell; is the merest commonplace of the new philology. True. But go among high-school and grammar-school teachers,

and find how much of it is commonplace, how many have even heard of it. That some have heard it, appreciate it, practise it, is happily true. But the majority, the great majority, are not in this case.

It is impossible to teach elementary English well unless the instruction be based on a historical study of the language. We make a subject clear by applying common-sense to it. But the moment we come to written English, we are confronted by a seeming total lack of common-sense in the speech itself,—a wild confusion of symbols set over against a natural and methodical system of sounds; strange constructions; intricate syntax. If we attempt to lead scholars through this maze, we are doomed to failure unless we are guided by a sense of the spirit of the language, for we do not know a language till we know its past. Many teachers are conscious of this; but average citizens, in school-committee assembled, do not recognize it at all. I am not sure that a knowledge of Chaucer's English would not be rather a disqualification than a recommendation for a teacher who should apply to a committee for a position in the primary schools. "No fancy stuff of that sort," cries the robust committeeman; "let us hear an Able Paper on Spelling in the Primary School." I present the average school-board to this convention as a most important, if unattractive, field for missionary labor. How can we raise the standard of instruction in our common schools, when the governing boards recognize for the teachers no valid standard of scholarship?

So much for the teachers. Of course we do not expect that they are to flood the ways of elementary instruction with the actual results of their own study: to incorporate, for example, the history of the *Ablaut* with the explanation of the scholar's first verb. A teacher should apply historical grammar as little as possible directly, as much as possible indirectly. Let us see what ought to be done for the pupil in the way of English Philology. Even the youngest scholars can understand and use many facts of historical English. I am assured by an excellent teacher that such matters as the origin of the relative pronoun (see Koch, *Eng. Gram.* § 346); the origin of the conjunction "that;" the history of the present participle and its relations to the verbal noun; the infinitive and its dative case; most especially, the simpler forms of sound—change in English from the middle to the modern period,—may all be used to advantage in

the grammar-school. Instead of the vain attempt to "analyse" these things, to explain them by mere surface work, we go to the history of the language, uncover the strata, and turn what has been the most tiresome study into the most attractive. Much interest can be called out by the use of a simple comparison like the following between modern long vowels and those of Chaucer. Such exercises give the pupil more insight into the processes of language than can be given by months of "analysis." A practical use of the comparison is obvious when, as in many high-schools, German is studied by advanced pupils. In the latter case the teacher contrasts the German practice, by which the symbol changes with the sound, and the English practice, by which the sound changes and the symbol remains unchanged. The long vowels may be ranged (omitting all intermediate sounds like α^e , etc.) in the row:

i \hat{e} \hat{a} \hat{o} \hat{u} .

In German, when the verb *riten* had its vowel diphthongized, the symbol changed also: *reiten*. But when Chaucer's *riden* changed just as the German verb changed, the symbol did not change. We "pronounce" a diphthong and "spell" a vowel: *ride*. For the English exercise, the simple movements upward and downward from the central vowel \hat{a} are interesting even to pupils who are not far advanced: thus sound \hat{a} has moved up to \hat{e} , but keeps the symbol, as Chaucer's *bane* (*a* as in *father*) has become our *bane*; \hat{e} has moved up to *i*, symbol stationary, as Chaucer's *fete* (*e* as in *fate*) and our *feet*; while *i*-symbol now represents, except in words like *routine*, a diphthong. Then the downward movement: \hat{a} to \hat{o} , in which case the symbol also changes (*bân*—*bone*); \hat{o} becomes \hat{u} , but the symbol remains (*goose*); while \hat{u} , like \hat{i} , is diphthongized,—*ou* being merely the French symbol for *u* and therefore unchanged (*house*). On the face of it, this seems far too hard for grammar-school pupils. Why? Because we are used to the medieval phraseology of "grammar," and common sense looks strange. But with time, patience and abundant use of physiology, this exercise can be made very instructive. Where the entire process is too intricate for the pupil, take a part of it. Show him how \hat{e} is raised to *i*. Text-books cannot do this kind of work. Here is where the teacher counts. But we virtually forbid the teacher to know anything about such matters. Again, I say, let members of this

convention single out men who serve on school-boards, and earnestly plead with them.

The teacher must judge what to use, how far to go. Often he must resolutely drop all illustration, and give hard drill in facts. Nor can he introduce all subjects. In any instruction below the college, a teacher would be foolish who should take a partly regular, partly irregular verb like *tell, told*, and explain the vowel-change. It would involve the most difficult phases of the principle of *Umlaut*, the principle of assimilation,—and so on. It would be a piece of pedantic folly. But, on the other hand, the theory of the simple *Umlaut* could and should be taught in the primary school. Show that the natural, "easy" vowel is *a*, the middle, indifferent position (physiology comes in here); show that a person when reading is always looking several words ahead of the word he is actually pronouncing, and so, in speaking a word, we are thinking of a sound to come, while we utter its predecessor; hence in uttering *a* in *many* we think of the *i*-sound (*y*) to come; the *i* influences the *a*, pulls it up (*i, e, a, o, u*,) toward the higher sounds, so that *a* becomes really *e*, a half-way place between *a* and *i*: and hence the pronunciation of *many* as compared with that of *man*. Indeed, the whole lore of sounds may be taught to children; each child has a capital little apparatus for experiments. For such instruction, we need a Primer of Phonetics, as simple and brief as possible. After the most active drill in this subject, the teacher could take up English historically. The merest child could understand the main facts of the formation of English, of its parent and related languages;—for all this, the blackboard could be made an Arcadia, as compared with the Hades of rules and spelling-books. I know nothing more important in the whole range of English Philology than the proper beginning of a child's study of language. It should be based on the simpler science of phonology. How many boys and girls begin that way?

But this paper is not intended to discuss details. First, let us have a door opened for the principle itself. Then let us convert the school-boards; let each of us become a priest and missionary *in partibus infidelium*. Let this convention utter an authoritative voice and give us heart. Mr. Arnold has shown the great value of academies (in the French meaning) for the literary interests of a nation. The same holds good of an edu-

cational *académie*, a body of men whose combined authority should set up and maintain high standards in certain departments of education. Whatever is for the good of elementary instruction in English, is for the interest of all modern language teaching. Let us have one scholarly, scientific spirit animating the whole system of instruction in languages,—from English *a b c*, up to the intricacies of Old French or Old English phonology. This body of scholars can watch the interests of their profession in more ways than one. I instance the need of some check upon that extraordinary passion for multiplying text-books in departments already more than supplied, and the strange fear of our critics to condemn careless work,—sometimes outright vicious work. Our system of public instruction tends, as I have hinted, to be a text-book system. What are many of these text-books? They are not written; as a Harvard professor once said to me, they are “shovelled together.” The art is not to make them, but to “push” them. There is no systematic, relentless criticism here in America, no organized criticism based on certain admitted principles, and ready to crush out of existence the impudent claims of a bad book. Here is something for this convention to undertake.

But suppose the missionary work done. Suppose the schoolboards soundly converted. Suppose that the robust average citizen has waved off the Able Paper, and called for scholarship. Suppose he says that instruction in English must be based on historical and scientific knowledge. Where is the teacher to obtain this knowledge? We have the old-fashioned college course. We have the special courses of the university. But the ordinary teacher has neither time nor money to devote to the preparation for a full college course, as well as to the course itself. The ordinary teacher cannot afford to go to the university. But can we not send the mountain to Mahomet? All that we need is the scriptural engine—faith. Once have faith in the need of Local Higher Instruction, as a means not only of spreading culture in a community, but also of elevating and sustaining the standard of teaching in its public schools, and the practical question is easily solved. I hope I do not exceed the bounds of propriety in stating that the institution with which I am connected—The Swain Free School of New Bedford—is now engaged in the work of solving this same problem of Local

Higher Instruction. It is endowed; it is absolutely free; it teaches only collegiate studies (at present to a limited extent, including simply English, Modern Languages and History); and it has a special regard to the wants of those who intend to teach. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of a new movement. But it does no harm for those engaged in such a work to put great faith in its mission and its ultimate results; and I cannot help thinking that this Local Higher Instruction will yet find a place in the educational system of America.

XIV.—*Adjectival and Adverbial Relations; their Influence upon the Government of the Verb.*

BY SYLVESTER PRIMER, PH. D.,

PROFESSOR OF MODERN LANGUAGES IN THE COLLEGE OF CHARLES-
TON, CHARLESTON, S. C.

IN an article on the Factitive in German, read at the last Convention of the Modern Language Association, I touched upon the adverbial case, but could not, for want of space, give that attention to it which the subject deserves. It is now my purpose to treat more at length the adverbial relations and their influence upon the government of the verb. But since the boundary between the functions of the adverb and the adjective is somewhat vague, so much so that it is often difficult to decide whether the adverb or the adjective would be more appropriate in a particular case, it will first of all be necessary to settle the real functions of the two words; to discover, if possible, the distinction between an adverbial and an adjectival modification of the idea expressed, whether that idea be verbal or substantival, or (thirdly) the compound idea formed by the union of the verb and substantive. In my former article I stated that the adverb expresses some of the vaguer relations of the factitive, but did not intend by that to deny its capability of expressing accurately the factitive relations. "A predicating judgment," says Becker, "always forms the basis of the logical factitive; it is therefore most perfectly expressed by the adjectives, but since *da*, *wie*, *so* are often used predicatively this same relation is also expressed by these." I also showed in my treatment of the factitive that a modifier often performs a double function in serving both as an attribute or modifier of the passive object, and at the same time qualifying the verbal idea. In expressions like *Socrates venenum laetus haurit, invitus dedi, nemo saltat sobrius, tardus venit*, in which the English imperatively demands the adverb, the Latin as imperatively the adjective, a careful analysis will show that the modification is neither adjectival nor adverbial, but stands on the boundary between the two. The idea is neither the joyous Socrates, nor drinking poison joyously, but

Socrates in a certain mood manifested by his manner of drinking poison. This double modification, where both the substantive element and the verbal element *are* alike affected, forms the very essence of the factitive function and causes the vacillation and uncertainty in deciding which element should be modified. Whenever the predicate adjective does not individualize or specialize the substantive element of the predicate, but only intensifies the antithesis between the substantival and verbal element while modifying both elements, then, in languages capable of inflection, the adjective, usually agreeing with its substantive in number and gender, frequently stands in the singular of the neuter: *αἱ μεταβολαὶ λυπρόν*; *triste lupus stabulis*, etc. From this adverbio-adjectival modification to the real adverb is but a step and the use of the adverb as factitive, though not always traceable to this particular transition, is to be explained by the vague boundary between the adjectival and the adverbial ideas when used as modifiers of the predicate. What, then, is the real nature of the adjectival and adverbial idea, and where shall we draw the boundary line between the two? A closer analysis of expressions like those quoted above shows that the adjective does not stand wholly in an attributive relation to the substantive, as its grammatical agreement would naturally imply; nor does it denote only the state or condition, or even the temporal relation of the substantive element, but it produces over and above all this a much more intensive effect upon the verbal element than the adverbial modifier could do. Let us begin with the substantival and verbal ideas. If we analyze a thought, it will be found to consist of two principal elements alike in essence, but performing quite different functions. The one expresses an essence or substance existing as an object cognizable by the senses or the intellect; the other also expresses an essence as an object, but in a state of activity, which latter idea subjects it to the phenomena of tense, mood, person and voice, i. e. to conjugation. Cf. *to move=motion*, *to rise=rising*, etc. The infinitive, participial noun, gerund and supine testify to the near relation of the verb and noun. The added "idea of time and relation of space have place in the conception" (of the verbal idea). The noun "exists at an indivisible moment;" the verb expresses "what is passing in time." The functional differences of these two essences form "the most important distinction in language." That element which we call essence or substance

par excellence, since it excludes the idea of time or relation of space, can be individualized or restricted in its meaning by becoming, through qualifiers, more pregnant or concrete, or by undergoing different modification according to the nature of the modifier. The element of which activity is the characteristic feature may be intensified or given an individual direction or modified "by an incidental or supplementary object," which, however, "differs from the necessary or complementary object," though also "involving a substance or tendency towards the same." We shall distinguish these two functional differences by the terms substance or substantival element and activity or verbal element. Starting out with these two ideas of substance and activity, let us next investigate the nature of the adjective and adverb and determine to which of these two functions they respectively stand in closer relationship.

Inasmuch as the primary distinction between the verb and noun is that the one is the essence in action, and the other is the essence existing at an indivisible moment of time, but without the idea of action, the adjective, from its very nature, stands in close relation to both. On the one hand, it is a "dormant verb" in which the idea of action lies in germ; the action is latent, but not wholly dead: on the other hand it partakes of the nature of the substantive since the idea of action is not conveyed to the senses or the intellect. Therefore it stands between the two, is in the transitory state from the object in action to the object without action. "Cf. *flumen rapidum*, where *rapidum* is an adjective, on the one hand, with *flumen rapit*, where *rapit* is a verb, and on the other hand, with *torrens* (= *flumen rapidum*), where *rapidum* is already incorporated with the noun." (Gibbs, Philological Studies, p. 55). Thus the adjective has only subjective existence. It partakes in so far of the nature of the noun as it has the idea of existence freed from action, but approaches the verb-nature in containing the idea of dormant activity. But the adjectival idea of action differs from the verbal in that it gives an idea of *permanency* to the quality expressed, to whatever it may be applied, while the verbal action is for the one occasion, is *transitory*; and we shall see that this is also a peculiarity of the adverb. In the objective relation of the sentence we have a direct antithesis of the verbal and substantival ideas, which, however, combine to form the unity of the thought expressed. We can observe a similar process in the transition

from *flumen rapidum* to *torrens*, where the attributive adjective *rapidum* combines with the noun *flumen* to form the unity of the substantival idea expressed by *torrens*. In the same manner the adverb combines with the verb to form the unity of the verbal idea. The reason is not far to seek: if the origin of the adverb is the one generally given, it must have an intimate relation with the verbal idea. We can observe in every language the fondness which the verb has to take to itself the accusative of cognate meaning, or accusative of the inner object as it has been appropriately called. The two ideas of the verb and its cognate object then unite to form one verbal idea. This construction is most frequent with intransitive verbs, and is quite common in Greek; as, *μαχητης μαχεσθαι*. But transitive verbs also often employ the cognate object in an adverbial sense; as, *φιλιαν φιλειν τὸν παιδα*. This inner object could also be, and generally was, modified by an adjective, or rather the idea formed by the union of the verb and inner object was thus modified; as, *φιλιαν μεγάλην φιλειν τινα*. The next step was the failure of the inner object, leaving the attribute 'to perform its functions; as, *παιδον διπλην*, Soph. El. 1415. The frequent adverbial use of the adjective arose in a great measure from this inner object, and the next step in the development of the adverb was to employ the neuter singular and then the neuter plural of the adjective. If we are to accept Curtius' explanation of the fact (Erl. 170) then the verbum substantivum also admits the idea of an inner object or freer and in part adverbial accusative; as, *ānijr ēsar=they were rest*. Similar expressions are found in Skr.; as, *īgam āsa*, or *īgam babbūva=dominationem fui*. Hübschmann, however, (Casusl. 196 f.) explains this latter construction as the paratactical accusative in which "the accusative of the feminine appears in some cases instead of a participle or adjective agreeing with the subject in case, gender and number," and cites as example *vedayām āsa*; this is undoubtedly the most satisfactory explanation, as we shall see later that the verbum substantivum, aside from its function as form-word, expresses existence, being, etc., and, like every other verb expressing an active idea, requires a complement to complete its meaning, either in the form of an adverb or other word containing the element of substance. In whatever way we may explain these accusatives they certainly belong to the *cas adverbial*. But the accusative alone has not furnished all the adverbial material,

though its great age and frequency cannot be doubted. "The numerous adverbs in the accusative form, the use of the supine *in-tum* in Latin (*nuntiatum ire=άγγελην ελθεῖν*) and much else proves this." The genitive, ablative and other cases have also furnished their quota and these cases, becoming petrified as it were, form the great bulk of the adverbial material. Whether there are primitive adverbs of a different origin is a question which will not be discussed here. It is sufficient for the purpose intended to have pointed out the fact that we owe many adverbs to the inner object, to the genitive, ablative and other cases which have become stereotyped in form and are adverbial in their nature. The relation existing between the verb and adverbs of this nature at least will now be more easily understood; it is that of verb and remoter complement. Containing the substantive element in themselves they naturally unite with the verbal element to form the unity of thought contained in the predicative idea; in other words they furnish the substantial element wanting in many verbs. We have already seen that the adjective is the connecting link between the verb on the one hand and the substantive on the other; it can therefore often very appropriately unite with the verb to express the predicate idea. Its function is then twofold: it strengthens or supplies substance to the verb, and also serves as attribute to the noun. Thus the functions of adjective and adverb encroach upon each other, though there is always a shade of difference between the two. The adjective is permanent from its very nature; it contains the passing action of the verb, crystallizing into the non-action of the noun, and differs from both verb and noun in expressing a quality, not an essence. The function of the adverb, like that of the verb itself, does not extend beyond the one single action; hence its effect is but transitory. From a syntactical point of view "the adverb often borders on the adjective and the employment of the adjectival form, which might possibly be considered an adverb with reference to the verb of the sentence, can admit partly of a predicative conception, and partly of a tendency toward the subject of the sentence." (Mätz. 3, 96.). Cf. *And slow and sure* comes up the golden year. Tennys.). *Clear* shone the skies (Thoms., 'Spring'). They weep *impetuous*, as the summer storm, And fall as short (Young, N. Th. 5, 562).

"Whenever the manner in which the activity is completed

can at the same time be considered a limitation of the subject expressing the same," adds Mätzner (l. c.), "then the adjectival or adverbial limitation is more or less free, especially to the poet." In cases of this nature the adjectival form gives more vividness to the expression and hence its employment. But there are cases where even from a syntactical point of view the adjective should be employed and only a careful analysis of the nature of the modification intended will decide which of the two modifiers is appropriate. No classification of verbs can be devised which would be of material assistance in choosing the proper modifier, as almost all classes of verbs readily admit both kinds of modification indifferently, according as the verbal or substantival idea is to be limited; nevertheless, one observation may be ventured. Of active verbs one class represents the activity as affecting an external or an internal object, the complement of the verb, called by Indic native Grammarians the *Parasmāi-padam*, or alien form, while the second, called the *Atmanē-padam*, or independent form, soul-form, represents, in its primitive sense, the activity as reflected back upon the agent of the action; "it shows that the action takes place for the benefit of the subject, or stands in a nearer relation to it." Though this medial form is wanting in the modern languages the essence expressed by a medial form or middle voice is still a living principle of language, as seen in the reflective and intransitive verb. Hence verbs of which the essence formerly expressed by the medial form constitutes the vital principle, in which the activity exerts itself only for the benefit of the subject, or in which the agent of the action and the object on which the action is exerted, stand in closer relation to each other, naturally require the adjective as modifier. In this category belong *fall*, *look*, *feel*, *grow*, *show*, *glow*, *seem*, *appear*, *taste*, *smell*, *sound*, etc.; as, He fell *ill*, he looks *pale*, he feels *cold*, he grew *warm*, her smiles amid blushes *lovelier* show, glows not her blush the *fairer*?, etc. In idiomatic expressions like *to fall short of*, *to make bold with*, *to set light by*; as, This latter mode of expression falls *short* of the force and vehemence of the former: L. Murray, Gram. 353; And that I have made so *bold* with thy glorious majesty: Jenks, Prayers, 156; Cursed be he that setteth *light* by his father or his mother, and all the people shall say, Amen: Deut. 27, 16, we have, if they are not the result of ellipsis, the same underlying principle. The verbal idea is strength-

ened by the latent verbal essence of the adjective which unites with the verb to form the predicate, while the substantial element of the adjective combines with the subject to form the substantival idea. Here we have, strictly speaking, a compound modification which does not admit of exact grammatical analysis. Logically speaking, it is the comprehensive thought expressed by the unity of the substantival and verbal elements that is to be modified and for this comprehensive idea we need a modifier which affects more or less both elements. But language has not produced any grammatical form for this functional relation; one language has inclined to the adjective, another to the adverb, hence the confusion. The Latin and Greek have attempted to solve the problem by putting the adjective in the neuter singular. (Cf. *αι μεταβολαι λυπρόγ*; *triste lupus stabu*is above. The French has cut the gordian knot by leaving the adjective in the singular of the masculine: *Ces fleurs sentent bon*; *Il a vendu cher sa vie*; *Et moi, pour trancher court cette dispute*, etc. In English we sometimes use the adjective and sometimes the adverb. The flowers smell *sweet*, but he sold his life *dearly*. Though the relation of this modifier, on the one hand, to the substantival and on the other to the verbal idea, is not subject to exact grammatical analysis, it does yield to a philosophical one. Let us take the sentence, *the rose smells sweet*, and analyze it from a philosophical point of view. In Reid's account of *sensation*, I find the following bearing upon the point under discussion: "When I smell a rose, there is in this operation both sensation and perception. The agreeable odor I feel, considered by itself, without relation to any external object, is merely a sensation. It affects the mind in a certain way; and this affection of the mind may be conceived, without a thought of the rose or any other object. Let us next attend to the perception which we have in smelling a rose. Perception has always an external object; and the object of my perception, in this case, is that quality in the rose which I discern by the sense of smell. Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led, by my nature, to conclude some quality to be in the rose which is the cause of this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object perceived." Sir William Hamilton in commenting on this definition of Reid's remarks; "A Cognition is *objective*, that is, our consciousness is then relative to some-

thing different from the present state of the mind itself; a Feeling, on' the contrary, is *subjective*, that is, our consciousness is exclusively limited to the pleasure or pain experienced by the thinking subject. Cognition and feeling are always co-existent. The purest act of knowledge is always colored by some feeling of pleasure or pain; for no energy is absolutely indifferent, and the grossest feeling exists only as it is known to consciousness. This being the case of cognition and feeling in general, the same is true of perception and sensation in particular. Perception proper is the consciousness, through the senses, of the qualities of an object known as different from self; Sensation proper is the consciousness of the subjective affection of pleasure or pain, which accompanies that act of knowledge. Perception is thus the objective element in the complex state,—the element of cognition; Sensation is the subjective element,—the element of feeling." Applying this distinction between perception and sensation to the two essences which we discussed above, the essence without motion, or substantive, is the *objective* knowledge, or perception, and the essence in action, or verb, embodies in the effect produced what might be appropriately called *subjective* knowledge, or sensation. The coexistence, or near relation of the essence without motion and the same in motion is seen in the gradation *to move, moving, motion*, where the first is purely *subjective*, the second both *subjective* and *objective*, while the third is purely *objective*; yet neither, except when abstractly considered, exists in a pure state; each is more or less colored by the other. Thus the quality of sweetness expressed by the adjective *sweet* in the sentence, *the rose smells sweet*, when considered as an odor felt, is *subjective*, and in so far the modification must affect the verbal idea in which the consciousness of the *subjective* affection of pleasure or pain inheres; the modifier would then necessarily be the adverb: but, when considered as the quality in the rose discerned by the sense of smell, it is *objective*, and relates to the substantival idea, in which the consciousness, through the senses, of the qualities of an object known as different from self inheres. But these two ideas of *objective* and *subjective* knowledge (cognition and sensation) are constantly confused, are never, perhaps, kept distinct in the mind, much less in language, and it would be difficult to affect the one by a modifier without at the same time affecting the other. Add to this the want of a distinct grammatical form

which would show that both were to be affected by the same modifier, and we can understand the confusion. In whomever the faculty of cognition was most active at the time being, for him the adjective would be the appropriate modifier; but in whomever the faculty of sensation predominates, he would choose the adverb. Soon authority would decide for each language between the two possible modifiers. As we have the union of the verbal and substantival ideas to form the unity of thought expressed, and the union of the substantive and its attribute to form the unity of the substantival idea, and as we have the union of the verb and its complement, be it noun, adjective or adverb, to form the verbal idea, so we must see in this a double function of the same modifier. The substantival idea of the modifier unites with the verb to form the verbal element and the attributive element unites with the substantive to form the substantival idea.

The union of the verb with the inner object, or effect produced by the verb, may be seen in Greek in *οἴνον χεῖν=οἴνοχοεύειν*; *ναῦς πηγήνειν=ναυπηγεῖν*. The union of the factitive object with the verb may be seen in Greek compounds like *κακοποιεῖν τινα*, to ill-treat one, to evil-entreat one, which are equivalent to the simple verb and the plural of the adjective, as *ποιεῖν κακά τινα*. If we remember that the Greek often employs the accusative where other languages employ the dative, as *πειθώ σε, persuadeo tibi*, we may infer that the primitive construction here was probably the dative, and even the Greek has retained this case in the broader sense of *dativus commodi* or *incommodi*, as *δις δὴ πολλὰ κάκον ανθρώποισιν ἔωργει. εὐλαβεῖσθ', δι τοῖς φίλοισι δρῶσιν οἱ κακοὶ φίλοι*, Eur. Orest. 736. Yet in general the Greek preferred the accusative, after expressions of this nature, ever a favorite case of the Greek language. The construction after compounds like the above will depend upon the nature of the verbal idea expressed by them. If the personal object be the limit of the activity contained in the verbal idea, then the accusative would be the appropriate case; but if the activity only tend toward the personal object, or the relation is only one of nearness in space, or only one of advantage or disadvantage, then the dative alone can be employed to express this relation. Nor will it make the least difference whether these compounds are separable or inseparable, the principle of the construction

remains the same. Let us apply this rule to such compounds in the German language.

We have seen above that the *verbum substantivum* has two functions: that of a mere form-word, or copula, and that of a real verb expressing existence, being, state. The form-word has no significance whatever, the verbal function inheres in the adjective, noun or phrase forming the predicative idea. But the verb of existence is a very important factor in the sentence and when joined with the adverb, as seen in Greek, becomes as it were an active verb; it is even found with the accusative. The use of the adverb as predicate modifier of this verb is somewhat uncommon and may mostly be explained as referring to some participle understood, as *apud matrem recte est* (comparatum), *sum Dyrrachii, et sum tuto*. Yet after eliminating all such cases there still remain adverbial modifiers which do not admit of this easy explanation, they seem to unite with the *verbum substantivum* to form the predicative idea. A part of these at least are to be explained as petrified cases of obsolete pronouns or pronominal adjectives, as *die Sache ist so*; *das Haus ist so dass man es nicht bewohnen kann*. Here the force of the adverb seems to be that of a pronominal adjective and this use of it reaches back to O. H. G. Notker 101, 25 *Doh sie so sei, sie zegant* (though they be so, they perish). Tatian 156, 2 *Ir heisset mich Meister unti Herro, ih bin so*. Even the superlative of the adjective is replaced by the superlative of the adverb in Modern German, and also in English, whenever the predicate is at the same time further modified by the relation of time or place or other qualifier and whenever the superlative serves to give the greatest intensity not only in comparison with the action when predicated of other subjects but also with the action when taking place under other relations of the same subject (cf. Becker ii, 25); as, *die Rosen sind in unserm Garten am schönsten, die Trauben sind im Süden am süssesten*, The days are shortest in winter, the dispute was then hottest, the grapes are sweetest in the southern countries. In all these cases the adverb gives intensity to the verbal idea and affects the substantival idea at the same time. The verb of existence is equivalent to some word like *blühen, wachsen, bloom, grow, become*. We may here justly ask what is the nature of this adverbial modifier, whether it is a general principle involved or whether these are sporadic instances. And perhaps we can best answer these questions by taking up

the constructions of the verbum substantivum used impersonally with the personal dative. The adverb is a favorite modifier here, whenever not so much the quality of the subject is distinctly predicated, but the way in which the qualification is asserted, and the kind of qualification becomes the leading idea, as *sivales bene est*. *Bonum* would give another meaning to the expression. cf. French *c'est bon* and *c'est bien*, the German *mir ist wohl (bene)* and *mir ist gut (heilsam)*. This is still seen in the O. H. G. *mir ist reht* which signifies *justum est, decet*, in M. G. *mir ist recht, mir geschieht recht*) and O. H. G. *mir ist rehte*, in M. G. *mir ist gelegen, mir kommt recht*. In this same class of verbs which admit both adverb and adjective as modifier belong *werden, geschehen, ergehen, thun, (baz thon, übele tuon)*, also *haben* goth. *thai ubilaba habandans, oi սահա՞ս էշօրտէ* Mark ii, 17, (but compare same expression translated by *thai unhaili habandans* Mt. 9, 12). "The verbs *gehen, stehen, sitzen, liegen* generally take adverbs of quality, can, however, sometimes turn these into the more lively personal adjective, as in Latin *eo tutus, sto erectus, sedeo tranquillus, jaceo supinus.*" Grimm Gram. 4, 931. "When the active quality of the adjective can be developed, both ideas approach each other as, *Er sitzt stille, die Sonne steht hoch, like tacendo, scandendo.*" ib., 939. But the most frequent construction with this verb used impersonally is the adjective. Some constructions with the noun also deserve notice, as falling under the same head. This verbal idea thus formed by the verbum substantivum and the adjective or noun governs either the personal accusative or the personal dative (cf. Grimm 4, 241), though in Modern German only the latter construction has been retained. In Gothic such compounds, especially with nouns, often take the accusative as *ni peei ina pize parbane kara vesi=ovx ծր: περὶ τῶν πτωχῶν ἔμελεν αὐτῷ* (not that he cared for the poor, *ihn kümmert*). In O. H. G. this accusative is disappearing but a few examples still remain, as *mih ist wuntar*, M. H. G. *mih ist wunder*, which Mod. G. turns by *mich wundert*. O. H. G. *mih niotot* and *mih ist niot* (me delectat) stand side by side, serving to show the construction of the accusative after the noun and verb is equivalent to the personal accusative after the impersonal verb. In the O. S., however, the dative is found after *niud, was im (eis) niud mikil* Hel. 425. O. H. G. *do si (eas) mickei fir-wiz was*, Moses; and *Er zeinta, thes sie uuas ouh oth, sines licha-men tot*, Off. 4, 19, 25, still show the accusative after nouns and

verbum substantivum. As often in Latin, we have here in connection with this personal accusative the genitive of the thing. Nor are these in reality impersonal verbs, since the activity is asserted of a subject, though the relation of that subject to the activity is a peculiar one. The logical subject here becomes the passive object of the activity, and the verb assumes the impersonal form. In *es hungert mich*, *es graut mir*, *me pudet*, *me pœnitet*, etc., the real idea of activity is predicated of the subject lies not so much in the predicative idea itself as in the feeling of hunger, etc., which has taken posession of the subject, here in the form of the suffering object (cf. Becker ii, 17). The explanation of this peculiar construction lies close at hand, though in this case as in the distinction between the adverbial and adjectival modifiers pointed out above it will be necessary to leave the province of grammar proper and call in the aid of philosophy once more. We saw there the distinction between objective cognition and subjective sensation, a principle also applicable to the two classes of verbs already discussed; the one, denoted by the native Sanscrit grammarians as *parasmāipadam*, would be that class in which the relation between the subject and passive object might be called one of objective cognition (in which the consciousness is relative to something different from the present state of the mind itself) in other words the action of the verb is exerted upon an object entirely different from the subject. The second class, or *ātmanēpadam*, would express the relation of the subjective sensation between the subject and passive object (in which the consciousness is exclusively limited to the pleasure or pain experienced by the thinking subject). The very formation of the *ātmanēpadam* would indicate that the action takes place only for, or in the interest of, the agent of the action, since the verbal ending is only different forms of pronouns referring to the same person, one as subject of the action, the other as passive object of the same. It is true that this middle form was extended to other than verbs of sensation, and finally developed into the passive form, but the principle, nevertheless, holds good; the same principle also underlies the reflexive verbs, and we have inferred that it even inheres in verbs like, *look*, *feel*, etc. But in all these cases we have the subject expressed while in *es hungert mich*, *me pudet*, etc., it entirely fails. If we analyze the thought here expressed, we shall find that the logical subject is implied in the verb itself. Cognition and feeling being always co-existent, the

former being colored by the feeling of pleasure or pain, the latter existing only as known in consciousness, the two elements form a complex state in which are found the objective cognition of the thought which is really the subject of the activity and the subjective sensation which governs the passive object. In *es hunger mich* we have implied the abstract idea of hunger, the *objective cognition*, the *perception* first acquired through the sensation, the *essence without motion*; this is the real agent, the logical subject of the activity. Besides this there inheres in the verb itself the *subjective sensation* of hunger, the *essence in motion*, forming the activity of the thought and governing the passive object in the form of the personal pronoun. This essence of motion is the feeling or sensation of hunger contained in the expression *es hunger mich*. But this objective cognition and subjective sensation are only theoretically, or rather, philosophically distinct from each other; practically the two ideas commingle and affect the personal object to which at the same time belong the consciousness relative to something different from the present state of the mind itself and the consciousness exclusively limited to the pleasure or pain experienced by the thinking subject, hence the subjective force of the whole thought, best seen, perhaps, when expressed in other words, as *I feel hunger working within me, hunger has, hunger possesses me*. (Cf. Greek, *κακὸν ἔχει μέ*, evil is upon me, *γελῶς ἔχει τινά*, etc.).

Somewhat allied, though entirely distinct in their explanation, are expressions like *es beliebt mir*, *me oportet*, *mihi licet*, *mihi libet*, Fr. *il me faut*, etc., which "express the relations of a moral possibility and necessity." Here the logical subject is expressed by the personal dative (or accusative): in expressions like *es ist etwas grosses um einer Herrscherin fürstlichen Sinn*, Sch.; Wie Steht's um Didier? ibid., however, the logical subject stands after a preposition. In most cases where the personal dative is the logical subject of the activity we find a grammatical subject in the form of a dependent clause, or in some other easily recognizable form; but often we find the personal dative (logical subject) where no moral possibility or necessity is expressed, as *es graut mir*, *es geht mir gut*, *es ist mir daran gelegen*, etc. These expressions belong to the category of the verbs of sensation just explained, the only difference being that the verbal idea requires the dative relation and not the accusative. As in the case with the accusative after such expression, so we find

here verbal compounds of the verbum substantivum and a noun, more often in O. H. G., as, *mir ist not=opus est mihi, necesse est.* M. H. G. *des was im ouch not.* Iw. 6552. O. H. G. *mir ist zorn=ira moveor: theiz imo zorn was,* Otf. 4, 19, 59. M. H. G. *mir ist zorn* (irascor) Nib. 2284, 4. O. H. G. *mir ist anado* (mir widersteht): *der dir filo ando was (qui indignissimus tibi videbatur).* O. S. *mi is ando.* M. H. G. *mir ist ande (mihi repugnat)* Modern German has *mir ist ernst damit;* *Wann einem noth ist nach einem ding, so misräth es ihm am allerersten,* Sch. & E. 297; *mir ist angst.* O. H. G. *her diufal ist im inne, ther fiant ist io manne,* Otf. 3, 10, 12. *Es sint uns harto thurfti* (pl.), Otf. 5, 12, 55. *Es warun in tha thurfti* (pl.), ibid. 4, 15, 2. It might be a question whether all of these were originally nouns. It is certain that several of them partook in so far of the adjective nature that they admitted of comparison in O. H. G. (*vän, niet, durft, ser, zorn, anado*), "through the seductive equalizing of such constructions with others in which decided adjectives are employed, or else one must in retaining the substantive nature assume in accordance with the Greek a comparison of the substantive," says Grimm, Gramm. 4, 241. In the earlier part of our discussion it has been shown that every adjective contains within it the element of a substantive and conversely there must be somewhat of the adjective nature in every substantive, as is shown by words which are sometimes used as nouns and sometimes as adjectives. Even among the nouns just quoted, *fiant* also employed in the same manner and *ser* might be real adjectives which have become substantives. In connection with the verb *thun* one of these nouns (*nöth*) also seems to perform the function of an adverb. In O. H. G. *ther hungar duit' imo es nöt,* Otf. 2, 4, 33, and other examples we have the beginning of the modern *es that noth*, the only example left of the numerous combinations of *thun* and nouns in O. H. G. (cf. Graff 5, 295 ff.) where the two elements compounded have melted into one idea.

Passing from these combinations of the verbum substantivum with nouns and adjectives to form the predicative idea, let us consider briefly the compounds of the same with adverbs. We have seen above that in its quality of verb of existence and being the verbum substantivum is capable of further modification, as *καυρήτεσσι κακῶς ἦν* (it went ill with them), H. G. 551. *Mir ist wohl*, etc. But the employment of the adverbial mod-

ifier with *sein* is too common in German to need comment here; not only *sein*, but *werden*, *geschehen*, and even *machen* and *thun* admit the adverbial modifier, and are then equivalent to the verb *sein* and the adverb, as *mir ist wohl*, *mir wird wohl* and *mir thut es wohl*, *die Erinnerung jener Stunden macht mir wohl*, Goethe, *Werther's Leiden*; *das thut mir leid*; yet the idea expressed by *thun*, *machen* when combined with the adverb differs in so far from that expressed by *sein* and the adverb that in the former the action, or being is made essentially prominent, while in the latter the state or condition is more especially qualified. Nor is this peculiar to the German language alone, in Greek *ἔχειν* with an adverb is equivalent, when used personally, to *εἴραι* with the adjective, and when used impersonally or with the personal dative it follows the same construction as in German: *ἀλλ ἐντοικοιδὴ ἔχει*, Hom. Od. 24, 245. Hdt. 7, 188. *Καὶ τοῖσι οὐτῷ ἔχε ὄρμον*. Th. 7, 57. (*ἐπολέμησαν*) *ὡς ἐνάστοις τῆς ἔντυχίας ἡ πατὰ τὸ ἔνυμφέρον ἡ ἀνάγνη ἔσχεν*. χ. Oec. 12. *οὐτωδὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἔχει περὶ τῆς ὀικονομίας*. In Latin *habere* with the adverb shows the same construction: *bene habent tibi principia*, Ter, Ph. 2, 3, 82. In all these instances the verb has become neuter, and is preferred to the *verbum substantivum* in order to give emphasis to the expression. The dative after these impersonal constructions is to be explained like that after the impersonal constructions with *sein* joined with the adverb, and is really the logical subject of the assertion, and needs no special explanation. But *machen* joined to the adverb *bange* (cf. Grimm, Wb., *sub voce*) has led to much confusion from the fact that the adverb *bange* has now also become an adjective. We find, therefore, *du machst mir bange*, *es macht mir bange*, and *du machst mich bange*, and both in good authors. Luther used only the adverb, *da furcht sich Jacob ser und im ward bange* 1 Mos. 32, 7. *denn das volk macht mir bang*. 2 Sam. 14, 15. *Es thut mir sehr bang, das ich nicht kan leiblich bei euch sein*. Luther, 5, 147. Lessing has *der Knabe, der so oft mir bange machte*; Goethe, *dass ihm die Heftigkeit oft angst and bange machte*; Schiller *Bei Gott, Sie machen mir ganz bange; denn alsbald ein auge sehr rot wird, so thut im das helle liecht wehe und bange*. Bartish 121. *Wem war bänger als mir?* Schweinichen 1, 189. *Die änderung vom warmen zum kalten hat mir viel bänger gethan*. Lohenstein Arm. 1, 584. "But in the seventeenth century there arose an inorganic adjective

which became still more general in the eighteenth century. *Wenn sich der bange stank bei heissem tag erhebet.* Gryp. 1, 317. *Und mit noch bängern mienen.* Gellert 1, 278. Cf. Hagedorn, Klopstock, Mess. 10, 221, 14, 371. Schiller, Schlegel, Goethe (*öfne meine bange kleine hütte*). Hence instead of *einem bange machen*, we find *einen bange machen, ich bin bange.*" Grimm Wb., sub voce. We have a similar construction after *machen* and the adverb *heiss* in the proverb "*Was ich nicht weiss, macht mir nicht heiss*" which Goethe, in mistaking the adverb for the adjective, changed to *Was ich nicht weiss, macht mich nicht heiss, und was ich weiss, machte mich heiss, wenn ich wüste, wies werden müste.* But in another passage he has the correct form: *Dies Wort macht den Umstehenden heiss.*

XV.—*The Requirements in English for Admission to College.*

By JOHN G. R. McELROY, A. M.,

PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

THE paper I have ventured to lay before the Association on this occasion very likely needs an apology. The questions it raises have none of the interest that attaches to questions in pure scholarship: they are simply practical questions in pedagogy, and must be answered in the light of experience. Besides, as they concern chiefly the course at school, they may seem even mis-addressed when proposed to a body of college professors.

But I am sure that these questions are of importance—and to us. As teachers, we can not get away from practical questions: we live in the midst of them. As college-professors may we not, in our zeal for advanced courses in English, have overlooked the needs of the school-course? May we not, in providing so liberally for the English of Chaucer and Ormin and Alfred, have stinted the English of Longfellow and Irving and Addison? I surely need not remind you that a house, however substantially built, stands but insecurely on an insufficient foundation; nor need I tell you that, if, as Prof. A. S. Hill says Harvard College is doing, our institutions of learning are graduating every year men of high scholarship in other things, yet "whose manuscripts would disgrace a boy of twelve," then there is at least one weak place in our teaching of English, and our plain duty is to ferret out this weak spot and either prop it up securely or (if necessary) to rebuild the structure from the ground.

Now, there can be no doubt that one source of weakness in the English course is the indifference of so many of our college-faculties. Too often English is the foot-ball of the party of the (so-called) more important studies, and is pushed about from hour to hour or class to class—nay, is even put into and out of the course alternately, as if it had no rights that any one is bound to respect: but *the* weak spot in the teaching of English

is outside of college, is the sadly unsatisfactory preparation with which so many candidates come for admission.

Hence my paper; which after what seemed to me a necessary introduction, I hasten to begin.

Two heresies in American education may, perhaps, be said to have spent their force,—

1st. That the children of English speaking parents know English by virtue of their birth;

2d. That the term *English* includes all studies of the curriculum except Latin and Greek and Mathematics.

First. Even the general public — *a fortiori* the college-public — has concluded that a college-graduate can not be expected to know English unless he has been taught it, and that to drill him in English grammar learned by rote is not to teach him English. Expert educators join in a dismal chorus on the amazing and disgraceful ignorance shown by young men and women, not only of the philosophy of their native tongue, but even of its facts—for example, its spelling and its history. The learned president of Harvard College, that rare example of the mingling of the conservative and the revolutionary in a single man, is reported to have said not long ago that he knew but one study essential for every American student, viz., the English language; and, in so saying, he compressed this new belief into a very dynamite cartridge,—a cartridge that may well be expected to seam and shatter and crumble into fragments even the century-old formations of blind superstition.

Secondly, the importance of studying English once recognized, a reasonable definition of the term naturally followed; and to-day *English* is no longer, as it once was, every modern subject of the course except itself, but, like *Latin* or *Greek* or *French* or *German*, the study of a language and its literature, whether for use or for culture.

The advance marked by these concessions is viewed by middle-aged men among us with either keen satisfaction or pronounced disfavor; young men who know the American school and college of thirty years ago only by hearsay, can hardly comprehend it; while certain worthy, but long-antiquated souls will never realize it, however deeply the conviction is borne in upon them that the world does move, and that a new history of man has been written since they were awarded their diplomas.

At the same time, the teaching of English, both at school and

at college, is still in a state far from satisfactory even to the men who, in the last dozen or twenty years, have done most to develop it and give it its present shape. Experiment has followed experiment; text-books have been multiplied; the course has sounded the whole gamut from the lower notes of grammar and analysis to the lofty strains of early English and Anglo-Saxon,—from empirical studies in expression to purely scientific research in philology and linguistics; but nobody seems to suppose that the end is yet. An unrest can plainly be felt among teachers and other school-officers; the air of both school-marm and college-professor is that of the anxious inquirer on whose tongue trembles the Athenian question, *Ti kainoteron?*

Nor is this strange. Though centuries have elapsed since Greek manuscripts were first brought by Italian merchants to western Europe, our own times have seen a revolution in the methods of teaching Greek. Latin is a yet older classic in Europe; but even Latin is not taught now as it was thirty or forty years ago. What wonder, then, if a study scarcely a quarter-century old is still groping in the twilight? What wonder if a venturesome teacher of English should ask whether abundant opportunities do not still exist for improving this study in both school and college?

The question before us, then, is the second half of this inquiry—How can still better results be obtained from the preparatory teaching of English?

As now laid down, the requirements in English for admission to college include commonly nothing but grammar and composition. A few colleges assign a number of books, which each candidate must at least have read, and from one or more of which the subjects of composition set at the entrance examination will be taken. But a larger number of colleges, perhaps, do not require this reading; some of those that do require it omit the examination in grammar, except so far as the correction of sentences false in syntax necessitates a knowledge of grammar; while at least one leading college, unless its catalogue for 1885-6 belies it, requires no examination in English at all. In a few places, the elements of etymology are exacted—the dividing of words into their component parts, and the deriving of their stems from their immediate ancestors.

This is all—absolutely all. Compare it with the accurate knowledge of Latin or Greek, or even French or German gram-

mar required by all our colleges,—still more with the extended reading necessary on the part of each student in these foreign tongues—and the discrepancy, if it were not so sad, would be laughable. The shoemaker's children have, indeed, no shoes: our boys and girls know every tongue better than they know their own!

But even this limited requirement is not insisted on: in fact, it cannot be; for it is never (or most rarely) met. A few schools prepare really well in English; but more are indifferent—they match the majorities in our faculties in indifference. Some masters say openly that, with so much else to teach in preparation, they have no time for English: others denounce the English examination as a mere bagatelle that any boy well trained in Latin can easily pass. The professor of English, rage he never so wildly, must take all candidates for admission that pass in the other subjects. His only alternative is to punish himself by conditioning them and then having the wholly superfluous task of re-examining them. Who ever knew a faculty to reject a candidate only because he was unprepared in English? The professor had better make the best of his hard lot, and mould as well as he can the nearly implastic material that is put into his hands. Occasionally he has his reward; for he can say of a brilliant writer among his graduates, as Volumnia, the mother of Coriolanus, said of her son,

“Thou art *my* warrior,
I help to frame thee.”

Lest I seem to be speaking unguardedly, let me cite an authority. If any of our colleges could exact a fair amount of preparation in English, our larger institutions might be expected to do so. Yet, in a paper on *English in the Schools*, published in Harper's Magazine for June, 1885, Prof. A. S. Hill, of Harvard, writes as follows:—

“Since 1873, when Harvard College for the first time held an examination in English, I have read from four to five thousand compositions written in the examination-room upon subjects drawn from books which the candidates were required to read before presenting themselves. Of these not more than a hundred—to make a generous estimate—were creditable to either writer or teacher. . . . In spelling, punctuation, and grammar some of the books are a little worse than the mass, and some a

great deal better; but in other respects there is a dead-level, unvaried by a fresh thought or an individual expression. If the dreary compositions written by the great majority of candidates for admission to college were correct in spelling, intelligent in punctuation, and unexceptionable in grammar, there would be some compensation; but this is so far from being the case that the instructors of English in American colleges have to spend much of time and strength in teaching the A B C of their mother-tongue to young men of twenty—work disagreeable in itself, and often barren of result. Every year Harvard graduates a certain number of men—some of them high scholars—whose manuscript would disgrace a boy of twelve; and yet the college cannot be blamed, for she can hardly be expected to conduct an infant school for adults."

So far Prof. Hill. Perhaps the case is not everywhere quite so bad. Here and there an exceptional teacher takes a real interest in English, and sends his boys to college well prepared. But the vast majority doubtless belong to that class of men already spoken of—the men whose "realizing sense" of the importance of English seems to be reserved as a revelation for them in the life in the world to come.

What, then, is the remedy for this state of things?—Amendment?—No; for I fear very much that the case has passed the stage in which medication is possible. Heroic surgery seems called for. And yet, I would conserve the patient's forces—would save every spark of life that can contribute to the *vis medicatrix naturae*. Or, (to change the figure,) I would prune the twigs that now seem only to exhaust the tree, in order by this process to throw all the more life into the branches left behind. Nay more, I would select a few healthy grafts of kindred stock, and by them enkindle yet more life. Figures aside, I would not only not omit any of the present requirements, I would not only not relax a fair rigor in examining, but I would strengthen the requirements by adding such subjects as may be relied on to call into play the faculties that the present requirements leave idle, and I would exact from all candidates a real compliance with every exaction made of them. I would imitate that wise pastor, who, when his people attended one meeting a week very slimly, at once announced four services between Sunday and Sunday.

To come to particulars, there has been no little talk against

English grammar in preparation for college. English is called "the grammarless tongue;" comparatively little time, we are told, "should suffice, if judiciously used, to teach an intelligent boy the few points of grammar which it is most important to know." But it is just because English is an non-inflected language, and therefore presents difficulties both of construction and of interpretation not presented by the inflected tongues, that it seems to me to need especial care. Doubtless, an immense mass of rubbish has been accumulated about the necessary truths of English grammar; but in clearing away this rubbish our broom must not sweep too clean. Rather than pull up the grain, you remember, even the tares were ordered to be let alone. Besides, as Herbert Spencer says of rhetoric, a knowledge of what is right and what is wrong in English construction "cannot fail to be of service," if only "as facilitating revision."

On one point alone our teachers might do their pupils signal service. Even boys who have learned to scan Virgil or Homer or Horace often know nothing of English versification. The fundamental distinction between quantity and accent, for example, often does not strike them till, perhaps, in reading Chaucer or Shakespeare, they are brought face to face with it, and are obliged to learn it. So, with the common substitution of a three-syllabled for a two-syllabled foot in English metres, and with caesura as a feature of English verse: they know nothing of all this, and must be taught it in college as if they were infant-school children. Of course, prosody is not strictly a part of grammar, but it may readily be taught as such.

Etymology, too, can ill be spared from the requirements. Not, of course, the senseless learning of stems and affixes by rote, but the intelligent dissection of words till this leads to a clear (if elementary) knowledge of the sources of our tongue and of the important processes by which it has come into being.

The course, then, ought not to be reduced: can anything be added to it? Something, surely, if only by way of strengthening the work already laid out. What if correctness in spelling, punctuation, diction, arrangement, with the simpler points in regard to clearness and force, were not only aimed at, but by a continual drill, drill, drill, secured? Abbott's *How to Write Clearly*, for example, gives definite ideas on many of these points. What if this work were named as stating more precisely what is expected in composition? What if the English classics required

were examined on for their contents, their chance allusions, etc., so as to inculcate a thoughtful mode of reading? Even a brief summary of the history of English literature and of both the English and the American people could be given. This, of course, not by a senseless herding together of names and dates and titles, but by Matthew Arnold's plan of marking out *points de repère*, whether great writers, remarkable books, or notable events, and then piecing in with these the other parts of the whole story. In a word, the course could be made to look to a real knowledge of the language and at least some of its worthiest books; not, as is only too often the case, to a verbatim acquisition of certain books about the language and its literature. Too often, indeed, these books are not even about the language and its literature, but about something that men who have never studied the literature imagine to be the language. For example, misled by continually teaching such books, a most successful teacher of everything but English said to me not long ago that he could not bring himself to use Prof. Whitney's *Essentials of English Grammar*, because forsooth! it had that vicious division of English verbs into strong and weak!

I would insist, then, upon grammar, (in the merest outline, however,) on a rational etymology, a high degree of correctness, clearness and force in composition, a skeleton of English literature and English literary history, as well as on the careful preparation of several, not too many, English books. Indeed, as will appear directly, I would ground my teaching on these English books, using text-books (properly so called) as little as might be, except for reference. I would begin early in the school-course, and maintain a steady discipline in English from that time till the time of the pupil's departure for college. I would not cure the prevailing over-medication by letting my patients die for want of medicine; but, giving as little medicine as possible, I would nourish the growing boy on pure, wholesome English, which, like

“The vines of France and milk of Burgundy
Strive to be interess'd”

with his “young love”—but are rarely allowed the privilege. The chief change I would propose in the English course at school, however, is in the method of teaching. As far as possible I would abandon books about English, and teach English

books. I would unite composition, grammar, etymology, literature, and literary history all in the closest union, and teach them all with standard English works as text-books. I have no desire to *name* text-books, but I can best make myself understood, perhaps, by citing examples. As soon as the child had learned a few pages from such a work as Mrs. Knox's *Lessons in English*, or Murray's *Essential Lessons in English Composition, Analysis, and Grammar*, I would choose a child's book—a fairy-tale, perhaps, such as *Alice in Wonderland*—and read it connectedly, bringing out by question and answer, or, better still, by encouraging the children to repeat it in their own simple way, the story as I had read it to them. Then, from the simplest books I could find—such as Dr. Abbott's *How to Tell the Parts of Speech* and Murray's *Advanced Lessons* or the Rev. Richard Morris's *English Grammar Primer*—I would teach the parts of speech, the handful of grammatical forms our language has, the nature of number, person, mood, etc., and the elements of our syntax. Meanwhile, and *pari passu* with the course in grammar, I would read several books (*Ivanhoe* and the like), till I had impressed on the class the truth that English grammar, etc., should be studied, not aside from, but in the closest connection with, English books; till I had stimulated a genuine interest in English studies, and had aroused the pupils' enthusiasm. Composition-exercises could be based on this reading, as well as test-lessons in syntax and analysis. For the latter departments of grammar, a more advanced book, Abbott's *How to Parse* or Whitney's *Essentials*, would doubtless prove necessary; but whatever text-book I used, I should never lose sight for a single hour of the English reading. And so with etymology. The outline once given, I should base all further teaching on the authors read. Prosody I would teach over a simple narrative poem, such as Scott's *Lady of the Lake*, Longfellow's *Evangeline*, or one of Tennyson's *Idylls*. Before many years—perhaps months—of this work, formal instruction, except by way of review, could, doubtless, be dispensed with, and the course be made up entirely of readings from standard authors with the applications of the principles already learned.

The supreme excellence of this plan lies in its always furnishing the pupil with his material for composition. If one error more than another, has characterized the past, it has been that of setting mere children to writing compositions, when they had

not, and could not be expected to have anything to say. The practice is scarcely less cruel and inhuman than the historical setting of the Hebrews in Egypt to making bricks without straw. Yet I hardly know a school to-day in which the practice is not followed.

Lest my plan seem that of a doctrinaire, let me say that it has been twice tried, in part, at least, under widely different circumstances. Some years ago, my sister used it with a class of boys from seven to eight years old, and with such success, that the class actually begged for an English lesson every day. Her experiment was interrupted, so that it can not be considered other than incomplete. More recently, however, the principle has been applied to greater extent. My assistant at the University of Pennsylvania has read with our freshmen this term Kingsley's *Hereward* and Milton's *L'Allegro* and *Il Penseroso*, principally for the purpose of supplementing the imperfect work done in English at school. He has also required his class to give an outline of the chapter or other portion set for recitation, and he has by explaining and illustrating the texts, made the readings interesting; but his chief aim has been to review and enforce the lessons that ought to have been learned more perfectly at school. It would have been impolitic, of course, to have announced this work, as the conducting of an infant school for adults; but, except that the plan was new, and that the boys seemed to be studying Charles Kingsley or Milton, instead of their thumb-marked and hand-worn English grammars, the work was simply a review of what they had done, or were supposed to have done, at school. The plan, too, has worked to a charm; and I have myself seen enough of it in this application to be confirmed in my good opinion of it. Would that the schools, by doing more of this work for their pupils before they send them to us, would enable us to do more successfully the advanced work naturally looked for in the college course!

In conclusion, let me hope that in whatever my paper may have failed, it may promote in however small a degree the success of our English courses at school and in college. Should it bring into college, even a single Freshman less fatally handicapped for his race either by ignorance born of no teaching at all or by stupidity born of false and cruelly wicked methods of teaching, I shall feel that I have not written in vain.

XVI.—*Remarks on the Conjugation of the Wallonian Dialect.*

BY J. JAMES STÜRZINGER, PH. D.,

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ROMANCE LANGUAGES IN BRYN MAWR
COLLEGE, BRYN MAWR, PA.

THE following few remarks bear on the modern Wallonian Dialect, especially that of Malmedy, as compared with Modern French. They are intended to show that this dialect (as indeed is generally the case with dialects) is in the main far more advanced in its linguistic development than the literary language, while in some cases, however, it may appear more conservative.

Dialects generally keep to an older and more correct state of things in the purely phonetic part of the grammar, that is to say, they will distinguish sounds which in the literary language (probably under the influence of the spelling) have long ago been confounded. Modern French, for example, has only one sound (ö) for the three Latin, *o*, *o* and *au*, in *meule* (mola), *gueule* (gula), *peu* (paucum), sounds which have been kept distinct by most of the French dialects. On the other hand, in the inflectional part of the language and especially in the conjugation, dialects give way to analogy to a much larger extent than does the written language. These two points, then, characteristic of dialects in general are the main features of the Wallonian Dialect as well.

In the Wallonian conjugation there are, of course, not many cases representing an older state of phonology, but still there are a few such. Thus, whilst Modern French has only one ending for the infinitive of the first conjugation, viz. *-er* and only one for the past participle of the same conjugation: *-é*, fem. *-ée* our dialect has, in conformity with the Old French, two terminations, namely, for the infinitive.

1) *-er*,¹ corresponding to Old French *-er*
and 2) *-i*,¹ " " " *-ier*

¹ The *-r* of *er* is mute as in modern French; the Wallonians have adopted the French orthography, so that all the forms which I shall quote hereafter without noting the pronunciation have to be read as French words would be.

and for the participle

1) -é, -èe corresponding to Old French -é, -ée
 2) -i, -ie " " " -ié, -iée, or rather, -ie.

Chanter, passer, parler and their participles will be found to have the same form in Wallonian, Old French and Modern French, but to Modern French verbs such as: *baigner, peigner, veiller; baiser, chasser, trousser, aider*; correspond in Wallonian *bagni, pegni, veuñi; bahi, chessi, troussi, aidi*; or to such as: *prier, plier, lier, essayer, laisser, juger, manger, lécher* *trébucher* correspond: *prii, ploï, loi, saï, leyi, jugi, magni, lechi, trebouhi*.

The masculine form of the past participle of these Wallonian verbs in -i ends also in -i. This -i answers to Old French -ié (in the infinitive, of course, to -ier; the -r of the infinitive of the first conjugation being silent in Modern Wallonian as in Modern French, it is, therefore, not written, in order to avoid the pronunciation *ir*); for every Old French *ie*, no matter of what origin, has become *i* in Modern Wallonian, thus Old French *chier*=Wall. *chir*, "cher," *prumier*=*prumi*, "premier," *Janvier*=*Janvir*, *bien*=*bin*, *rien*=*rin*, *vient*=*vint*, *vieil*=*vi*, *fiere*=*fire*, *fies*=*fi*, "fiefs," *piez*=*pids*, "pieds," *ciel*=*ci*, *pierre*=*pire*, *crieve*=*crive*, "crève," *lieve*=*live*, "lève."

The feminine of the same past participle ends in -eie; this termination is the Old Picard ending -ie=(Old French -iée), every Old or Modern French *ie* becoming *eie* in Wallonian. Cf., for example, the French past participle of the *I*-conjugation, *finie*=Wall. *f' nèie*, *garnie*=*garnèie*—or *vie*=*vèie*, *envie*=*invèie*, *patrie*=*patrèie*, *il marie*=*marèie*, *Marie*=*Marèie*, *qu' il die*=*dèie*, etc.

To these examples may be added some forms of the singular, of the present tense, which have kept the old form as to the accentuated vowel of the stem, whilst in Modern French they have changed it on the analogy of the forms accentuated on the termination. Thus the infinitive

pârler has the pres. *ju parole*=O. Fr. *je parol*, Mod. Fr. "je parle"
lever " " *ju live*= " *je lief*, " "je lève"
crèver " " *ju crive*= " *je crie*, " "je crève"
drovi " " *ju drouve*= " *j' oeuvre*, " "j' ouvre."

The *i* of *live, crive* answers exactly to the Old French *ie*, and so also the *ou* of *drouve* to Old French *ue* (*oe*). Many other verbs, which have in Old French throughout the conjugation the same stem-vowel (or stem), show in our dialect according to its peculiar phonetical rules a different vowel (or stem) in the forms accentuated on the stem and those accentuated on the termination: for example, *ju cours*, "je cours" and *infin. cori, dènne*, "donne" and *d' ner*, *marèie*, "marie" and *marier*, *waitèie*, "guette" and *waiter*, *rouvèie* and *rouvi*,—*mostèrre* "montre" and *mostrer*, *couvèrre* "couvre" and *covri*, *soffèrre* "souffre" and *soffri*; *soffèlle* "souffle" and *soffler*, *troubèlle* "trouble" and *troubler*, *accoupèlle* "accouple" and *accoupler*, *ronfèlle* "ronfle" and *ronfler*, etc. It is not necessary to say that all those strong verbs which in Modern French have not changed their stem-vowel under the influence of analogy; as, for example, *je veux* and *vouloir*, *tiens* and *tenir*, *meurs* and *mourir*, etc., present the same peculiarity in Wallonian, cf. *ju vous* and *voleur*, *tins* and *tini*, *mours* and *mori*.

More numerous are the cases which show the influence of analogy in the Wallonian conjugation. They all of course have one aim, that is, to reduce the multiplicity of the forms. This reduction is obtained by simplifying each of the three constituent elements of the inflexion:

- a) by dropping the six personal terminations,
- b) by reducing the three conjugations to one,
- c) by giving up the so-called "strong" inflexion.

These three kinds of simplification are conspicuous in the forms of the past tenses.

a. The personal terminations of the past tenses, it is true, are expressed in the spelling, but they are never pronounced, just as it is sometimes with the personal endings of the singular in Modern French (*je parle, tu parles, il parle, je parlais, tu parlais, il parlait*).

the Perfect Indicative in: -a -as -at, =imperf. indic.

pronounced a

the Imperfect Subj. in: -ahe¹ -ahes -ahe, -ah¹(s) -ahiz -ahi(t)
pronounced a¹ a¹ a¹

In the actual pronunciation, therefore, only the two numbers (singular and plural) are distinguished,² the six persons being indicated merely by the pronouns. In some of these cases, as in the singular of the imperfect indicative and subjunctive and even of the conditional, the uniformity seems to be the result of mere phonetic development, but all the others are due to analogy.

It is curious to see how small the influence of analogy has been in the tenses of the present. The plural, for example, has kept everywhere the forms of the three persons distinct, and if the singular shows greater uniformity, it is mostly due to phonetic development.

b. The three (*A*-, *E*- and *I*-) conjugations are reduced to one in the tenses of the past, the first or *A*-conjugation supplanting the two others in all forms of the singular and in the plural of the imperfect subjunctive, the second replacing the others in the remaining plural forms. For the above named terminations -é^v, -i, -ā, -ā¹ and a¹i are used with the exception of the two auxiliary verbs, for all three conjugations. Thus the *singular of the imperfect indicative* is in the

I conjug.	II.	III.
ju chant-éve "je chantais"	vind éve "vendais"	part éve "partais"
tu chant-éves	vind-éves	part-éves
i chant éve	vind-éve	part-éve

Or to give some other examples:

i *ju poirtéve* "je portais" *ju soffléve* "soufflais", "wårdéve" "gardais"
j'alléve "J'allais" *ju porminéve* "promenais," etc.

¹ The *h* has different pronunciations in different parts of the country, varying between voiceless *h*, *χ* and aspirate *h* on the one hand, and voiced *z*, *y* and *'*, on the other. The voiceless sound answers to Latin *ss+Pal.* or *sc+e, i*, the voiced one to Latin *Voc. s+Pal.* or *Voc. c+e, i*.

² There is a striking similarity to the declension in this reduction of the forms: the declension, too, distinguishes only the singular and plural by the termination, and the six Latin cases are indicated by prepositions. Although this similarity seems to be merely accidental, it is not unlikely nor in fact uncommon that these two principle parts of speech influence each other.

2 *ju duhindéve* "descendais," *battéve*, "battais," *k'nohéve* "connaissais" *j'avéve* "avais," *ju savéve* "savais" *veïtve* "voyais," *ju v'léve* "voulais," *p'léve¹* "pouvais," *f'stve* "faisais," *d'héve* "disais," etc.

3 *ju doirméve* "dormais," *vikéve* "vivais" (the infinitive is *vik*= Old French *vesquir*, supposititious infinitive made on the perfect *ves-qui*) *ju coréve* "courais," *covréve* "couvrais," *v'néve* "venais," *t'néve* "tenais," *ju gemihéve* "gémisais," etc. This termination *ev* is, of course, like the *-eve* in *auardeuet* "il regardait" of the "Jonas Fragment" of the tenth century (second oldest document of the Wallonian dialect)=Latin *-ába-*, but whilst this termination *-eve* in the tenth century was confined according to its origin to the first conjugation, it has since been extended to the second and third. As has been said, the two auxiliary verbs *aveur* "avoir" and *esse* "être" make exception, *aveur* having the imperfect indicative *j'aveus*, (*dž avö*), *t'aveus*, *i aveut* and *esse*: *j'esteus*, *t'esteus*, *i esteut*. This termination *-eu-* is Old French *-eie-* (cf. "Jonas Fragment:" *saveiet* "savait," *doceiet* "docebat," *penteiet* "poenitebat,") later *-oi*, for Old French *ei* (*oi*) becomes *eu* in Modern Wallonian (cf. the infinitive of the second conjug. *aveur* "avoir," *saveur* "savoir" or *dreut* "droit," *treus* "trois," *teut* "toit," etc.). - The verb *aveur*, it is true, has also the new form *aveve* and in the future this will probably be the only one used, but at present the distinction seems to be made between the two forms: *aveus* is the imperfect of the auxiliary verb *aveur*, whilst *aveve* belongs to the active verb *aveur*, "to possess." The verb *saveur* "savoir" too, has sometimes the older form *saveu(s)* probably by the close resemblance of the two verbs *aveur* and *saveur*.

One might conclude from the infinitive ending *-i* (=Old French *-ier*) that the same verbs in the imperfect indicative have *-ive* instead of *eve*; but I have never come across such form. The verb *bâhi* "baiser," for example, makes *bâhéve* just as *passer* has *passéve*, *prii* "prier" *priéve*, *èvoii* "envoyer" *èvoiéve*, *annonci* "annoncer" *annoncéve*, *s' habii* "s' habiller" *s' habiéve*, *touchi* "toucher" *touchéve*, *songi* "songer" *songéve*, *chergi* "charger" *chergéve*.

The termination of the singular of the conditional, since it is derived from *aveus*, is *eu(s)*, for example:

ju parler-eus "je parlerais," *tu parler-eus*, *i parler-eut*.

ju pièdr-eus "je perdrais," etc.

ju sâreus "je saurais," etc.

ju doimr-eus "je dormirais," etc.

¹ The verb *p'lleur* or *poleur*, "pouvoir" has in our dialect throughout the conjugation the same forms as *v'lleur* or *voleur*, "vouloir," the initial consonant *p* being the only difference. The *l* in *p'lleur* is then certainly taken from *v'lleur* just as Middle French *il peult* "pouest" owes its *l* to *il veult* "volet".

It is evident that the termination *-a* of the singular of the perfect indicative of all three conjugations is the ending of the first conjugation, especially that of the third and second persons, the Old French forms terminating in *-ai -as -a* as in Modern French. The ending *-a* must have been extended first to the first person, replacing *-ai*, and then to the two other conjugations. For the forms nowadays are, in the

Ist conjug.	II.	III.
ju chant-á "je chantai"	vind-á "vendis"	part-á "partis"
tu chant-as	vind-as	part-as
i chant-a	vind-a	part-a

Or, to give further examples :

1. $\begin{cases} ju \text{ jura} & \text{"jurai,"} \\ j'all \text{ a} & \text{"allai,"} \\ \text{chargea} & \text{"chargeai,"} \\ bâha & \text{"baisai,"} \\ louka & \text{"regardai,"} \\ \text{(infinitive: louki, of German origin, cf. English look, German lügen).} \end{cases}$

2. $\begin{cases} ju \text{ prinda} & \text{"pris,"} \\ rinda & \text{"rendis,"} \\ k'noha & \text{"connus"—veyá "vis,"} \\ duva & \text{"dus,"} \\ f'sá & \text{"fis,"} \\ d'ha & \text{"dis,"} \\ \text{etc.} \end{cases}$

3. $\begin{cases} ju \text{ drová} & \text{"ouvrir,"} \\ j'oya & \text{"ouis,"} \\ vuná & \text{"vins,"} \\ tuna & \text{"tins,"} \\ rgrandihá & \text{"agrandis,"} \\ beniha & \text{"benis,"} \\ \text{etc.} \end{cases}$

The only exceptions to this formation are the two auxiliary verbs, which keep here also the older forms,

esse : *ju fous* (dzü fü) "je fus," *tu fous, i fout,*
aveur : *j'ous.*

The *ou* in these forms is to be explained in the same way as the *u* in the corresponding French forms; for *ou* in Wallonian=French *u* (cf. *nou* "nul," *noule* "nulle," *cou* "cul" and past participles in *-ou* as *pindou, piérdou*).

The ending *-áhe* of the singular of the imperfect subjunctive is undoubtedly again taken from the first conjugation, Latin *-ásse-* becoming *-áhe* according to the phonetic rules.

Ist conjug.	II.	III.
quu ju passahe	vindahe	partahe
" tu passahes	vindahes	partahes
qu' i passahe	vindahe	partahe ¹

¹ It is to be noted that similar forms of the perfect indicative and imperfect subjunctive occur as early as the fourteenth century in certain grammatical treatises pointed out by Stengel, *Zeitschrift für neufranz. Sprache u. Lit.* i, 55, and by me, *Orthographia Gallica*, p. 7.

Other examples are:

1. *quu ju jásahē* "jásasse," *mariahē* "mariasse,"
2. " *prindahē* "prisse," *rindahē* "rendisse," *-veyahē* "visse,"
duvahē "dusse," *v' lahē* "voulusse," *savahē* "susse,"
f'sahē "fisse," *d' hahe* "disse,"
3. " *morahe* "mourusse," *drovahe* "ouvrisse," *oyahe* "ouisse,"
vunahe "vinsse," *tunahe* "tinsse," etc.

The two verbs *esse* and *aveur* again make an exception to this, *quu ju fouhe* "fusse," etc.; *j' ouhe* "eusse," etc. being the forms of this mood.

The plural forms of these three past tenses have, like their singulars, only one termination for all three conjugations. The plural of the imperfect indicative ends in *-i-*:

Ist conjug.	II.	III.
<i>nos chantis</i> "chantions"	<i>vendis</i> (s)	<i>partis</i>
<i>vos chantiz</i> "chantiez"	<i>vendiz</i>	<i>partiz</i>
<i>i chantiti</i> (t) "chantaient"	<i>vendi</i> (t)	<i>parti</i> (t)

cf. other examples; as,

1. *nos alli* "allions," *mini* "menions," *qwitti* "quittions," *bahi* "baisions," *annonci* "annoncions," etc.
2. *nos metti* "mettions," *bèvi* "buvions," *avi* "avions," *savi* "savions," *poli* "pouvions," *voli* "voulions," *estti* "etions," *d'hi* "disions," *f'st* "faisions," etc.
3. *nos v'ni* "venions," *doirmi* "dormions," *viki* "vivions," *cori* "courions," *covri* "couvrions," *gèmihî* "gemissions," etc.

This ending *-i-* is the French *-iez* of the second person. (Latin *-ebatis*), so that here the second conjugation supplanted the two others as it has done in French, there being only this difference, that our dialect reduced at the same time the personal inflexion, introducing the ending *-i(z)* of the second person into the two other persons. As the two auxiliary verbs have in Old French already the same terminations in these forms as the other verbs, they make no exception here in our dialect and for the same reason the plural of the conditional terminates in *-i-*:

- 1 *nos toumr-i*(s) "tomberions," *vos toumr-iz*, *i toume-i*(t).
- 2 *nos àr-i*(s) "aurions," *vos àr-iz*, *i àr-i*(t).
nos fri(s) "ferions," *vos friz*, *i fri*(t).
- 3 *nos vinri*(s) "viendrions," *vos vinrîz*, *i vinri*(t).

The perfect indicative has lost its proper plural, the plural of

the imperfect indicative being used for it. The two auxiliary verbs alone have a plural in this tense; the forms are:

nos four-i(s) "fumes," *vos four-iz*, *i four-i(t)*.

nos our-i(s) "eumes" *vos our-iz*, *i our-i(t)*;

The terminations are here then the same as in the imperfect indicative, that is to say, the terminations of the imperfect have been put to the stem of the perfect, there being in Latin and Old French no termination in the perfect plural which would give -i-. As to the *fouri* and *ouri* it is probably due to the third person, (Lat. *fuerunt* and *habuerunt*, Old French *furent* and *eurent*, become *fourent* and *ourent* in Wallonian; this stem *four-* and *our-* was extended to the first and second person, for the sake of uniformity).

The plural of the imperfect subjunctive of all three conjugations terminates in -ahî-:

Ist. conj.	II.	III.
<i>quu nos chantahî(s)</i> "chantassions"	<i>vindahî(s)</i> "vendissions"	<i>partahî(s)</i>
<i>quu vos chantahîz</i> "chantassiez"	<i>vindahîz</i>	<i>partahîz</i>
<i>qu' i chantahî(t)</i> "chantassent"	<i>vindahî(t)</i>	<i>partahî(t)</i>

1 cf. *nos passahî* "passassions," *jâsahî* "jâsassions," *mariahî* "mariassions," etc.

2 *prindahî* "prissions," *rindahî* "rendissions," *veyahî* "vissions," *duvahî* "dussions," *v'lahî* "voulussions," *savahî* "sussions," *f'sahî* "fissions," *d'hahî* "dissions,"

3 *morahî* "morussions," *drovahî* "ouvrissons," *oyahî* "ouissions," *vunahî* "vinssions," *tunahî* "tinssions," etc.

This termination -ahî corresponds exactly to the French ending -assiez, the termination of the first conjugation being therefore used for all three conjugations. The -i of -ahî is just as the French -ions, -iez in -assions -assiez, -issions -issiez the termination of the imperfect indicative plural, the subjunctive mood being sufficiently indicated by the syllable -ah- (Fr. -ass-). There are three other endings of this plural, all terminating in the characteristic -he :

1. The two auxiliary verbs have the form: *fourî-he* "fussions," *fourî-he(s)*, *fourî-he(n)t*, *ouri-he* "eussions," *ouri-he(s)*, *ouri-he(n)t*. These plural forms are made from the perfect indicative *fourî*, *ouri*, just in the same way as the singular of the imperfect subj.: *fouhe*

ouhe seems to have been formed, viz.: by adding *-he* to the perfect indic., for *fouri-he*: *fouri(s)*=*fou-he* : *fou(s)*, *ouri-he*: *ouri(s)*=*ou-he* : *ou(s)*.

2. It has been said, that all the verbs with the exception of these two auxiliaries have lost their plural of the perf. indic. and that the plural of the imperfect indic. is used instead of it. On the analogy of *fouri-he* from *fouri* and *ourihe* from *ouri*, other verbs have an imperf. subj. plur. formed from their perfect indicative (or as the case may be, imperf. indic.) as *quu nos savi-he*, "sussions," from *saví* "savions;" and "sumes" just as *ourihe* from *ouri*.

3. Such forms of the plur. imperf. subj. ending in *-he*, together with the singular terminating in *-ahe* or *-he*, must have caused *-he* to be regarded as the characteristic sign of the imperfect subjunctive and have led to its being added to those forms which lack it. Thus, from the first mentioned ending *-ahi* (=Fr. *-assiez*) a third one is formed *-ahihe*, for example: *nos veyahihe* "vissions," *vos veyahihe*, *v' lahihe*. This syllable *-he* has not only been looked upon as a characteristic of the imperf. subj., but of the subjunctive mood in general, for it is introduced in the present subj., *-he* being added to the present indicative, as in *qu' i toumèhe* (pron. *tumèχ*) "qu' ils tombent," *tunehent* (pron. *tünéχ*) "tiennent," from the indic. *i toumet* (pron. *tume*), *tunet* (*tüné*); or to old subjunctive forms as: *qu' i aïehent* "aient" from *aïe(t)*, *seïehent* "soient" from *seïèt*, *quu vos seïohe* "soyez" from *seïo(z)*,¹ *vos oïohe* "oyiez," from *oïoz*, etc. For the remaining tenses and moods, as in the present indic., subj., imperative, and in the future indic., the reduction of the conjugations has not been carried much farther than in Modern French. The singular of the present has the same terminations as in French, two conjugations being distinguished, and to the three plural terminations *-ons -ez -ent* of the three conjugations in French, there are three corresponding terminations in Wallonian also: *-ans*(=ä) *-o(z)* *-et* (pron. *-é*): *nos parlans*, *avans*, *battans*, *partans*, *vos parloz*, *avoz*, *battoz*, *partoz*; *i parlét* (*ont*) *battét*, *partét*.

The ending *-ans* reminds one of the *oram* in the Eulalia and is likewise puzzling; the *-oz* of the second person corresponds to the Old French *-oiz* (-eiz) of the second conjugation, for the French *-oi* becomes *-o* in certain conditions (cf. *avone* "avoine," *fore* "foire").

The third person has laid the stress on the termination in conformity with the other persons of the plural. In the terminations of the past tenses we have seen that the third person plural has always adopted the ending of the two other persons of the plural; the displacement of the accent in the plural of

¹ *Seïoz* is used as imperative.

the present is certainly caused by the accentuation of the first and second person, and is the first step towards the uniformity of this plural also. The same accentuation of this person is to be found, as is well known, in many other Dialects of France, both old and modern. The terminations of the future are of course those of the present of *aveur*; the plural ends therefore in *-ans*, *-oz*, *-ont*, but the singular has undergone some slight change, the termination of the first person (French *-ai*, Wallonian *-è*) being extended to the other persons, so that the forms are :

ju chantrè, tu chantrè(s), i chantrè(t)
nos chantrans, vos chantroz, i chantront.

As the influence of analogy is so much less in the present than in the past tenses, the reason of its appearance here in this present tense is to be found in the similarity of the endings with those of the perfect indicative *-ai*, *-as*, *-a*. The third case of analogical influence refers to the reduction of the "strong" inflexion especially of course in the forms of the perfect indic., imperfect subj. and past participle.

French, like the other Romance languages, has already in many Latin verbs exchanged the strong inflexion for the weak one, but our dialect has gone much further; out of thirty eight Modern French verbs of the strong system, only the two auxiliaries *aveur* and *esse*, in their perf. *j'ōus*, *ju fōus* and imperf. subj. *j'ōuhe*, *fōuhe*, have retained the strong inflexion; all the others have taken to the weak one, their terminations being *-a* and *-ahe* in these two tenses as in all three of the weak conjugations.

Thus the four verbs of the *first strong class* have the following forms :

1. *{ fer* "faire" makes: *ju f' sá* "fis," (*nos f' sî*) "fîmes," *ju f' sáhe* "fisse," *f' sahî* "fissions;" *veie* "voir:" *ju veyá* "vis," *veyî* "vîmes" *veyâhe* "visse," *veyahî* "vissions;" *t'ni* "tenir:" *ju t'ná* "tins," *t'ni* "tînmes" *t'nâhe* "tinsse," *t'nahî* "tinssions;" *v'ni* "venir:" *ju v'ná* "vins," *v'ni* "vinmes" *v'nâhe* "vinse," *v'nahî* "vinssions."

2. *{ dire* "dire:" *ju d'há* "dis," *nos d'hî* "dîmes" *ju d'hâhe* "disse," *d'hâhî* "dissions;" *metté* "mettre:" *mettâ* "mis," *mettî* "mîmes" *ju mettâhe* "misse," *mettahî* "missions;" *prinde* "prendre:" *prindâ* "pris," *prindi* "prîmes" *ju prindâhe* "prisse," *prindahî* "prissions," etc.

beure "boire :" *ju bēvá* "bus," *nos bēví*, "būmes" -*ju bēváhe* "busse," *bēvahí* "bussions;" *creure* "croire :" *ju creyá* "crus," *nos creyí* "crūmes" -*ju creyáhe* "crusse," *creyahí* "crussions;" *d'veur* "devoir :" *ju d'vá* "dus," *nos d'ví* "dūmes" -*ju d'váhe* "dusse," *d'vahí* "dussions;" *saveur* "savoir :" *ju savá* "sus," (*saví*) "sūmes" -*ju saváhe* "susse," *savahí* "sussions;" *v'leur* "vouloir :" *ju v'lá* "voulus," *v'lí* "voulâmes" -*ju v'láhe* "voulusse," *v'lahí* "voulussions;" *p'leur* "pouvoir :" *ju p'lá* "pus," *p'lí* "pūmes" -*ju p'láhe* "pusse," *p'lahí* "puussions;" *crèhe* (pron. *créx*) "croître :" *ju crèhá* "crus," *crehí* "crūmes" -*ju creháhe* "crūsse," etc.; *mori* "mourir :" *ju morá* "mourus," *mori* "mourâmes" -*ju moráhe* "mourusse," etc.; *viki* "vivre :" *ju viká* "vécus," *viki* "vécûmes" -*ju vikáhe* "vécusse," etc.

The past participle has not been as much affected as the "verbum finitum;" according to these perfect and imperfect forms, all these verbs ought to have as termination of the past participle -é (or -i) as in the weak *A*-conjugation, but nearly all end in -ou, corresponding to French -u; as, *veyóu* "vu," *mettou* "mis," *bévou* "bu," *creyóu* "cru," *d'vou* "du," *v'lou* "voulu," *crehóu* "crû," *strindou* "étreint," etc., and even some strong forms have been retained as: *fait* "fait," *dit* "dit," *pris* "pris," *serit* "écrit," *moirt* "mort."

The infinitive of the present is the form which has kept most to the strong inflexion, as it did in French and in the other Romance languages, Spanish and Portuguese excepted. To the strong infinitives *fer*, *veie*, *dire*, *mette*, *prinde*, *beure*, *creure*, *crèhe*, named in the list above may be added certain others; as, *esse* "être," *batte* "battre," *attinde* "attendre," *étinde* "entendre," *dustinde* "détendre," *finde* "fendre," *d'finde* "défendre," *pinde* "pendre," *rinde* "rendre," *piède* "perdre," *r'boide* "retordre," *ruclore* "clore," *rire* "rire," *assire* "asseoir," *dustrure* "détruire," *taire* and *plaire*, etc.

The few strong forms of the present indic. retained in Modern French have been lost altogether in Wallonian:

"nous sommes" is replaced by *nos estáns*,
 "vous êtes" by *vos estóz*,
 "vous faites" becomes *vos f'sóz*,
 "vous dites" becomes *vos d'hóz*.

The main object of this paper was to show that analogy has had even a greater influence in the conjugation of the Wallonian dialect than in that of Modern French. The reason why

the influence thus exerted has been less in the forms of the present tenses is probably to be found in the more frequent recurrence of these forms; for the use of our dialect, or "patois," is almost wholly restricted to conversation, and in every day intercourse we certainly make greater use of the present than of the narrative tenses. Forms employed at every moment are of course well fixed in the mind, nobody will hesitate as to them; but with forms of infrequent use it is just the reverse. These are liable to the influence of other forms and their variety will be reduced as much as possible in order to relieve the memory.

XVII.—*On the Use of English in Teaching Foreign Languages.*

BY HANS C. G. VON JAGEMANN, PH. D.,

PROFESSOR OF THE GERMANIC LANGUAGES AND PHILOLOGY IN
INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON, IND.

NOTHING is more suggestive of the present confusion of ideas concerning the means and ends of language study than a comparison of two articles in a recent number of *Education*.¹ Here we have a distinguished teacher of modern languages claiming, substantially, that French and German may, upon occasion, take the place of Latin and Greek in the college curriculum, provided they are taught by the same methods and with all the thoroughness and accuracy characteristic of the teaching of the classic tongues by the best teachers. On the other hand, we have an experienced instructor in Latin and Greek, advocating that the instruction in the classics can be improved by the introduction of certain methods, which, although the writer seems reluctant to admit it, are more commonly employed by teachers of modern languages than by those of the classic tongues. The impartial observer would naturally be led to think that either class of teachers can learn from the other and that, consequently, the necessity for reform is not all on our side, as some of us have modestly believed.

It is not necessary here for me to go into a discussion of the ends of modern language study, as I stand, substantially, on the ground marked out by this Association in its declaration that "literary culture, philological scholarship and linguistic discipline are the primary aims of collegiate instruction in modern languages." It seems to me, however, that we are inclined to mistake the means for the end; to consider certain methods as essential to the attainment of this end, that are really unessential; to think that literary culture, philological scholarship and linguistic discipline are more apt to be gained by a certain mode

¹ Vol. VI, No. VI, "The Preparatory Schools and the Modern Language Equivalent for the Greek," by Charles E. Fay, A. M., Tufts College, and "Methods of Classical Instruction" by A. C. Richardson, A. M.

of acquiring the new language than from its actual possession. Here is where the fault lies. The man who knows three languages thoroughly, *is* an educated man to the extent to which the study of three languages can make him, whatever method he may have pursued in their acquisition. Does the learning by heart of paradigms of nouns, adjectives and verbs make educated men? Is it not more apt to make pedants? On the other hand, who will deny that an accurate knowledge of several languages, that will enable a man to discriminate between the style of different authors and the language of different periods, is an evidence of high culture? I do not wish to disparage the value of learning paradigms, inasmuch as it leads to a more accurate knowledge of the language itself; nor do I wish to cast any slur upon the early introduction of historical grammar, inasmuch as even elementary historical grammar, if discreetly taught, may be made to answer very practical purposes; but I feel sure that if we feed our students upon phonetic laws and historical accidence and syntax without giving them a sufficient knowledge of the language itself, we shall find that as many students will turn their backs upon us as have turned their backs upon the Greek and for the same good reasons. I have heard from a good source that one of the foremost Romance philologists of Germany was often in doubt, when obliged to speak French, whether the plural of *cheval* was *chevals* or *chevaux*. If I should name the distinguished man you would probably agree with me that, although a German, he was better fitted for a professorship of Romance philology than any native Frenchman who had never had any doubts as to the correct plural of *cheval*; yet I doubt whether with such a theoretical knowledge of a language any one could nowadays attain to such a distinguished position, and certainly for any other purpose for which a knowledge of French is at all desirable, it ought to be a more practical kind.

Let us aim then at, I will not say, a *practical*, but a *thorough, symmetric* knowledge of the language, and let us use such methods as will lead to such a knowledge by the surest and shortest road. A really thorough understanding of several languages, ancient or modern for all that, must necessarily carry with it literary culture, philological scholarship, and linguistic discipline in whatever way and by whatever means such a knowledge be acquired. I need not add that, of course, it must be acquired by work and not in the thoughtless way in which a

child learns the language of his nurse; for nobody ever gained such a knowledge of several languages as I above defined, except by hard work. Now everybody knows that the easiest way of learning German is to go to Germany, mingle with the people, read newspapers, go to the theater, and last but not least, work hard under an experienced teacher who has a thorough knowledge of English and can understand your difficulties and answer your questions. I try in my class-room and otherwise in the intercourse with my students to reproduce these conditions as far as that is possible. I know that from the first time I heard in actual life the expression "*is that you?*" I have never forgotten it, and its syntax as compared with the German "*sind Sie es*" has been ever present in my mind, much more so than if I had first seen the phrase in a book and had been compelled to look up a reference in an elaborate grammar. So the first time my students hear me ask the question "*wie heissen Sie?*" they realize the passive force of the verb *heissen* and are sure to remember it from its peculiar application, at least much more so than from a premature grammatical explanation given at the first opportunity, which they are sure to forget before they meet the word again in their reading. And who cannot from his own experience multiply these instances by the hundred! I cannot here go into the psychology of the "Natural Method." Suffice it to say that I do not think the subject has received the serious attention it deserves. The cry for this method has been much louder in this country than in Germany, and yet our American Natural Methodists have failed to produce anything nearly as philosophical as Felix Francke's little pamphlet, entitled "*Die praktische Spracherlernung auf Grund der Psychologie und der Physiologie der Sprache.*"² I will confine myself to a consideration of one feature of the "Natural Method," namely, the use of the language to be taught as a medium of intercourse between teacher and pupil, a feature which may be adopted to a certain extent even by those teachers who, with myself, reject the fundamental principle of the "Natural Method," i. e. that a grown up, educated person can and should learn a foreign language as a child learns his mother-tongue. I will try to show how, without sacrificing thoroughness, or without turning serious class-work into rambling "conversation lessons," we can use the language to be taught as our medium of com-

munication; I will try to point out the advantages of such a method, and will endeavor to remove its most apparent objections. For the sake of brevity I will only speak of German, though my remarks with the necessary modifications apply to other languages as well.

First then, how should it be done? Teach the student by any method you may choose to employ, the use of about fifty nouns, as many adjectives, the numerals, a few particles and a few forms of the auxiliaries. A week will amply suffice for this. The student will now be able to understand a simple grammatical principle if stated in German:

Die deutsche Sprache hat zwei Declinationen. Die erste Declination hat drei Klassen. Die erste Klasse hat in der Mehrzahl keine Endung, etc.

These are sentences which the German student of a week or two will understand as readily as though they were written or spoken in English. The statement and explanation, in German, of grammatical principles is much easier than is commonly supposed. It requires at first a little effort on the part of the teacher, to couch his explanations in such plain language as his students can understand. But this art may soon be acquired. A calculation shows that the elements of German can be taught according to either Whitney's or Brandt's grammars with the use of about eighty-five grammatical terms, mostly of course of Latin extraction. If the German language is to be used as a means of communication between teacher and pupil, sixty-four of these terms, or about seventy-five per cent. may be used in a so slightly modified form, that the student will easily understand them the first time they are used, and this without unduly resorting to Latinisms, using merely the same terminology that is used in Germany in all schools of a higher grade. In the case of twenty-three words, or twenty-seven per cent., is the corresponding German word of German origin preferable; in only a few cases, like "Ablaut" and "Umlaut" *must* a purely German word be employed. Some teachers will find it more advantageous to use as much as practicable a purely German terminology, and there is no doubt a certain gain in teaching such terms as "Hauptwort" and "Bindewort;" but even in that case, the student will have to learn only forty-eight words which he does not know in slightly modified form from English

or Latin grammar, and most of them, like those cited above, are of a very transparent signification. Aside from these technical terms, only the most common words which every student ought to know, will be needed to make up an elementary German grammar in German. As the time arrives for the student to grapple with the more intricate laws of language he will be able to understand the more difficult phraseology needed to express them. And we may add, if a teacher succeeds in couching a new grammatical principle in such language as the class with close attention can understand, it will make a greater impression upon them than a statement in English to which they listen only with one ear.

So much for the systematic teaching of the grammar. Translation into German in the early stages of the study should be abandoned.³ The method long used in Larousse's grammars and lexicologies for the public schools of France, which has lately passed as entirely new and original into some American text-books, is much preferable, and besides, the place of translation into German is largely taken by the answers to grammatical or lexicological questions which the pupil must give in German. Nor should translation in class from the German into English be encouraged. Interpretation in German may be largely substituted for translation. What is the use of translating in class, unless it be that the teacher may convince himself that the class has understood the true meaning of the text? Now if he can convince himself of this by way of asking questions in German on the text, would this not be preferable? How do teachers teach German in German schools, or English in English schools? If the class read such matter, as at their stage of advancement they should read — and I think, we are inclined to give our students too difficult things to read — the greater part of the text should be readily understood by the student. There will be difficult passages, and there should be, but in nine cases out of ten, the difficulty of a passage hinges upon the meaning or syntactical relation of one or two words, and with a sufficient German grammatical vocabulary at his disposal, the teacher can generally explain such meaning or

³ This view is gaining ground in Germany. Comp. H. Breymann und H. Moeller, *Zur Reform des neusprachlichen Unterrichts*. Munich, 1884. The authors are, on principle, opposed to translations into the new language, although for practical reasons, probably because they do not expect their views at once to be accepted by a large number of teachers, the usual number of exercises have been added to the *Uebungsbuch*.

relation without leaving the territory of the German language. If this be done as a rule, an occasional resorting to translation, if accuracy require it, will do no harm.

This is, in outline, the method I should recommend. Let us now turn to a consideration of the advantages it offers. In the majority of the institutions with which I am acquainted, by far the greatest part of the time allotted to German, is given to translation. After the translation is done, grammatical and lexicological questions are asked, and discussed. The consequence is that aside from the reading of the text in German—and even that is not always done—the student hears and speaks nothing but English; in other words, for about ten minutes out of possible fifty, he learns German, the remaining forty minutes he learns facts about German. On the other hand, if the instruction be carried on in German, the student will learn German for fifty minutes. In addition to the study of the grammatical subject under discussion or of the text before him, he has all the grammatical, lexicological and literary comments in German. We all know the value of a vast amount of easy reading for the acquisition of a language. It seems a low estimate if we consider the amount of German the student will hear in each recitation over and above the text itself equal to ten ordinary pages of an easy text; this would be equal to fifty pages a week, or seven hundred and fifty pages for the single fall-term of fifteen weeks, or two thousand pages for the year of forty weeks. It seems evident that this must considerably increase and strengthen the student's knowledge of the language. What is the philosophy of the rapid progress we make in a foreign language, as soon as we arrive in the country where it is spoken? Is it not simply that we continually hear the same forms, the same words, the same combinations of words? If German is spoken in the class-room, every sentence—whether spoken or read—will be a drill in the noun and adjective-declensions, in the conjugation, in the government of prepositions and in the elementary rules for arrangement. I suppose, of course, that the teacher is thorough, and that no faulty answer is ever allowed to pass.

Again by this method the student obtains a better hold on the vocabulary of the language. The difficulty about reading German at sight is not that the vocabulary is so large, but that the student is commonly brought face to face at once with too many

of the rarer words and in his bewilderment he has neither time nor opportunity for becoming thoroughly acquainted with the most common words. Who has not often remarked, especially in examinations, an astonishing ignorance on the part of students, of the most fundamental and necessary terms of the language! And any uncertainty as to the meaning of these common words which the student ought to know, and might know, will materially lessen his capacity for correctly guessing the meaning of a rarer word occurring in the same passage. An examination of ten pages of Goethe's prose chosen at random shows that the articles, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, auxiliaries and the most common adverbs constitute no less than fifty-eight per cent. of his vocabulary. If the student has these at his fingers' ends, together with a reasonable number of nouns, adjectives and verbs, he will have an excellent hold on the vocabulary of the language, and certainly a method like the one described, will keep these most fundamental terms sounding in the student's ears until he is as familiar with them as with their English equivalents.

Thus the student acquires his knowledge of elementary grammar and his vocabulary largely without special effort except that of paying attention in class; consequently so much time and energy becomes available for the study of those things for which otherwise there would be no time, particularly philology and literary history. I can substantiate this proposition by a particular fact in my own experience. Last year in a limited number of recitations with one of my classes, I was only just able to translate *Iphigenie auf Tauris*. The work was very unsatisfactory to me. This year under like conditions, by adopting the method just explained, I succeeded in making the course in *Iphigenie* nearly as complete in every respect, as I could have done if I had had all the time I wanted, and this not at the sacrifice of thoroughness, for in the final examination I required the students to translate some of the most difficult passages, and the examination was more satisfactory than last year.

I think one of the most fatal mistakes which teachers of modern languages in colleges are liable to make, is to hurry their classes too much. The time allotted to their work is as a rule so short and their aims are so high, that they very often give their students too difficult work. I would rather the student should never see a German Classic than to have him slur over the

elements of German and then spell out or guess at Goethe's or Lessing's thoughts, or take a tumble from the noble flights of Schiller's language down into the regions of the adjective-declension. As Prof. Newton of Oberlin expresses it, it is not knowing German to be able to work one's way through a foot-note and just miss the point from not knowing the force of a modal auxiliary. The use of German in the class-room will be found a most wholesome corrective of this evil. The teacher, being obliged to make himself understood by his students, will not present to them material for which they are not prepared. Again, in this way, and only in this way does the student become acquainted with the spoken language. This is a matter of no mean importance and is well worth a more careful consideration than I have time to give it here; I must confine myself to calling your attention to the most important points. The literary language is to a certain extent a dead language; the spoken language on the other hand exhibits life, action, linguistic tendencies. We believe in teaching in college the great principles of language building and these principles are better illustrated by the spoken language than by the literary speech. The every-day speech of the people is also more idiomatic than the literary language and it is the idiomatic portion of a language that gives it soul and life. No language is properly learned until its idioms are mastered. Who will deny that the student will hear a more idiomatic use of the language from the mouth of his teacher than he will ever learn from the stereotyped sentences of a First and Second German Course?

Moreover a knowledge of the every-day speech of a people is necessary for the intelligent appreciation of its literature. The character of literary productions, of authors, of schools of poetry, of entire periods of literature is often defined by their relation to the every-day speech of the people. How then can we make students appreciate the character of the works they are reading unless we give them the standard of the every-day speech to measure by? Can any one appreciate the simple grandeur of the language of the English Bible or the loftiness of that of Milton, who does not know how English speaking people commonly talk? It is never one particular work, however perfect it may be that makes the character of a language or a literature; on the contrary, there is nothing more characteristic of a language than the diversity of uses to which it can be put. The every-day

speech of a people seems to be the best starting point for the study of the various languages within a language, and the most natural standard of comparison.

It is with reluctance that I speak of the practical advantages arising from a knowledge of the spoken language. Our Greek friends will charge us at once with unwise and unnecessary concessions to the grasping money-making spirit of the age.

Certainly to be able to ask in a foreign language for something to eat or when a train is to depart is no great intellectual attainment, and is no evidence of a knowledge of the language; many uneducated persons can do the same thing; but on the other hand, not to be able to conduct such a simple conversation, is evidence of a very one-sided knowledge of the language in question. Prof. Schmitz in his Encyclopedia of Modern Languages (a book still valuable, though superseded in many points by works of more recent date) puts it about this way: A waiter's vocabulary of a foreign language is of course limited to the bill of fare, and words like wash-basin, baggage, and *Trinkgeld*; but the fact that the waiter knows these words is a very poor reason why the scholar should not know them. To know them, is no honor, not to know them, is a disgrace.

But the practical advantage arising from our method which I value highest, is the interest it awakens in the student. I have heard it said on good authority, and as far as my experience goes, I can endorse the statement, that in the German universities the law-students are the laziest, because they have hardly any opportunity for the practical application of what they learn in the lecture-room, and the students of medicine and of the natural sciences are the most industrious, because they never learn anything in the class-room, of which they do not at once make use in the laboratory, the dissecting-room or the clinique. I can certainly testify from my experience, that since I have conducted my classes entirely or almost entirely in the languages to be taught, and have thus given my students an opportunity for immediate practical application of the knowledge just acquired, the best students have worked with more zeal, and even the indifferent ones have risen from their lethargy, and when I made this change in my method, I did it with the firm determination to resort to the old method again as soon as I should find that I could not do as thorough work as before. Now I expect that certain imaginary objections to this method will be thought

to counterbalance its advantages. In the first place, I am prepared to hear it said, that this method does not admit of such thorough work as the method at present most in vogue. If that be the case, it is the fault of the teacher. Such a charge can be based only on two grounds, viz.: either the students do not understand all the teacher says, and lose a part of his explanations, or the teacher avoids going to the bottom of things for fear of not being understood. No good teacher will lay himself open to these charges, if he follow the rule to use the German language systematically and as much as possible, but not to hesitate to resort to English, when an explanation is considered necessary, which the students could not possibly understand, if given in German. Such cases will not occur very frequently, if the teacher will hold back his philology a little, until his pupils can appreciate it.

Again it will be objected that after all, the greatest disciplinary advantages arising from language-study are to be obtained from the exercise of translating from one language into another. But pray, do we not all hold that great discipline is derived from a thorough study of the English language, even if it cannot be comparative? Must American boys and girls translate the English classics into some foreign tongue, and compare forms and syntactical constructions in order to be benefitted by the study of their mother-tongue? Certainly not, if the study of English is otherwise what it should be and might be. Nor is it necessary to translate Iphigenie into English in order to obtain the greatest possible amount of mental discipline, which Goethe's wonderful work can yield! The mental process of translation consists of two parts: first, we must grasp the thought of the author; second, we must express this thought in the language into which we are translating. Now in making a translation from German into English, only the first part of this mental process has any effect upon the student's knowledge of German; consequently for the study of German we may be content if the student grasp the author's ideas, and this he can do without translating. The second part of the mental process of translation, viz. (in Prof. Newton's words) the recasting of the original thought into the moulds of English speech, is really only a drill in the use of the English language; and thus the answer to the question whether translation is necessary or not, depends on whether we believe that German is to be taught for

its own sake, or in order to increase the student's command of his native language. Now I certainly believe that it is worth while for the American student to study the German language and literature for their own sake; and if they are studied thoroughly, this cannot help exercising a most wholesome influence on the student's mental habits; and after all, is it not of as much importance to teach a student to think as to express thought in words?

And that the method under consideration teaches the student how to think is one of the greatest advantages I claim for it. For what is more likely to exercise all of the student's mental faculties than to be obliged to follow logically a logical definition or explanation given in a foreign language?

I think the interests of a collegiate education will be best served if the teacher of physics confine himself to teaching physics and the teacher of German to teaching German. If the students do not get training enough in the use of the English language, let them learn fewer definitions in Rhetoric and fewer dates and names in literature, or otherwise increase the time devoted to the study of English. Let each subject be taught for its own sake, and by a wise adjustment of the different studies within the curriculum effect their harmonious working together for one end, a liberal education.

XVIII.—*The Realgymnasium Question.*

By A. MARSHALL ELLIOTT, A. M.,

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ROMANCE LANGUAGES IN THE JOHNS
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, BALTIMORE, MD.

THE present struggle for university reform in Germany to give to the Realgymnasia the same rights and privileges as are held by the Gymnasium proper, bears so much resemblance to the reform which is taking place in this country and which this Association has at heart to promote, as a part at least of its mission, that I have thought a glance at the question would not be entirely without interest at this stage of our development. The leading features of the discussion in Germany and in the United States are as nearly identical as the differences of the school and university systems in the two countries could admit. The primal cause at the bottom of the controversy in both places is the same, that is, monopoly; the principles fought for have been the same, namely, equality of rights: *Lehrfreiheit*, *Lernfreiheit* and *Studienfreiheit*; the pivotal point about which the whole movement has taken place and is taking place is the self-same in both, that is, the cutting out of the existing system some disciplina in order to give room, in accordance with the demands of modern culture, for another or for other disciplinae which are held to bear a more direct relation to our present life.

From the beginning of this discussion, the same subject has been selected and agreed upon by common consent of educators as that special one in whose withdrawal from the present scheme, the system would be the least injured, to state the proposition negatively, or by the absence of which and by the substitution of other teaching material in its place, the system would be improved according to the opinion held by the majority of the reformers. Not only in America, but also in European countries generally: Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Austria and Hungary, it is the Greek which is believed to be the least essential to our general modern culture and hence the whole force of the struggle has centered in the so-called Greek-question, where, very often, the main issue, the necessity of reducing

the number of subjects taught, is lost sight of altogether and the fight is carried on as though there could be no virtue in Greek in any circumstances. The practical life in our country and the rapid growth of applied science have naturally had much to do with the extreme phase of opinion that one meets here sometimes and which would lead its advocates to strike this important branch of learning, Greek, from the college curriculum altogether and make us depend, for classical culture, upon the Latin alone. You need only call to mind the School of Extremists that has sprung up with us, especially since Charles Francis Adams' famous address. But we are not alone here in America in this respect. I find in a monograph by Dr. Fr. W. Fricke, 'Die Ueberbürdung der Schuljugend,' Berlin, 1882—as radical views expressed as can be cited from the most uncompromising publications that have ever appeared on this side of the Atlantic. He would banish both Latin and Greek from every institution of general education and this solely on the ground of an overcrowding of those studies necessary to make up a passable education to-day. The more general view, however, and the one which is destined to prevail in the end is exactly the same as that held by the majority of German educators, namely, that the circumstances and calling of life should have their influence in the training given and that the pupil should have the privilege of choice of studies accordingly, so that the student who is looking forward to the profession of general teaching, for example, would pursue a scheme of work naturally different from that of the man who is preparing for a business career; or, the worker in Natural Science should have special chances for the cultivation of his powers of observation, for which the material in other departments offers a less favorable opportunity. These views would seem most natural and yet we know how bitterly opposed they are by certain educators whose opinions carry great weight in the education of our youth. They are willing to agree that every important advance in civilization demands a corresponding advance in the educational scheme of a people, but it is evident that this can take place only within the bounds already established or by extending the limits fixed at any given period so as to take in new domains of knowledge, and it is to this widening of the out-look, to this broadening of the field so as to include territory not yet touched that objection is made and the extreme conservatives refuse to admit practically (though it is constantly

done tacitly) that the culture of the present is a much richer, more manifold, more complicated product; that more intensity of purpose is required to control its material, to seize, appropriate and develop its tendencies than was necessary in the smaller circle of a more restricted social and political organization. The higher intellectual life of Germany, at the time of the Reformation, was embodied in the spiritual union that bound together Luther and Melanchton, that is the union of Evangelical Christianity with Humanism, but as we shall see in a moment the end of the XVII Century, the special cultivation of Natural Science, already produced the germs of Realism and in the struggle between these two systems in the following century it soon became evident that the Gymnasium, the sole representative of Humanistic Culture, did not satisfy the new and varied demands of the times. Hence the rapid development of the Realschools and the final initiation between them and the Gymnasium of that jealous strife which has had divers periods of ebb and flow, but which, since 1878, is more bitter than at any other period perhaps of its history. But however varying the Realschool question may have been in its treatment, however many elements foreign to the jist and kernel of the problem, may have been dragged into the discussion, three points remained as a constant factor in it; namely,

1. Is the Realschool necessary alongside of the Gymnasium?
2. Has the Realschool equal worth with the Gymnasium?
3. Ought the same rights to belong to the Realschool as to the Gymnasium?

But before we discuss the special points at issue in the Realschool question and in order better to understand the problem as it presents itself to-day in Germany, we must look back for a moment at the history of the growth of the Realschool from its beginning to the present time.

It is now a century and three quarters (1709) since the Preacher Semmler established a school in Halle and gave to it the name *Realschule*, the first time this appellation was used in this sense. We must go back still a hundred years however, if we would trace the earliest tendencies toward the development of the Realsystem. They first showed themselves in the rapid growth of the Natural Sciences at the beginning of the seventeenth century and then finally their present name was assumed,

as we have just seen at the commencement of the eighteenth century. But it was still only in name, not as an expression of the actual existing tendencies of these institutions, that they took the label which they still bear. We have to come down again another century—the beginning of the nineteenth—before we find established in Berlin the first Realschool which bore the name and embodied the spirit, that is, combined both name and tendency of the former attempts in this direction. This school was founded in 1822 and the following growth of like establishments up to 1849 constitutes an important period of segregation, wherein the elements of modern culture were gradually shaping themselves into more definite forms and drawing together into more homogeneous groups. In the same year that Semmler named his novel school, the Royal Society of Sciences expressed itself in terms of encouragement for the new departure; to wit, it held Semmler's plan as "feasible, praiseworthy and advisable" "eine thunliche, lóbliche und rathsame sache," and furthermore expressed the opinion that "it would be a good thing to have boys instructed in a certain mechanical school in order that they might have their intelligence enlightened and be able to tell the quality and worth of the materials and objects necessary to life." It will be seen, therefore, that in the beginning the whole aim of this instruction was a practical one and there is no thought whatever of such a development of the institutions that impart it as to count them competitors with the old established Gymnasium. But if we come down about four generations, that is one hundred and fifty years, we find that circumstances have changed so much, so many improvements have been introduced into the Realsystem, the original purpose has been so modified, the number of studies has been so increased and the kinds of study so supplemented, that we have in the Educational Law and Examination Ordinance of 1859 the organization of a definite and well-established system for the Realschool in every way co-ordinated with that of the Gymnasium proper. "For the arrangement," we read in said Ordinance, "of the Realschool, the immediate necessities of a practical life cannot be the norm, but the end must be kept in view to raise the youth entrusted to it to that state of intellectual development which constitutes the necessary preparation for a free and independent comprehension of the later calling in life. It is not an Institute of Technology, that is, professional school, but it

has, just as the Gymnasium, to do with general educational means and fundamental principles of general knowledge (sie sind keine Fachschulen, sondern haben es, wie das Gymnasium, mit allgemeinen Bildungsmitteln und grundlegenden Kenntnissen zu thun), and hence between Gymnasium and Realschule there exists no material opposition but only a reciprocal, supplementary relation, (zwischen Gymnasium und Realschule findet sich daher kein prinzipieller Gegensatz, sondern ein Verhältniss gegenseitiger Ergänzung). The year 1859 thus becomes a mile-stone, so to speak, on the highway of history of the question now before German educators. It was then that the state called the Realschool into a legitimate and recognized existence, with its present definite organization, alongside of its sister institution, the Gymnasium. The founders of this school had originally no idea of competition with the Gymnasium as above noted. Their primary object was simply to furnish an institution where parents might have their sons study for six years (in Saxony to this day the Realschools have only six years) before entering upon military duty or, at least, till they should acquire the necessary knowledge for one year volunteer service, and no longer than forty years ago (1843) the Minister of Public Instruction for Prussia refused to regard these new schools as general educational establishments such as they were held to be a decade and a half later (1859), in the Ordinance already quoted from, and he named them professional schools, whose maintenance and development depended upon the practical and material interests that had first called them into existence. In the same report he would accord to the Gymnasium, as an exclusive privilege, the capacity to develop harmoniously the intellectual powers and lay the foundation for any calling whatever of life. In this decade and a half, then, (1843-1859) we find the whole aspect of the relation of the two institutions changed; this was the birth-period of co-ordinated interests which were recognized as we saw in 1859 and which are still recognized and maintained in the latest ministerial edict, March 31, (1882), as an integral part of the Prussian system of general education. Since this last educational Statute was enacted the whole Realschool question has entered upon a new phase in that the study of Latin has been increased in amount and thoroughness and the former opposition to the Realschools on account

of lack of classical training has materially diminished, while new friends have been won to the cause, the number of students has rapidly increased, and the results of examinations for their graduates have been more favorable than for those of the Gymnasium, as will be shown further on.

But if we would hold in our minds the first epochs through which this problem has passed, we must remember another date about thirty years earlier than this (1832) when the provisional regulation was published, limiting the Realschool course of study to six years, and hence, two years later (1834), when the present order of things was established for the Gymnasium, there could still be no question whatever as to the relative merits of the two schools. Such a thing as competition, then, was not thought of fifty years ago. It is only in this second period of development, (measuring periods according to governmental Statutes) from 1832-59—that the vigor of the new comer began to manifest itself and, through the extension of her domain of work, the chasm which had hitherto separated the two systems was narrowed, while the sympathies of the people for the younger but more energetic sister increased, the numbers of students grew rapidly larger, till finally the government was forced to send forth its enactment wherein the two educational institutions, now become rivals, were declared to be upon a similar footing so far as the general results of their training was concerned; in other words, they were no longer to hold the relation of superior to inferior but that of two perfectly co-ordinated, harmoniously organized systems with different bases. Both institutions, it was thought, would now remain true to the historical principle of a higher culture, and thus embrace the whole chain of elements which belong to both the humanistic and materialistic side of general education, differing only in the respective centres of their chief activity, that is, according to the School-law §107, the Curriculum of the Gymnasium is based upon the old Languages and Mathematics; that of the Realschool upon Mathematics, Natural Science and the Modern Languages. Both institutions now receive the same length of course (nine years); a like number of subjects is taught and a like number of hours of weekly exercises is held; both have equally well-trained teachers paid according to the same general system,—by far the most of them, in Realschools are Gymnasium graduates; both have the

same equipment and facilities for work ; they both take their pupils at the same age and require the same preparation in order to be accepted in their classes ; they both hold to the same earnest work ; both subject their pupils to the test of equally difficult examinations and the graduates of both have 75.57 per cent of all instruction based upon precisely the same subjects, leaving 24.43 per cent. resting upon unlike basis. The instruction not common to both is Greek and a plus in Latin for the Gymnasium ; English and a plus in French, Mathematics and Natural Science for the Realgymnasium. But no opponent of reform has ever been able to assert that the curriculum of the Realschools demands less than that of the Gymnasium. In these circumstances, nothing would seem more natural than that the two establishments should have equal rights and privileges with reference to the admission of their graduates into the various faculties of the university. This is not the case, however, and herein lies the whole trouble to-day, the cardinal point in the Realgymnasium problem. *Gleiche Berechtigung* are the watch word, to which the hearts of the reformers are tuned and they cling to their purpose of having the same rights as their opponents with a tenacity that signally marks the justice of their cause while the shibboleth of the old party, the advocates of any uncompromising conservatism, is exclusive privilege for the Gymnasium as training school for the university. And this point they insist upon with all the ardor characteristic of a series of years of unquestioned rights though they were the sole possessors of the key to the university for scarcely three decades and a half (1834-1870). The *noli-me-tangere* doctrine assumes a fresh importance in their minds for each step their vigorous rivals advance and for each new privilege wrung from them they would willingly have us believe the whole fabric of society is about to crumble away simply because the cry of the German idealism, of the gigantic strides of materialism will not frighten common sense out of the average nineteenth century mind. They have raised the flood-gates just enough to realize the danger and now, only too often by misrepresentation, or a stolid ignoring of facts, they hope to check the current for a while longer.

From the date of official recognition of their co-ordinated standing with the Gymnasium, the friends of the new departure have struggled for all those rights of which her elder sister has

held the monopoly, namely, that their graduates should also be admitted without question to any Faculty they may choose in the scheme of university studies. Before the memorable date 1859, no student of the Realschule had the privilege to matriculate in any department of the University. This state of things would seem inconsistent, to say the least, to a foreigner who knows nothing of the prejudices involved and who is unable to feel the full force of tradition in which the whole subject is wrapped for the native German. Looking on at a distance, it cannot fail to strike us, I think, that the presumption of not only an extension but of equal privileges on the part of the Realgymnasium is the natural and legitimate outcome of the parity of studies and this struggle for more extended rights has not been without success though complete equality of privileges with the Gymnasium in reference to university work does not yet exist.

Scarcely a decade (1870) had passed after the two institutions were officially proclaimed co-ordinate, when the Realschule Abiturienten were admitted into the university for the departments of Mathematics, Natural Science and Modern Languages and again another decade (1882) and all the Real-schools of first order have obtained the official appellation of *Realgymnasium*, without in this case, however, obtaining that extension of their domain which they have so earnestly coveted for the last quarter of a century, namely, that their students should be admitted to the departments of Law and Medicine in the university. Many, however, of the leading practical educators and professors of pedagogics are bold advocates of the extension of Realgymnasium preparation to all university departments save the theological and historical-philological and among these reformers, may be especially mentioned Prof. Friedrich Paulsen, who, in his 'Geschichte des gelehrtenden Unterrichts,' uses the following strong words on this subject: "Es müsste jemand, etwa durch Gymnasial Pädagogik, um den Gebrauch seines Verstandes gebracht sein, um zu behaupten, dass ein junger Mann, der in jeder Hinsicht den Anforderungen, welche die Abgangsprüfung einer Realschule I. Ordnung stellt, genügt hat, nicht imstande sei, mit Aussicht auf Erfolg jedes Universitätsstudium, etwa das theologische und historisch-philologische ausgenommen, zu unternehmen."

This title "Realgymnasium" is thought by many to be only a bait thrown out to satisfy in part the demands of the Re-

formers, and the increase made in Latin and diminution (1882) of hours in Natural Science is nothing but a Danaergeschenk, as it is suspected that the government has no intention of increasing their privileges.

The Realschools, then, that had their origin in the eighteenth century partly through the furthering of pietistic doctrines and partly through philanthropic efforts stimulated by J. J. Rousseau and Basedow, could not come for a long while into special notice alongside of the gymnasium because of the many fruitless experiments in which they had failed to establish a settled system of instruction or develop a definite organization. At the end of the first quarter of this century they received a more fixed organization through the efforts of August Spilleke, Director since 1822 of the Fredrich-Wilhelms-Gymnasium and of the Royal Realschule in Berlin. He it was who, for the first time in the history of these institutions, revised their plan of studies so that they should answer the requirements of practical life and at the same time not be alienated from that fundamental training necessary to a free and liberal culture. In a short time after this happy turn had been given to the disciplinary methods of the Realschools, the Bureau of Public Instruction saw itself forced to take hold of them in order to control or at least supervise their independent organization and then followed the above named ordinance (Dr. Lud. Wiese) of 1859 (October) in which both the plan of studies and the privileges of these schools were definitely fixed. As Dr. Wiese himself exclaims, "Die Realschule ist nicht mehr 'eine herumirrende Seele, die einen Leib sucht.'"—Here was established, too, that difference between the Realschools of I. and II. rank which finally led in 1882* to the former being honored with the name Realgymnasium, that is, the latter were incomplete Realschulen, a sort of Pro-Realschool in which the most advanced class was wanting. It lacked the Latin and had but six years while the Realschool of the first order settled down with the nine years course alongside of the Gymnasium proper. It is thus that these two institutions bear the relation to each other of being reciprocally

*According to the plan of studies for the Higher Schools of Prussia, as promulgated on 31st March of this year, seven varieties of these institutions are recognised; viz, three with a nine-year course, each: Gymnasium, Realgymnasium and Oberrealschule; three with a seven-year course, each: Progymnasium, Realprogymnasium and the Realschule, corresponding to the nine-year course minus the prima; one with a six-year course: the *höhere Bürgerschule*.

supplementary and yet notwithstanding the definite law that fixed this co-ordinated position, the graduates of the Realschule did not have the privilege of entering the university; in other words, so far as the university career was concerned the Real-school pupils remained exactly where they were before the ordinance. The consequence of this awkward condition of things was that numerous petitions were made to the Government on this subject and finally in 1880 (December) the decree went forth that said students should have the privilege of matriculation in the Philosophical Faculty of the University for the departments of Mathematics, Natural Science and Modern Languages with a limitation of right of appointment thereafter for such students as took this course, to Real-institutions only.* Here, then, was the fulfillment in little more than a decade of the prediction made by Minister von Bethman-Holweg, who, at the beginning of the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on the School Law of 1859, declared with a wise preision: "Die Realschulen werden an die Pforten der Universität klopfen und man wird ihnen Einlass gewähren."

From this fact, that the Realgymnasium graduates are admitted to certain departments only of the University, has sprung up a lack of respect for, or even opposition to these schools. This evil effect was seen a few years ago when the subject was laid before the Physicians of the Empire as to which training they would consider the better preparation for the study of medicine, that of the Gymnasium or that of the Realgymnasium. It was everywhere agreed that the latter offered much the greater advantages in this direction but, notwithstanding this, it was decided by a large majority for the Gymnasium training simply "weil die Realschule in der öffentlichen Meinung niedriger stehe als das Gymnasium, und durch die Zulassung der Realschul-Abiturienten zum Studium der Medizin die Gefahr herbeigeführt werde, dass der ärztliche Stand herabgesetzt und unter das Niveau der höher gebildeten Klassen gestellt werde." In this case, we see, then, that the objection to the Realschule is not on any inherent or material, but simply on external and social grounds. The physician who goes through the Realschule and who should, afterward, successfully pass

*Originally the Realgymnasium could give the right to attend only the Technischen Hochschulen, the Forst—and Bergakademie and to enter the Postoffice and Revenue departments.

the medical examination would be less esteemed by his colleagues than one who has studied Greek and just here lies the secret of the strong opposition of the medical fraternity to these institutions. It is clearly not a question of professional knowledge as indicated in Professor Brücke's Rectoratsrede, where the leading feature of the situation is characterized in the following significant words: "Es unterliegt kaum einem Zweifel, dass es einst Aerzte geben wird, welche den jetzigen an medizinischen Wissen weit überlegen sind und doch weder Griechisch noch Lateinisch verstehen.....Aber es handelt sich zunächst nicht darum, wie, für den Arzt die Stunden auf Griechisch und auf Lateinisch vertheilt werden, sondern darum, dass er denjenigen Bildungsgang durchgemacht habe, den der Staat für den im Range ersten erklärt, den er für seine Geistlichen, für seine Richter und Rechtsanwälte und für den höheren Lehrer- und Beamtenstand vorschreibt." It will be observed, therefore, that these limitations both within the university and after the university course is finished, operate very materially against the Realschool graduates but that they had once been admitted into the pale of the University was a great step forward and broke the backbone of the monopoly of the Gymnasium to which alone the privilege before this was accorded of preparing students for the University. With this breach in the monopoly-doctrine the friends of the Realschool pushed forward for more extensive privileges and for the last fifteen years the struggle has been a bitter one between the two parties, the one, advocates of Realschool interests claiming like rights with their opponents; the other, supporters of the Gymnasium system denying that the Real-graduates have that general training necessary to a broad and liberal culture. It is especially to the department of Medicine that the Realschool supporters have turned their attention, believing that their special line of instruction gives better preparation for the study of medicine than that obtained in the rival institutions. But after a struggle of twelve years the Law of 1882, by which new plans of study were prescribed for all the higher institutions in Prussia, brought no relief to the Realschool except the one above mentioned, to change the name to Realgymnasium.

Of the various objections adduced by the monopolists against granting equal privileges to Realschool and Gymnasium students, many are too frivolous to be mentioned and others are

of so general a nature as to be of like force against any system of training. We may cite the following two or three specimens:

i. That the Realstudents are unable to understand and explain the termini technici coming from the Greek.

ii. It would be encouraging the materialistic tendencies of modern education to receive them, and a consequent lack of idealism is directly fostered thereby. They quote the famous couplet from Hofmann von Fallersleben:

Brot ist das Einzige universelle
Unserer Universitäten
Dies reimt sich nicht, ist aber doch wahr,
Und wer's nicht glaubt dem wirds mit der zeit doch klar.

iii. Lack of unselfish devotion to Science is engendered in their students.

And it is not alone the unpractical savants who sound their jeremiads against the devise of the Realschools, non scholae sed vitae, but not unfrequently the representatives of the very people who are struggling to proclaim their right to a system of instruction better adapted to their wants. Thus, in one of the discussions before the Reichstag on the reform of the Gymnasium, a Deputy, whose conservatism and self-complacency equaled his lack of practical insight, exclaimed with oracular pomposity: "es müsse eine Einrichtung gefunden werden, bei der die Realschulen für alle Fachstudien geeignete Abiturienten liefern können," and one of his benighted colleagues, of boundless self-esteem, added with the apparent view to close all argument on the subject: "die Begünstigung der Realschule—d. h. die Realschule selbst ist mir nicht sympatisch (sic!)."

And just here it may be well to stop a moment to notice the action of the University of Berlin in reference to this subject. The strongest centre of opposition to the new order of things is found here and we are all acquainted, perhaps, with Prof. Hofmann's Rectorasrede that has become famous, and having been translated into English, has had extensive circulation in America as a sort of campaign document for classical studies. Hofmann spoke and wrote against Realschool graduates not knowing that three out of six of his own assistants were Real-scholars and when a list of all the Realgraduates studying Natural Science was sent him and he was challenged in the face of facts contrary to those he had stated to publicly acknowledge his mistake, he did not have the manly courage to do so. I

refer here to a letter to Prof. Hofmann from Dr. Steinbart, Director of the Realgymnasium at Duisburg, 9 April, 1881, and published in his monograph "Unsere Abiturienten" (Berlin, 1881), p. 8: "Von einem Manne, der so hoch in der Wissenschaft steht, wie Ew. Magnificenz, dürfen wir wohl vertrauensvoll erwarten, dass er nach gewonnener Kenntnis der Thatsachen nicht Anstand nehmen wird, sein Urtheil öffentlich zu corrigieren. Wir setzen andererseits auf das Bestimmtteste voraus, dass wenn Ew. Magnificenz bei Ihrem Urteil beharren sollten, Sie nicht zögern werden, mit Zahlen und Namen Ihre ungünstigen Erfahrungen zu belegen."

Prof. Hofmann's experience, as stated in this address, loses much in objective value through its general character and indefiniteness of expression, but of a wholly different worth are the official reports on the results of examinations for teachers in those branches that are open to the Realschool graduates, as given by Dr. Steinbart in his suggestive monograph, 'Unsere Abiturienten' 1878. One of these runs, "The preliminary training in the Realschools, First order, for teachers has shown itself of equal worth at least with that of the Gymnasium and even superior to it."

In "Unsere Abiturienten" (fortsetzung) 1881, p. 19, the following tabular view is given of the relative grades of Gymnasium and Realgymnasium candidates in the examination *pro facultate docendi* from April 1, 1887 to April 1, 1879:

	Number of Pupils.			Percentage.		
	1st Gr.	2d Gr.	3d Gr.	1st Gr.	2d Gr.	3d Gr.
Gymnasialabiturienten...	3	25	10	7.9	65.8	26.3
Realschulabiturienten...	4	13	3	20.0	65.0	15.0

These few figures give more substantial evidence of the relative results of the training in the two systems than all the subjective 'opinions' that could be heaped up by the united opponents of the reform. Notwithstanding these official reports, however, the enemies of the Realsystem have exerted themselves to throw suspicion on the Realschool training and one of the foremost among these is certainly Prof. Hofmann.

In the year 1869, the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Berlin, in a report to the Cultus Minister, charged as principal objection to the Realschools that a proper *centre* was wanting to their instruction. Hofmann repeated the same charge in 1880

in his Rectoratsrede. The centre of the Gymnasium instruction falls in the classics, and so too, it is also claimed, the Realschool instruction has its centre in the Modern Languages and Nat. Sciences. But when the Cultus Minister (Müller) made this demand (1869) of the Prussian universities that they report as to how far the Realschool graduates could be permitted to share the privileges of the University, the demand was too early because at the time no experiment had been tried and there were no Realschool graduates at the universities. They received permission to enter the departments of Mathematics, Natural Science and Modern Languages only on the 7th of December, 1870. Now, the equal worth of the two institutions, Gymnasium and Realgymnasium, or the inferiority of the one to the other can be shown in only two ways, either synthetically or analytically. Synthetically when we reason from the teachers, subjects taught and pupils to the results of the training, that is, the graduates themselves or, analytically, when we start with the quality of the graduates and draw our conclusions with reference to the school. It was only after 1870, then, that the analytical process was opened to them and yet Prof. Hofmann had the temerity to report in that same year: "Nach dem übereinstimmenden Urtheil *sachkundiger Lehrer* auf dem Gebiete der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaften würden die auf der Realschule Reifefundene in den späteren Semestern fast ausnahmslos von Gymnasialabiturienten überholt, wie sehr sie ihnen auch gerade in den genannten Fächern während der ersten Semester überlegen gewesen wären." As students, then, more advanced than their fellow Gymnasium graduates are these Realschulabiturienten when they enter and they continue so for several Semesters, after which, by a jump backward, Prof. Hofmann would set down against them their former training! This sounds to foreign ears like veriest prejudice, supposing, with all, that he had the experience behind him to justify such a conclusion. This, however, was impossible from the nature of the case, as there were no students before the ominous oracle was delivered.

At the beginning of 1880, following a proposition of Prof. Droysen, the whole Phil. Faculty of the Berlin University occupied itself with the Realschool question for the second time, in order to report to the Cultus Minister (8th of March, 1880) on the admission of Realschool graduates to the study of Mathematics, Natural Science and Modern Languages, that is, in accord-

ance with the results from experience since 1870. Whatever unbiased reader follows this document must readily understand, I think, the destroying criticism against it by Prof. Strack in the "Centralorgan für die Interessen des Realschulwesens" for November, 1881. After a very critical examination of this *Gutachten* in its smallest details and a careful presentation of the loose and even false statements contained in it based on lack of examination and the consequent deplorable lack of acquaintance with the subject, the writer shows by statistical tables, drawn from official records and bearing upon examinations of both classes of pupils, the superior results obtained for Realgymnasium graduates and concludes his brilliant refutation of the charges made in the Berlin document, with the following significant résumé:

"Die Einwendungen der Gegner aber treffen nirgends die Schule, sind niemals allgemein, sind nirgends mit Zahlen belegt; sie treffen höchstens Individuen, Charaktere, Naturanlagen u. s. w. und reden nur von "Schwierigkeiten", niemals von Hindernissen, und noch dazu einzig von Schwierigkeiten für die Professoren, nirgends von solchen für die Hörer."

In this Enquête, Prof. Droysen, the proposer of it, does not express any opinion, so that one would like to ask what experience led him to suggest such a thing. In all, thirty six professors signed the report, but most of them in a general way according to departments; only ten put their names to it. Thirteen only out of thirty six say anything about *experience*. Eleven out of thirty six had signed the report of 1869 but only two out of the original eleven put down their *experience* in accordance with the spirit of the report, that is in opposition to the Realschools. Of these two professors (Müllenhof, Peters) the latter emphasises the imperfect knowledge on the part of the Realgraduates not only of Latin but also of English and French, and were this accusation substantiated it would be the gravest point that has ever been urged against the Realschools, but it happens curiously enough that Prof. Peters is the only man who voted this opinion. Prof. Martens of the same Faculty knows nothing whatever about such lack and even the Prof. of English, who certainly ought to be capable of judging the matter, makes no such statement. In view of assertions so rash as these, we have the right to question, I think, the candor of the few men on the Berlin list who expressed themselves

so decidedly against the reform without giving accurate data; in fact, through this whole discussion it is the Reformers who stick close to details and by statistics that cannot be doubted unless one doubts all official reports of the Government, put clearly before us the actual condition of their case while, in great part, their opponents deal largely in mere assertions *άντος ἐφα*, in generalizations, and sometimes even in positive misrepresentations. The spirit with which this whole question is treated by some of its opponents, is nicely illustrated by Dr. Steinbart in the above mentioned monograph, where he cites the case of Prof. Hanstein, Professor of Botany at the University of Bonn. When the Cultus Minister Falk sent out in 1880 for information respecting the relative standing of the two categories of students, Gymnasial und Realgymnasial Abiturienten, Hanstein said to his assistant: Nun sollen wir uns schon wieder gutachtlich aussern; selbstverständlich sind die Gymnasial-Abiturienten die besseren: "Aber, Herr Professor, wandte der Assistent ein, der Herr X, welcher neulich *summa cum laude* in den Naturwissenschaften promovirt hat, ist Realschul-Abiturient" "Ja, das ist eine Ausnahme," "Und Herr Dr. B. der Privat Docent an unserer Universität, ist ja auch Realschul-Abiturient." "Auch eine Ausnahme," rief Hanstein ärgerlich. "Und vor wenigen Wochen," fuhr der Assistent muthig fort, "hat ein Realschul-Abiturient die Prüfung für das Lehramt in der Chemie und in den beschreibenden Naturwissenschaften mit Nr. 1. bestanden." "Ausnahmen, alles Ausnahmen" war das dritte Mal die Antwort des Professors. "Herr Professor, wir sind ja in Bonn überhaupt nur 7-8 Realschul-Abiturienten, die Naturwissenschaften studiren." "Wir?" fragte Hanstein sich plötzlich umdrehend, "dann sind *Sie* auch wohl Realschul-Abiturient?" "Gewiss, Herr Professor." "Nun dann sind Sie erst recht eine Ausnahme." Sprach's und verliess das Zimmer.

But a word here with reference to the future prospects of these new institutions. The present position of the Realschools in Prussia is somewhat perplexing. In his address before the Versammlung der Realschulfreunde on 9th of April of last year, 1884, Dr. Steinbart shows clearly how injurious it is to Realgymnasien that their trial period should be prolonged. Parents grow tired of having their sons refused the privilege, after having gone through a creditable course of study, to enter any branch that they may wish of a professional career that is freely

open to their friends of the gymnasium. He especially emphasises the disadvantage the Realschool advocates are under of having no representation whatever in the Ministry and, therefore, the whole treatment of the question that lies so near to them is left in the hands of men who, whatever their capabilities may be in other directions, have certainly no sympathy for the reform movement and consequently are imperfectly or not at all informed on it. The ruling power of the Government naturally works for itself and makes use of the schools in its own interest. All competition is thus cut off, nay, every attempt at reform is checked unless the State undertakes it, or, at least, permits it to be undertaken. The uniformity of the educational system thereby produced, acts as a support to the prejudices of the people and while it may be good for the development of the military, it does not conduce to the growth of brains.

A trial-period such as is now forced upon the Realgymnasien (before 1879 no such thing was thought of) is contrary to the tradition and to the true sense of reform and the author thinks if the Realschools are thus held back for many years there will be a number of them that will have been changed into regular Gymnasien and this will come about from the fact that parents whose sons are destined for the Ministry, for Law or for Medicine, prefer to send them, from the beginning, into those institutions whence they have a right to pass into the respective faculties of the university. So arbitrary, furthermore, is the action of the local governments in some cases with reference to these schools that it is difficult for us to understand the matter. When, for example, in Alsace by a simple stroke of the Governor's pen, four Realgymnasien were wiped out of existence, we should naturally think of a protest, of a bold outcry on the part of teachers and those especially interested, against this high-handed proceeding and such was the case, but, so far as I am aware, without any avail towards righting the outrage and, notwithstanding this uncomfortable state of things, the friends of the reform movement in these few injured districts do not despair, nay, they even take courage and firmly believe tandem *bona causa triumphat*, simply because of the virtue of their cause and the superior character of their students and their excellent contributions to Science. In Halle, for example, for 1883, out of the total number (10) of those who came forward for the Doctor's degree, nine were Realgymnasien scholars, and,

in the different university or Akademie-chairs throughout Prussia, they have to-day twenty-one Realgraduates, three of whom are ordentliche, seven ausserordentliche, Professors, and eleven Privatdozenten.

But a few words in conclusion, as to the Greek which in Germany as with us, is made the thorn in the side of the modern educator. All that can be claimed against the Real-schools in this respect is that the educating element alone of the Greek is wanting; Greek literature is wanting, but here only on the linguistic side, that is, in form not in contents, as these are learned through good translations; Greek art is not wanting since it is supplied through models and photographs. It is important to note in connection with the opposition to the Real-schools on the score of lack of training in Greek that the Saxon plan of studies of Melanchthon of 1528 banishes Greek from the school entirely and substituted the reading of the Latin Testament in its stead and Melanchthon himself pursued these studies "weil ein Hauptbestandtheil der Theologie auf den griechischen Texten beruht." On these grounds, Greek found later its introduction to the schools, but throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was confined to the upper classes and had, as its direct object, the interpretation of the New Testament. In 1735, a law was enacted in Prussia that the larger Latin schools should not pass any student for the university "der nicht mindestens zwei Evangelisten im Griechischen, als Matthäum und Johannem" fertig exponieren und ziemlich analysieren könne." The notion that Greek should constitute an important element in general education did not exist till toward the end of the last century and in Germany it was especially under the influence of Freiherr von Zedlitz, who became the head of the Prussian educational system in 1771, that this opinion gained ground. Certain well-known educators and teachers of that time did not entertain such a thought, as is evident from a *Gutachten* of 1803 of the Philosophical Faculty of Halle, wherein F. A. Wolff would make Greek obligatory only for the Theologians and Lehrer an Gelehrtenenschulen. Leaving out of account, then, the question of overcrowding of subjects, we see that the common notion, so wide-spread in Germany, that Greek has been from time almost immemorial an integral part of Gymnasium training is a pure fiction. The celebrated Ritterakademie had no Greek and in these were

found the elite of the nobility who, after their studies were ended, entered the highest positions the state could give, and at the beginning of the present century Greek was elective in very many of the Gymnasien; in fact, up to 1830 students were constantly excused from it and in Cassel, Greek was not obligatory till after the year 1840. And already in this year a state official of the Prussian government received the commission to work out a report on the great amount of time spent in the Gymnasien on the Old Languages. It is then only half a century that instruction in Greek has taken so important a place in the curriculum of the Gymnasium, and hence the cry for the maintenance of tradition can hardly be considered a legitimate one on historical grounds, as the special claims of this department have not been urged and admitted in the Gymnasium system for more than a generation and a half. But it is natural that the paramount importance of this study should be emphasized by those who have a strong interest at stake in keeping intact all its acquired rights and privileges and also by those who know these studies only or who are acquainted with the good effects of this discipline alone. It has been appropriately said that it would be indeed strange, if the highest mental culture could come from but *one* science, that we can learn from the parchment rolls of one department of literature more than from all the rest of the great domain of literature and science put together, as some extravagant admirers of Greek would have us believe. The desirability of the study cannot be doubted in certain circumstances but its relative position in the make-up of general culture is likely to remain a perplexing problem.

From this hasty survey of the conditions in which the Real-schools have developed, it is easy to draw the conclusion that there is in Germany to-day a powerful impulse toward a more rational organization of her educational material, and that the drift is decidedly in favor of the Realgymnasium studies, particularly for the last few years. Before the Reformation, Prussia had forty-eight Gymnasien; in the sixteenth century, seventy-eight; in the seventeenth century, thirty-one; in the eighteenth century, seventeen. Through special favor of the Government, the purely Gymnasial institutions reach this year (1885) the large number of 288 as opposed to the 180 of the Realsystem, but while the growth of the former has been going on for

several hundred years, the latter have sprung up mostly within a very brief period, thus showing them to be a characteristic and necessary product of our present civilization. In 1867-68, for example, the Realgymnasien increased in the astonishing ratio of 566 per cent and their scholars 730 per cent while the Gymnasien proper show only 67 per cent. From 1859-61, the höhere Schulen had thirty-six pupils to every thousand inhabitants and, in 1881-2, fifty four to the thousand, showing an increase for these twenty years of 38 per cent for the Realgymnasien, notwithstanding the fact that the municipalities themselves had to bear the burden of supporting the latter besides paying taxes into the coffres of the State for carrying on the former; for, the Government, be it remembered, heavily subsidizes its Gymnasien but leaves the new-comers, for the most part, to take care of themselves. Thus, in 1882, Prussia spent on her höhere Schulen 4,353,000 marks, of which eight ninths went to the Gymnasien; in 1883-4, she spent 3,853,538 marks, of which not half a million went to her Realinstitutions. Yet, notwithstanding this great preponderance of favor shown the Gymnasia, the sister schools go on increasing and in some cases rapidly, as is shown by Dr. Schmeding, who, *Aus dem Neunten Jahresbericht der Delegirten-Versammlung des Allgemeinen deutschen Realschulmänner-Vereins in Hannover* (for 1885), reports the establishment in Prussia alone for this one year of ten Realgymnasien and three other institutions (Realschulen, Oberrealschulen) that were in process of being turned into Realgymnasien. In the first list, is included the Falkrealgymnasium of Berlin, one of the most important and powerful institutions of this kind in the whole of Germany.

The following publications have been consulted for material bearing upon the Realgymnasium question:

Allinson, Dr. Francis G., *The Secondary Education. Address delivered before the Alumni Association of Haverford College, October 9th, 1885.* pp. 33, 8vo. Philadelphia, Fell & Co., 1885.

Beyer, Oberlehrer, *Die im Laufe der zeit hervorgetretenen Mängel der Unterrichts und Prüfungs-Ordnung der Realschulen I. O. Pädagogisches Archiv*, Nr. 8., October 1880, pp. 545-561.

Central-Organ für die Interessen des Realschulwesens, Nr. 12, Berlin, 25. März, 1886. Contains "einen für die Beurtheilung der Realschulfrage sehr bedeutsamen Brief des Herrn Prof. Dr. von Bezold an Geheimrath Prof. Esmarch, sowie dessen Antwort." pp. 209-214.

Das Reichskanzleramt und die Ärztliche Prüfungsordnung. pp. 22, 12mo. Leipzig. Siegismund & Volkening, 1880.

Klassizismus oder Materialismus? von einen Unbefangenen. Leipzig, Reissner, 1886. pp. 49, 8vo.

Knape, Dr. E., *Gymnasium und Realgymnasium.* Ratibor, Schmeer & Söhne, 1884. pp. 21, 8vo.

Krumme, Direktor Dr., *Rückblick auf die bisherigen Verhandlungen über die Vermehrung der Berechtigungen der Realschule. Pädagogisches Archiv.* Bd. XXIV, Nr. 1, 1882, pp. 1-32.

Krumme, Direktor Dr., *Über die durch den Besuch höherer Schulen zu erwerbenden Berichtigung.* Vortrag gehalten in der Hauptversammlung des liberalen Schulvereins Rheinlands und Westfalens zu Bochum am 11 October, 1885. pp. 15, 8vo. Stettin, Herrcke & Lebeling, 1885.

Langbein, Prof. W., *Aus einem bayrischen Realgymnasium. Pädagogisches Archiv* Nr. 10, December, 1879. pp. 689-703.

Mach, Dr. E., *Der Relative Bildungswert der Philologischen und der Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Unterrichtsfächer der Höheren Schulen.* pp. 29, 8vo. Leipzig, G. Freytag, 1886.

Meyer, Dr., Mitteilungen an die Mitglieder des Allgemeinen deutschen Realschulmänner-Vereins. *Pädagogisches Archiv*, Bd. XXVI, No. 6, 1884. pp. 365-385.

Meyer, Dr. K. Wald., Die moderne Berechtigungsjagd auf unseren höheren Schulen. Ernste pädagogische-militärische Bedenken. Hannover, Norddeutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1885. pp. 112, 12mo.

Mitteilungen an die Mitglieder des allgemeinen deutschen Realschulmänner-Vereins. V. Ausgegeben den 1. März, 1885. Redaktion: Dr. Meyer, Dortmund. Dortmund, Krüger, 1885. pp. 10, 8vo. contains "Die Stellung des Heeres zur Realschulfrage."

Mitteilungen and die Mitglieder des Allgemeinen deutschen Realschulmänner-Vereins. VI. Ausgegeben den 30. Mai, 1885. Redaktion: Dr. Meyer, Dortmund, Stettin, Herrcke & Lebeling, 1885. pp. 39, 8vo. contains "Aus dem neunten Jahresbericht der Delegierten-Versammlung des Allgemeinen deutschen Realschulmänner-Vereins in Hannover," erstattet durch Prof. Dr. Schmeding, Duisburg.

Mitteilungen an die Mitglieder des Allgemeinen deutschen Realschulmänner-Vereins I. Hamburg, 1883. pp. 20, 8vo.

Mitteilung an die Mitglieder des Allgemeinen deutschen Realschulmänner-Vereins, VIII, being the Central-Organ für die Interessen des Realschulwesens, Nos. 23, 24, June, 1886. pp. 393-460, Berlin, Friedberg & Mode, 1886.

Münck, Direcktor Dr., Die Reformbewegung auf dem Gebiete des neusprachlichen Unterrichts. Vortrag in der Versammlung rheinischen Schulmänner in Köln, 1886. *Pädagogisches Archiv* Bd. XXVIII, No. 8, 1886. pp. 520-537.

Münch, Dr. W., Der deutsche Unterricht am Realgymnasium, seine Eigenart und seine Aufgaben. Betrachtungen und Vorschläge. Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Realgymnasiums zu Barmen, Ostern, 1886. Programm Nr. 429 Barmen, Steinborn & Co., 1886. 4to, pp. 24.

Paulsen, Dr. Friedrich, Geschichte des Gelehrten Unterrichts auf den Deutschen Schulen und Universitäten vom Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zur Gegenwart. Leipzig, 1885. pp. 811, 8vo.

Perthes, Dr. Hermann, Das Latein an der Realschule und die Zulassung zum Medicinstudium. Separatabdruck aus dem *Pädagogischen Archiv*, Stettin, Von der Rahmer, 1880, pp. 50.

Pflüger, Dr. Fr. W., "Human und Realgymnasium." Ein wort zur Aufklärung an alle Gebildeten. Chemnitz, Focke, 1882. pp. 75, 8vo.

Puschmann, Dr. Th., Giebt das Gymnasium noch die geeignete Vorbildung für alle Studien? "Tägliche Rundschau, Unterhaltungs-Beilage" Nr. 168. (22 Juli), Nr. 169. (23 Juli), 1886.

Rosenthal, Dr. J., Die Vorbildung zum Universitätsstudium. Vortrag gehalten in der 9. Jahresversammlung des Allgemeinen deutschen Realschulmänner-Vereins zu Hannover am 8. April, 1885. pp. 23, 8vo. Separatabdruck aus dem *Pädagogischen Archiv*, Heft. 4.

Schmeding, Prof. Dr. F., Die Klassische Bildung in der Gegenwart. Berlin, Gebrüder Bornträger. pp. VII+204, 8vo.

Schwalbe, Prof. Dr., Über die akademische Studienfreiheit in Beziehung zur Realschulfrage. Vortrag gehalten in der ersten Sitzung des deutschen Realschulmänner-Vereins, Sektion Berlin. Winter 1881-2, am 10. November. *Pädagogisches Archiv*, Bd. XXIV, No. 2. 1882. pp. 81-104.

Steinbart, Dr. Q., Unsere Abiturienten (Fortsetzung). Ein neuer Beitrag zur Erklärung der Realschulfrage. pp. 26, 8vo. Berlin, H. W. Müller, 1881.

Steinbart, Dr. Q., Die Realschule I. O. und die beabsichtigte Revision ihres Lehrplanes. Vortrag gehalten in der Versammlung der Deligierten von Kuratorien selbständiger Realschulen I. O. und vollberichtigten höherer Bürgerschulen Rheinlands und Westfalen zu Düsseldorf den 24. Februar 1882. Duisburg, Mendelsohn, 1882. pp. 22, 8vo.

Steinbart, Dr. Q., Was uns schadet und was uns helfen wird. Bericht über den Stand der Realschulfrage, erstattet der Versammlung von Realschulfreunden zu Düsseldorf am 9. April, 1884. Separat-Abdruck aus dem Central-Organ für die Interessen des Realschulwesens XII. Jahrgang, Heft. VI. Berlin, Friedburg & Mode, 1884. pp. 12, 8vo.

Steinbart, Dr. Q. Über die Unmöglichkeit der Einheitsschule. *Pädagogisches Archiv*, Bd. XXII. No. 3, 1880. pp. 177-202.

Stengel, Prof. Dr. E., Die Ziele und Wege des Unterrichts in den neuern Sprachen. *Pädagogisches Archiv*, Bd. XXIII., Nr. 6, 1881, pp. 377-392.

Strack, Dr. M., Recension: Hofmann, Dr. A. W., Die Frage der Teilung der philosophischen Fakultät. 2 Aufl., 1881. Central-Organ für die Interessen des Realshulwesens. Neunter Jahrgan, Heft. XII. November 1881. Berlin, Friedberg & Mode.

Vielhoff, Prof. Dr. H., Betrachtungen über unser höheres Schulwesen. *Pädagogisches Archiv*, Nr. 7, August, 1883. pp. 460-511.

Wendt, Dr., Die höhere Unterrichtsfrage in England. *Pädagogisches Archiv*, Nr. 10, December, 1879. pp. 715-722.

Wiese, Dr. L., Die höheren Schulen vor dem Abgeordnetenhouse. *Pädagogisches Archiv*, Nr. 4, April, 1881. pp. 233-253.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

	PAGES.
I. Richter's Correspondence with a Lady. Some unpublished Letters.....	3- 24
By President FRANKLIN CARTER.	
II. The Aims and Methods of Collegiate Instruction in Modern Languages.....	25- 36
By Professor W. T. HEWETT.	
III. The Factitive in German.....	37- 56
By Professor SYLVESTER PRIMER.	
IV. How far should our Teaching and Text-books have a Scientific Basis?.....	57- 63
By Professor H. C. G. BRANDT.	
V. On the Genitive in Old French.....	64- 83
By Professor HANS C. G. von JAGEMANN.	
VI. The College Course in English Literature, how it may be Improved.....	84- 95
By Professor JAMES MORGAN HART.	
VII. The French Language in Louisiana and the Negro-French Dialect.....	96-111
By Professor ALCÉE FORTIER.	
VIII. A Modern Classical Course.....	112-117
By Professor F. V. N. PAINTER.	
IX. The Place of English in the College Curriculum....	118-132
By Professor TH. W. HUNT.	
X. The Collective Singular in Spanish.....	133-148
By Professor HENRY R. LANG.	
XI. A Review of Edmund Gosse's "From Shakespeare to Pôpe".....	149-155
By President HENRY E. SHEPHERD.	

	PAGES.
XII. German Classics as a Means of Education.....	156-169
By DR. JULIUS GOEBEL.	
XIII. What Place has Old English Philology in our Elementary Schools?.....	170-178
By DR. FRANCIS B. GUMMERE.	
XIV. Adjectival and Adverbial Relations; their Influence upon the Government of the Verb.....	179-194
By Professor SYLVESTER PRIMER.	
XV. The Requirements in English for Admission to College.....	195-203
By Professor JOHN G. R. McELROY.	
XVI. Remarks on the Conjugation of the Wallonian Dialect.....	204-215
By Professor J. JAMES STÜRZINGER.	
XVII. On the Use of English in Teaching Foreign Languages.....	216-226
By Professor HANS C. G. von JAGEMANN.	
XVIII. The Realgymnasium Question.....	227-250
By Professor A. MARSHALL ELLIOTT.	



PB
6
M6
v.1

Modern Language Associa
of America
Publications

**PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET**

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
